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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
On February 24, 1969, the United States Supreme Court handed down 
its decision in Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent Community School Dis­
trict (1). Not since the landmark desegregation decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education (2) had the court issued a ruling which had such a 
significant Impact on public education. Students, parents and lawyers 
were quick to recognize the importance of the Tinker decision and turned 
with increased frequency to the federal court system in attempting to 
obtain clearer determinations of student rights in the public school set­
ting. By the end of 1982, the Tinker decision had been referred to and 
cited in subsequent court decisions well over one thousand times (3). 
The news media and professional publications have been generous in 
their coverage of cases involving student rights issues, especially those 
won by students and parents. Apparently, many writers in the news media 
and professional publications felt the public needed to leam about 
court-imposed limitations on the authority of school officials. 
However, while the expansion of student rights has become better 
publicized, little media and professional coverage has been devoted to 
the other side of the student rights coin. Although students and parents 
have lost numerous decisions in state and federal courts in the 
thirteen years since Tinker was issued, little media and professional 
attention has been devoted to the area of student responsibilities. 
It was the purpose of this study to review federal court decisions 
regarding student rights issues decided and reported between the handing 
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down of the Tinker decision in February, 1969, and the beginning of 
1983, and attempt through special attention given to those decisions 
lost by students and parents to determine expressly stated and inferen­
tial delineations of legal responsibilities of students in the public 
school setting. Specifically, federal court decisions in the area of 
student rights issues were reviewed in an effort to ascertain the param­
eters of student legal responsibilities established by the federal 
courts. A review and analysis of those court decisions was expected to 
suggest to public school officials specifically, and the public gener­
ally, guidelines as to what the federal courts expect from public school 
students in terms of legal responsibilities. 
This chapter relates to the nature of the problem and the need for 
the study. The remainder of the chapter includes a discussion of pro­
cedures and techniques used in the study, delimitations, and the order 
in which the study is presented. 
Statement of the Problem 
The federal court system has been repeatedly turned to by students 
and parents attempting to obtain a clearer delineation of student rights 
in the elementary and secondary public school setting. While the param­
eters of student rights have become better defined and publicized, little 
attention has been devoted to the area of student responsibilities. 
The problem was, therefore, to determine the extent to which re­
ported decisions of the federal courts issued from February, 1969, 
through 1982 have developed or delineated, expressly or impliedly, the 
parameters of student legal responsibility. 
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Need for the Study 
Since the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Tinker, 
a considerable amount of publicity in the news media and professional 
publications has been given to the rights of students. Little attention 
has been given to issues of student responsibility. Even when a publica­
tion in its title purports to discuss both student rights and responsi­
bility, seldom is any mention of responsibilities made. 
At least one result from this one-sided publicity coverage of the 
student rights and responsibility dichotomy among educators has been a 
litigation paranoia. Often, when the public opinion polls show 
that the public desires more discipline exerted in schools, school 
officials yield in the face of expressed or implied threat of lawsuit. 
One author recently summarized the situation as follows : 
Teachers and administrators are clearly receiving 
garbled messages about education law. Increased litiga­
tion in all areas--including desegregation cases, those 
dealing with the handicapped, and even those involving 
the financing of education and educational malpractice— 
are contributing to the feeling on the part of isolated 
practitioners that the risk of lawsuit has substantially 
increased. Some of these fears, but only some of them, 
are accurately held. These feelings have real implica­
tions for the way educators actually behave in the class­
rooms and corridors of our public schools. In the coming 
decade, school personnel will be responding increasingly 
to these perceived dangers. They will be more reluctant 
to discipline students, and for seme individual?, the per­
ceived loss of freed^Tt in dealxng with their immediate 
environments may cause them to leave the profession 
altogether, (4, p. 18) 
Apparently, educators need to know and understand that merely be­
cause a student or a parent files a lawsuit, it does not mean that the 
educator will automatically lose. Educators need reinforcement in the 
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fact that they frequently win lawsuits brought against them, and that 
with even a rudimentary knowledge of the legal principles at issue, they 
can exhibit much greater fortitude in the face of threatened lawsuits. 
They need to be reminded that students and parents frequently lose law­
suits, and that often student and parent losses on student rights issues 
reflect the parameters of student responsibilities. 
The literature reviewed on this subject indicated the lack of any 
comprehensive study, or even a compilation of federal court decisions 
which were lost by students and parents on student rights issues or 
which contained inferences of students exceeding their legally-protected 
rights. A review of Comprehensive Dissertation Abstracts Database, 1861 
to January, 1983, a computerized research tool indexing Dissertation 
Abstracts International, American Doctoral Dissertations, and Comprehen­
sive Dissertation Index, indicated no record of a study which appears 
to research the legal aspects of student responsibility as delineated 
in federal court decisions. A search of E.R.I.C., a computerized data 
bank of educational materials, also revealed no titles or materia is which 
appear to deal directly with legal aspects of student responsibilities. 
The Education Index, The Index to Legal Periodicals and Current Law 
Index list numerous articles that provided helpful background and lead 
information, but only a few of them focused at all on the legal aspects 
of student responsibilities. 
An article by Elwood M. Clayton and Gene S. Jacobson identified 158 
federal and state court decisions involving student rights issues (5). 
The decisions were divided into topical areas and the number of decisions 
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in each topical area favoring school officials and those favoring stu­
dents was provided. According to the article, one hundred twenty-one of 
the decisions were rendered between 1969 and 1971. Fifty-two were re­
solved favorably toward students and sixty-nine resolved favorably toward 
school officials. Of the ninety-seven decisions rendered by the federal 
court in the period 1960-1971, forty were found to be favorable toward 
students and fifty-seven were favorable toward school officials. Sixty-
nine of the decisions were concerned with student dress codes. One of 
the conclusions reached by the authors of the article was that an in­
crease in the number of school related court cases in the future was un­
likely because precedent setting cases had already been decided which 
would result inmost school cases being settled out of court (5, p. 52). 
The article did little more than give the number of decisions 
rendered in each topical area. A substantial number of the decisions 
involved in the study were decided before the Tinker decision and many 
involved state court decisions. There was no indication in the article 
as to how court decisions which decided some issues in favor of school 
officials and some issues in favor of students were tabulated in the 
numerical counts. 
In another article, the author compiled a series of brief statements 
regarding public school authority and responsibility to establish and 
enforce rules (6). The article cited numerous supportive state court 
decisions but did not purport to be the result of a formal study. 
An article by J. Patrick Mahon was especially refreshing in that it 
quoted language from several federal court decisions that the author 
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considered supportive of the authority of school officials to maintain 
discipline (7). The article, however, did not purport to be the result 
of a formal study and was far from exhaustive in its coverage. In his 
conclusion, Mr. Mahon stated what may be the theme of this current study: 
Today, students are quick to remind educators of student 
constitutional rights. Educators should be just as quick 
to remind students of student responsibilities. (7, p. 72) 
This study was intended to provide a comprehensive review of re­
ported federal court decisions rendered between February 1969, and 
January, 1983, regarding student responsibilities. Special emphasis was 
placed on those decisions won by school officials and those decisions 
which have established express or inferential parameters of student re­
sponsibilities. The study was undertaken with the desire that the in­
formation collected would prove useful to school officials and employees 
in their dealings with student rights and responsibilities issues. For 
the purpose of this study, various expressly stated and inferential 
parameters of student legal responsibilities, as discussed by the federal 
courts, were categorized by the legal issues raised by the litigants. 
Procedures and Techniques Used in this Study 
The research referred to in this study has been almost entirely 
limited to primary source data. Those data consist of federal court de­
cisions contained in the National Reporter System. The National Reporter 
System is published by the West Publishing Company and contains complete 
reported decisions from all federal courts with jurisdiction in the 
United States. Location of appropriate court decisions published in 
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the National Reporter System has been achieved through use of The Federal 
Practice Digest, 2d, The American Law Reports, The Shepard Citation to 
Court Cases and Statutes, The Corpus Juris Secundum, and The American 
Jurisprudence, 2d. Secondary sources of information include journals 
and publications of the education profession, law reviews and journals 
and other publications offering commentary regarding student responsi­
bilities. 
The primary method utilized for locating relevant court decisions 
for review has been the federal Practices Digest, 2d which contained 
brief summary statements of points of law discussed in each reported 
court decision. Each point of law was indexed through West Publishing 
Company's copyrighted "key" numbering system. Once relevant portions of 
decisions were located, additional decisions were found through use of 
the "key" numbering system and The Shepard Citation to Court Casus and 
Statutes. 
Delimitations 
Due to the fact that federal courts at the district, court of appeals 
and supreme court levels review and decide many different types of edu­
cation law issues, this study was limited to the following: 
a. Reported federal court decisions involving public 
elementary and secondary school students. 
b. Reported federal court decisions involving public 
postsecondary students which contain important impli­
cations for the exercise of legal rights and respon­
sibilities by public elementary and secondary students. 
c. Reported federal court decisions issued from February, 
1969 through 1982. 
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d. Reported federal court decisions whose principles 
affect student 1 gal rights and responsibilities. 
e. Reported federal court decisions which address only 
questions of student legal responsibilities. 
f. Reported federal court decisions from which inferences 
can be drawn regarding questions of student responsi­
bilities . 
It was the purpose of this study to attempt to capture the essence 
of relevant federal court decisions which aid in the delineation of 
parameters of student responsibilities. While a thorough review of rele­
vant federal court decisions was undertaken, not necessarily all relevant 
court decisions have been reviewed or reported in this study. 
Definition of Terms 
The term "student rights" was used in this study to refer to those 
aspects of student conduct and discipline over which the power and 
authority of public school officials is greatly limited by constitutional 
constraints on their exercise of power and authority. 
The term "student responsibilities" was used in this study to refer 
to those aspects of student conduct and discipline over which the power 
and authority of public school officials are not greatly limited by con­
stitutional constraints. Because courts seldom delineate student respon­
sibilities in express terms, it has been an important aspect of this 
study to attempt to draw inferences of student responsibilities from fed­
eral court application of points of law to specific factual circumstances. 
For the purposes of this study, unless it was otherwise clear from the 
facts of the decision, when students or parents lost a lawsuit involving 
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student conduct against public school officials on substantive issues 
of law, rather than technical and procedural issues, it has been inferred 
that the students involved have breached their legal responsibilities 
as students. 
The tern "parameter" was used in this study to refer to scope, 
limits, extent and dimensions. When used in the context of student 
rights and responsibilities, it included flexible, indefinite and dis­
cernible lines of delineation of student rights and responsibilities. 
The term "federal court" refers to all United States district courts, 
courts of appeals and the supreme court. Each state and territory in 
the United States is divided into one or more districts presided over by 
a federal district court. All of the district courts are divided into 
judicial areas called circuits and are presided over by a court of ap­
peals. The court of appeals for each circuit is superior in power and 
authority to all the district courts within the circuit. There are cur­
rently thirteen circuit courts of appeals with jurisdiction over states, 
territories and the District of Columbia. During most of the time period 
covered by this study there were eleven courts of appeal (see Appendix). 
All district courts and circuit courts of appeals are under the power and 
authority of the United States Supreme Court. Its rulings are "the law 
of the land." Litigation in the federal courts usually begins at the 
district court level. If one or more of the parties to the lawsuit in 
district court are not satisfied with the decision rendered, they may 
appeal to the circuit court of appeals with jurisdiction over that dis­
trict court. Litigants dissatisfied with circuit court decisions may 
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appeal to the supreme court. The supreme court has discretion and 
authority, in most cases, to decide whether or not it will accept and re­
view an appeal frcni a decision of a circuit court. If an appeal fran a 
circuit court decision is not made or is not accepted by the supreme 
court and if a district court decision is not appealed to a circuit 
court, the last decision rendered is the final decision in the matter. 
Organization of the Study 
This study is organized into chapters related to the following 
topics : 
Chapter I. Introduction 
Chapter II. The Tinker Decision 
Chapter III. Speech and Expression 
Chapter IV. Press and Distributions 
Chapter V. Procedural Due Process 
Chapter VI. Validity of School Rules 
Chapter VII. Search and Seizure 
Chapter VIII. Dress Codes 
Chapter IX. Corporal Punishment 
Chapter X. Other Issues 
Chapter XI. Summary and Conclusions 
Except for Chapters I, II, and XI, each chapter deals with specific 
areas of the law reviewed by federal courts. This study was divided in 
such a manner because of the various differing legal principles involved 
and because of the varying degrees of express and inferential student 
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responsibility found in each of the areas. Many chapters contain brief 
statements of the current status of student rights on the specific 
issues considered. This was to create a better perspective for compar­
ing and contrasting student rights and responsibilities. The largest 
portion of each chapter was normally devoted to a discussion of those 
federal court decisions \rtiich had ramifications for the determination of 
student responsibilities. 
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CHAPTER II. THE TINKER DECISION 
This chapter contains a discussion of the Itoited States Supreme 
Court decision entitled Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent Community School 
District (1). Tinker has been, and continues to be, one of the most im­
portant and influential court decisions regarding public education. 
While the United States Supreme Court had previously ruled in a number 
of decisions that actions of public school officials are controlled by 
the provisions of the constitution. Tinker was the first decision in 
which constitutional rights of students collided directly with public 
school officials' authority to maintain school discipline. Because of 
that importance in broadening federal court focus on student rights 
issues, this entire chapter has been devoted to a discussion of the 
Tinker decision. 
î©ny persons familiar with the Tinker decision remember what the 
decision said about student rights, but few remember the Tinker decision 
for what it also said about student responsibilities. It is the purpose 
of this chapter to review and underscore the importance of the Tinker 
decision in the delineation of legal parameters of student responsi­
bilities . 
Tinker 
The Tinker decision involved several students in the Des Moines, 
Iowa, public school system, aged eight to 16 years, and their parents. 
They alleged that the Des Moines school authorities infringed upon the 
13 
students* constitutional rights because they would not allow the stu­
dents to wear black armbands to school as a form of symbolic protest. 
The factual basis on which the court decision was made arose in early 
December, 1965, when a group of parents and their children met in a pri­
vate home in Des Moines and decided to publicize their objections to the 
conflict then raging in Vietnam and their support for a military truce. 
It was determined, by those present at the meeting, that they would make 
their opinions known by wearing two-inch wide black strips of cloth on 
the upper part of one arm during the forthcoming holiday season and by 
fasting for two days during the holiday season. 
Des Moines school principals became aware of the students' plans 
to wear black armbands to school and at a meeting on December 14, they 
adopted a rule prohibiting the wearing of armbands to school. Under 
the policy, students wearing armbands would first be asked to remove 
them, and if the request was refused, the student would be suspended 
from school until he or she agreed to return to school without the arm­
band. The three students involved as plaintiffs in the lawsuit were 
aware of the rule. 
On December 16, two of the student plaintiffs wore black armbands 
to school in violation of the recently promulgated rule, and the next 
day the third did likewise. They were all suspended from school and 
their return was conditioned upon their returning to school without the 
armbands. The students did not return to school until after New Year's 
Day, the expiration date of their planned period for wearing the arm­
bands. 
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The student's parents filed a lawsuit in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Iowa under the provisions of 42 United 
States Code, Section 1983, alleging that Des Moines school officials, 
by their actions, violated the constitutional rights of the students in­
volved. In the lawsuit, the parents sought nominal damages and an order 
from the court which would restrain Des Moines school officials from 
disciplining the students. After an evidentiary hearing, the district 
court dismissed the lawsuit. The court found that the school officials' 
actions were reasonable in order to prevent disorder and interruption of 
school discipline (8). 
The students and their parents appealed the district court decision 
to the court of appeals for the eighth circuit where, because of the im­
portance of the case, arguments were heard and considered by all eight 
judges in that circuit rather than the customary three judge panel which 
normally heard appeals. The appeals court was equally divided on the 
legal issues before it and the division had the result of affirming the 
district court's decision. No written opinion was issued (9). 
The United States Supreme Court agreed to review the case (10) and 
oral arguments were heard by the justices on November 12, 1968. A deci­
sion was rendered on February 24, 1969. The majority of the justices 
voted to reverse the district court decision and ruled in favor of the 
students. Two justices wrote dissenting opinions. 
The supreme court majority ruled that the Des Moines students in­
volved in expressing their views on the Vietnam conflict did not forfeit 
the right of expression merely because they were minors under the 
15 
authority of public school officials. The court found the students were 
engaged in the expression of views in a manner involving "... direct, 
primary First Amendment rights akin to 'pure speech'" (1, p. 508, 89 S. 
Ct. at 737). As such, public school officials could not, in the absence 
of a material and substantial disruption of the operation of the school, 
prohibit or interfere with their expression of views. As the court 
stated in its often quoted language: 
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment, are available to 
teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either 
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights of 
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. 
This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for al­
most 50 years. (1, p. 506, 89 S. Ct. at 736) 
The result of the majority holding was that students in the nation's 
public schools could not thereafter be disciplined for or prohibited from 
engaging in speech and actions of expression protected by the first 
amendment, unless material and substantial interference with the educa­
tional process occurred or could reasonably be predicted by school offi­
cials . No interference with nondisruptive student protest would be 
allowed merely because student actions were considered controversial by 
the school authorities. There were, in the court's opinion, facts which 
led it to believe that the Des Moines school officials were attempting 
to prohibit the expression of one particular opinion, and it stated con­
clusively, that in the absence of material and substantial interruption 
of the school environment, it was not constitutionally permissible to do 
so. 
The earliest outcry as to the potential adverse effects of the 
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Tinker decision on school discipline was immediate in the form of a 
stinging dissent to the majority decision written by Justice Hugo Black. 
His remarks were SOTietimes sarcastic, sometimes philosophical, sometimes 
biting, but seldom moderate• He wrote sarcastically: 
The original idea of schools, which I do not believe is 
yet abandoned as worthless or out of date, was that chil­
dren had not yet reached the point of experience and 
wisdom which enable them to teach all of their elders. 
It may be that the Nation has outworn the old-fashioned 
slogan that "children are to be seen not heard," but one 
may, I hope, be permitted to harbor the thought that 
taxpayers send children to school on the premise that at 
their age they need to learn, not teach. (1, ?. 522, 
89 S. Ct. at 745) 
He wrote more philosophically: 
We cannot close our eyes to the fact that some of the 
country's greatest problems are crimes committed by the 
youth, too many of school age. School discipline, like 
parental discipline, is an integral and important part 
of training our children to be good citizens—to be 
better citizens. Here a very small number of students 
have crisply and summarily refused to obey a school 
order designed to give pupils who want to leam the 
opportunity to do so. One does not have to be a prophet 
or the son of a prophet to know that after the Court's 
holding today some students in Iowa schools and indeed 
in all schools will be ready, able and willing to defy 
their teachers on practically all orders. (1, pp. 524-25, 
89 S. Ct. at 746) 
In reading his concluding remarks, one can almost imagine heated ink 
flowing from his pen: 
Students engaged in such activities [violent protests] are 
apparently confident that they know far more about hew to 
operate public school systems than do their parents, 
teachers and elected school officials. It is no answer to 
say that the particular students here have not yet reached 
such high points in their demands to attend classes in 
order to exercise their political pressures. Turned loose 
with lawsuits for damages and injunctions against their 
teachers as they are here, it is nothing but wishful think­
ing to imagine that young, immature students will not soon 
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believe it is their right to control the schools rather 
than the right of the States that collect the taxes to 
hire the teachers for the benefit of the pupils. This 
case, therefore, wholly without constitutional reasons 
in my judgment, subjects all the public schools in the 
country to the whims and caprices of their loudest-
mouthed, but maybe not their brightest students. I, 
for one, am not fully persuaded that school pupils are 
wise enough, even with this Court's expert help from 
Washington, to run the 23,390 public school systems in 
our 50 States, I wish therefore, wholly to disclaim any 
purpose on my part to hold that the Federal Constitu­
tion compels the teachers, parents, and elected school 
officials to surrender control of the American public 
school system to public school students. I dissent, 
(1, pp. 525-26, 89 S. Ct. at 746) 
The fears expressed by Black in his dissent apparently had some 
effect on the final language approved by the majority when it issued its 
decision in Tinker. Writing for the majority. Justice Abe Portas obvi­
ously took great pain in his drafting to allay the concerns raised in 
Black's dissent. He underscored the court's longstanding position of 
affirming the comprehensive authority of school officials to presc-ibe 
and control student conduct within the school within constitutional con­
straints (1, p. 507, 89 S. Ct. at 737) and repeatedly distinguished the 
facts in the case from one in which actual disruption of the school envi­
ronment had occurred. 
Justice Portas repeatedly stated that the record in the case before 
the district court was devoid of any indication of significant disruption 
occurring in the educational environment as a result of students wearing 
black armbands to school. He clearly implied that had violence or sub­
stantial disruption actually occurred, the result of the decision would 
have been different. Justice Portas noted no less than four times in the 
opinion the absence of disruptive conduct and even the absence of 
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potential for disruptive conduct by those student participating in the 
protest. The majority opinion reads as follows; 
As we shall discuss, the wearing of armbands in the cir­
cumstances of this case was entirely divorced from actu­
ally or potentially disruptive conduct by those partici­
pating in it. (1, p. 505, 89 S. Ct. at 736) 
It also reads as follows; 
The school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners 
for a silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied 
by any disorder or disturbance on the part of petitioners. 
There is here no evidence whatever of petitioners' interfer­
ence, actual or nascent, with the schools' work or of colli­
sion with the rights of other students to be secure and to 
be let alone. Accordingly, this case doss not concern speech 
or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the 
rights of other students. 
Only a few of the 18,000 students in the school system 
wore the black armbands. Only five students were suspended 
for wearing them. There is no indication that the work of 
the schools or any class was disrupted. Outside the class­
rooms, a few students made hostile remarks to the children 
wearing armbands, but there were no threats or acts of 
violence on school premises. (Emphasis added.) (1, p. 508, 
89 S. Ct. at 736) 
And : 
In order for the State in the person of school officials 
to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, 
it must be able to show that its action was caused by some­
thing more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and un­
pleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. 
Certainly where there was no finding and no showing that en­
gaging in the forbidden conduct would "materially and substan­
tially interfere with the requirements of appropriate dis­
cipline in the operation of the school," the prohibition can­
not be sustained. (Citation omitted.) 
In the present case, the District Court made no such find­
ing, and our independent examination of the record fails to 
yield evidence that the school authorities had reason to antic­
ipate that the wearing of the armbands would substantially 
interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights 
of other students. (Emphasis added.) (1, p. 509, 89 S. Ct. at 738) 
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It certainly appears from the language quoted above that the major­
ity on the court attempted to highlight a delineation between student 
conduct deemed to be acceptable when exercising constitutionally-pro­
tected rights, and the point at which students go too far in that exer­
cise and in fact infringe upon the rights of others. Even the conclud­
ing remarks of Portas' opinion for the majority emphasizes the point. 
The opinion reads as follows; 
As we have discussed, the record does not demonstrate 
any facts which might reasonably have led school authori­
ties to forecast substantial disruption of or material inter­
ference with school activities, and no disturbances or dis­
orders on the school premises in fact occurred. These 
petitioners merely went about their ordained rounds in school. 
Their deviation consisted only in wearing on their sleeve a 
band of black cloth, not more than two inches wide. They 
wore it to exhibit their disapproval of the Vietnam hostili­
ties and their advocacy of a truce, to make their views known, 
and by their example, to influence others to adopt them. 
They neither interrupted school activities nor sought to in­
trude in the school affairs or the lives of others. They 
caused discussion outside of the classrooms, but not inter­
ference with work and no disorder. In the circumstances, 
our Constitution does not permit officials of the State to 
deny their form of expression. (Emphasis added.) 
(1. p. 514. 89 S. Ct. at 740) 
It is obvious that the majority in Tinker drew a clear delineation 
between student exercise of protected rights and student conduct which 
exceeded constitutional protection. Under Tinker, students exercising 
constitutionally-protected first amendment rights may do so without 
interference fran or discipline imposed by public school officials, only 
so long as the acts of the students do not create disorder which materi­
ally and substantially disrupts the school environment. Actions by stu­
dents resulting in serious disruption to the school environment do not 
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carry consitutional protections. 
Thus, while the Tinker decision permits unfettered the nondisrup-
tive expression of opinions by students, such as the "silent witness" 
of black armbands, it does not follow that a student may, as a matter of 
right, voice his or her opinion on the Vietnam War, or any subject in the 
middle of à mathematics class. Such an act clearly infringes upon the 
rights of other students and teachers to exist in an environment con­
ducive to educational pursuits. As a result of the Tinker decision, stu­
dents, even when exercising constitutionally-protected rights, have the 
responsibility of not infringing upon the rights of others. The Tinker 
majority expressly stated as much: 
conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for 
any reason--whether it stems from time, place, or type of 
behavior--materially disrupts classwork or involves sub­
stantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, 
of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee 
of freedom of speech. (1, p. 513, 89 S. Ct. at 740) 
This view of a delineation between disruptive and nondisruptive con­
duct of students exercising constitutionally-protected rights is rein­
forced by action taken by the supreme court about two weeks after the 
rendering of the Tinker decision. On March 10, 1969, the court refused 
to hear an appeal by students in the case of Barker v. Hardway (11). The 
facts in Barker involved a violent student demonstration which resulted 
in damage to property and personal injury on a college campus. While 
there is nothing unusual in the court's denial to hear an appeal, it is 
unusual for one of the justices to make written comment about the denial. 
Justice Portas, however, felt the necessity to clearly delineate a 
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factual distinction between Tinker and Barker. That distinction being 
between students disciplined for expressing their opinions as opposed to 
students disciplined for their disruptive behavior. Justice Portas 
stated in Barker as follows : 
I agree that certiorari should be denied. The petitioners 
were suspended from college not for expressing their opin­
ions on a matter of substance, but for violent and destruc­
tive interference with the rights of others. An adequate 
hearing was afforded them on the issue of suspension. The 
petitioners contend that their conduct was protected by the 
First Amendment, but the findings of the District Court, which 
were accepted by the Court of Appeals, establish that the 
petitioners here engaged in an aggressive and violent demon­
stration, and not in peaceful nondisruptive expression such 
as was involved in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District [citation omitted]. The petitioners' conduct 
was therefore clearly not protected by the First and Four­
teenth Amendments . (12) 
Summary 
It is quite clear the opinion of the majority in Tinker, perhaps as 
a result of having to defend itself in light of Justice Black's sharp dis­
sent, drew a relatively distinct line of demarkation between student 
rights and student responsibilities. Clearly, at the point student exer­
cise of first amendment rights exceed that which is protected, a respon­
sibility arises to not infringe upon the right of others to the enjoy­
ment of a peaceful educational environment. When students exceed their 
constitutionally-protected rights through the infringement of the rights 
of others, they can expect to be subject to punishment imposed by school 
authorities and school officials can expect the federal courts not to 
interfere in the carrying out of their duty to maintain order in the 
schools. 
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While the Tinker decision did not clearly delineate facts which 
would enable a person to determine when students exceed their constitu­
tionally-protected activity in all circumstances, it did establish the 
parameters of protected and unprotected student conduct. It left the 
further development of the delineation in specific given circumstances 
to subsequent court decisions. Many of those subsequent decisions which 
have given greater clarity to the issue are the subject of the remain­
ing chapters in this study. 
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CHAPTER III, SPEECH AND EXPRESSION 
This chapter is a review of federal court decisions involving 
issues of free speech and expression in the public school setting. Only 
a few of the court decisions won by students are discussed. Emphasis 
here has been given to those court decisions in which students and par­
ents have sued school officials for alleged violation of constitution­
ally-protected rights of free speech and expression and have lost or in 
which the courts have established express or implied parameters of stu­
dent responsibilities. 
Student Rights 
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in 
part, prohibits government interference in the area of "freedom of 
speech." Courts have by definition broadened the term "speech" to in­
clude the use of symbolic speech and actions which form a protected 
freedom of expression. This was discussed somewhat in the Tinker deci­
sion and resulted in a decision by the supreme court in that case that 
the students' wearing of black armbands as a symbolic protest to Ameri­
can involvement in the Vietnamese conflict was "akin to 'pure speech'" 
(1, pp. 505-506, 89 S. Ct. at 736-37). 
Clearly the most important federal court decision involving speech 
and expression of rights of students in the public schools is Tinker. 
That decision stated very clearly that minor age public school students 
do not lose their constitutional protections merely because they are in 
24 
the school environment. The court ruled, as was discussed in Chapter 
II, that unless school officials can establish that a material and sub­
stantial disruption of the school environment actually occurred or could 
reasonably be predicted, the rights of students to speak freely and ex­
press their opinions cannot be abridged. 
The position taken by the court in Tinker has been expressly followed 
in many subsequent federal court decisions. For instance, a result simi­
lar to that in Tinker occurred in Aguirre v. Tahuka Independent School 
District (13), where a school rule against wearing "apparel decoration 
that is disruptive, distracting, or provocative," was held unconstitu­
tional by the court. The Aguirre case involved students of Mexican de­
scent who wore brown armbands as expression and support for their view 
that educational policies, unspecified by the court, were unfair and 
should be corrected. The court found that disruption alleged by school 
officials to have resulted from the armbands was not supported by the 
evidence and ruled that the students' conduct was protected by the consti­
tution. The court rejected the school officials' argument that the 
wearing of the armbands in and of itself was disruptive. 
In Aguirre, the court's decision was based in large part on the 
determination that because the rule had been promulgated the day after 
the students first began wearing the armbands, the rule had been devel­
oped specifically to address the practice. Such restraint, in the ab­
sence of a showing of material and substantial disruption, was clearly 
prohibited by the First Amendment as interpreted in Tinker. 
Another armband decision which found in favor of the students 
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involved was Butts v. Dallas Independent School District (14). The 
Butts case involved a school regulation interpreted by school officials 
as prohibiting the wearing of black armbands to school in support of 
the "Vietnam Moratorium of October 15, 1969." School officials felt the 
wearing of armbands would be disruptive to the school environment and 
contrary to a long-standing school rule. While the district court agreed 
that the school officials had reasonably predicted a potential disrup­
tion of the school environment, and upheld the actions of school offi­
cials, the court of appeals for the fifth court ruled that as a result 
of Tinker a high standard of protection for student expression is re­
quired and reversed the district court. The court of appeals ruled that 
the record did not disclose any substantial facts that indicated to it 
that protesting students would cause a serious disruption. The school 
officials' primary fear was that nonprotesting students would start 
fights with protesting students. The court of appeals ordered the 
school officials involved to refrain from interfering with the students' 
exercise of free expression. 
An unusual argument of protected expression was also upheld by a 
federal court in Fricke v. Lynch (15). In the Fricke case, a male stu­
dent argued that his attendance at the high school prom with a male escort 
was a statement favoring equal rights for homosexuals. School officials 
argued that allowing the boy to take a male date to the prom would pre­
dictably result in violence and disruption. They established in testi­
mony that another male student's request to take a male date to the prom 
the previous year had resulted in his being physically attacked and 
26 
injured while at school and that the boy currently requesting permission 
to bring a male escort was actually attacked and beaten while at school 
the day after he filed the lawsuit. 
The court acknowledged that the likelihood for violence existed but 
raised the question of whether the school should prohibit the speech, 
or protect the speaker. It decided that since the assignment of a 
principal to accompany the boys while in school had previously ended 
the attacks upon both of them, school officials had established that they 
were in a good position to take appropriate measures to control the risk 
of harm. Since protecting the student was less restrictive than stop­
ping the student's act of expression, the court said that the school 
was obligated to seek the least restrictive alternative. 
It is possible that the decision in Fricke was based, in part, on the 
fact that the prom was an optional school social event and had no direct 
effect on the educational environment. Had the issue been more closely 
tied to the learning environment, a different result might have occurred. 
Student Responsibilities 
The obvious—violence 
From a reading of the Tinker decision, it is fairly obvious that 
conduct in the school setting that is inhibiting, loud, boisterous and 
violent in nature is not protected by the constitutional safeguards of 
the First Amendment. Nevertheless, as obvious as that may be to some 
persons, others involved in such conduct are not precluded from at least 
alleging that their rights have been violated. 
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Such was the case of Rhyne v. Childs (16). The facts in Rhyne 
showed that a general melee between blacks and whites had erupted in the 
school. One of the students bringing the lawsuit had refused to stop 
fighting when ordered to do so by a school official, and after being 
forcefully restrained, continued to provoke the other combatants into re­
newing the fighting. Another student plaintiff threatened a school 
official with a wooden stool after the official had intervened in another 
fight. Three of the students blocked one teacher's reentry to the school 
building from the school's parking lot and threatened the teacher with 
physical injury. Some of the students involved left their classrooms, 
blocked hallways and went into other classrooms attempting to persuade 
nonparticipating students to leave their classes. A number of the stu­
dents involved in the violent conduct were suspended with readmittance 
conditioned upon a conference between the students, parents and school 
officials. At least one student was disrespectf"' -f' uncooperative at 
the conference. 
The federal courts involved with Bhyne had little difficulty in 
ruling on the facts of the case that the students had exceeded the con­
duct which is protected by the First Amendment. The discipline imposed 
by the school officials was upheld. 
Similar results occurred in Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish (17), 
and Esteban v. Central Missouri State College (18). The former case in­
volved a demonstration against racial discrimination at a high school 
which became violent and disruptive and the latter involved college stu­
dents suspended for being involved in mass demonstrations which resulted 
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in property damage and participants being disrespectful toward school 
officials. 
Student demonstrations do not necessarily have to be violent and 
destructive to be a material and substantial disruption of the educational 
environment, however. In HSynes v. Dallas County Junior College Dis­
trict (19), several students were standing in the lobby of the school 
administration building discussing grievances they believed they had 
toward the administration of the college. Other students both supportive 
of and opposed to administration policy gathered until a crowd of at 
least 200 noisy and impassioned students had congregated. The mass of 
students was not destructive or violent, but it did block access to the 
college bookstore, and stairways to classrooms. The dean of students 
approached the group and asked its members to either disperse or continue 
the discussion in fewer numbers in his office. The students refused to 
leave immediately but did disperse shortly after the dean left the scene. 
A number of the students were suspended from school for their conduct 
and challenged their suspensions in federal court. The district court 
upheld the suspensions and noted that the students were not punished for 
expressing their views but were instead punished for causing a disturb­
ance . 
Other armband cases 
No one should understand the Tinker decision to say that the wearing 
of armbands in all circumstances is protected expression. The ruling in 
Tinker, as in any other court decision, must be considered in its total 
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factual context. A very clear inference was created in Tinker by 
Justice Portas' repeated reference to the absence of disruptive acts or 
a reasonable prediction of disruptive acts in that case. Actions of 
expression by students in the school setting are not protected when 
material and substantial disruption occurs or is reasonably predictable. 
Just such a situation of reasonable prediction of disruption oc­
curred in a case of Hill v. Lewis (20), which was rendered almost exactly 
two years after Tinker. The facts in Hill and Tinker are somewhat simi­
lar in that public school students were suspended from school for re­
fusing to remove armbands they wore to protest the Vietnamese conflict. 
After that, however, the facts are clearly distinguishable. The North 
Carolina high school involved in Hill was located only four miles from 
the Fort Bragg Military Reservation and was within ei^t miles of Pope 
Air Force Base. The high school had an enrollment of 1,653 students, 
and thirty-eight percent of the students had a parent on active military 
duty and an additional sixteen percent had a parent who was a federal 
employee. When sane students proposed to wear black armbands to school 
in support of the "National Moratorium," other students threatened to 
wear red, white, and blue armbands as a protest against the protestors. 
Some of the teachers felt that a confrontation between the groups was 
possible. On the day before the moratorium, some students distributed 
leaflets soliciting support for the moratorium and the wearing of black 
armbands to school the next day. 
On the day of the moratorium, between twenty-five and fifty students 
wore armbands to school. Some wore black armbands, some wore red, white 
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and blue, and a third group of students wore black gloves or black 
scarves. Some students received armbands from their fellow students 
after they entered the school building. 
The school's teachers were notified by administrators to refuse ad­
mittance to class to any student wearing an armband of any color, and to 
send to the office anyone who refused to remove an armband. Most pro­
testing students complied with teachers' requests to remove the armbands, 
but there were examples of refusals to comply and some disrespect and 
belligerency was shown toward teachers and other school officials. 
As the beginning of the school day approached, tension ran high. 
Several groups of students partially blocked hallways, and some moved 
noisily down the halls. Some students chanted. Protesting students 
solicited others to join their ranks. The situation was later described 
by witnesses as "volatile." "explosive." and "very tense." 
Some of the students disciplined by school officials challenged their 
actions in federal district court and the court found on the record be­
fore it that the school officials, in taking the actions they did, acted 
with a reasonable apprehension of disruption and violence. There was, 
according to the court, substantial evidence to reasonably lead school 
officials to forecast material and substantial disruption of the school's 
activities and acts infringing upon the rights of other students. The 
school officials, therefore, were found not to have violated the rights 
of the protesting students. In effect, the court in Hill found that the 
protesting students, through exercise of their right of expression in a 
noisy, belligerent manner, were interfering with the rights of the 
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nonprotesting students. The court's discussion of the point reads as 
follows : 
The educational opportunities thus proved are free of charge 
to all children who desire an education. Fortunately, the 
vast majority of children attend school for that purpose. 
Surely, their constitutional right to an education under 
school conditions conducive to that end must be paramount 
to any rights of those who would disrupt the process. In 
the balancing of First Amendment rights the duty of the State 
to operate its public school system for the benefit of all 
its children must be protected even if governmental regula­
tions incidentally limit the untranmeled exercise of speech, 
symbolic or otherwise, by those who would impede the educa­
tion of those who desire to leam. The interest of the 
State is superior to the rights of the protestants, (20, p. 59) 
A similar result occurred in a Pennsylvania case. In Wise v. Sauers 
(21), an eleventh-grade student was disciplined for refusing to remove 
an armband. The events involved in the Wise decision occurred a few 
days after the May 4, 1972, killing of four persons by National Guard 
on the Kent State University campus. There was a tense and uneasy 
atmosphere in the Wise boy's school when he was called into the princi­
pal's office on May 7 for wearing an armband with the word "strike" on 
it. He was told that he and the other students could not wear armbands 
with the words "strike" or "rally" on them. He was f.oid that the two 
terms advocated disruption and violation of the state's laws on compul­
sory attendance. He was informed that students could wear plain arm­
bands of any color or armbands with only a peace symbol. Armbands with 
other wording on them were prohibited. The Wise boy complied with the 
principal's request to remove his armband with the word "strike" on it. 
A few days later, however, the boy wore another armband to school 
with the phrase "stop the killing" printed on it. This time when the 
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principal asked him to remove the armband, he refused and was suspended 
from school. In upholding the principal's actions, the court summed up 
its reasoning as follows: 
The temporary restriction by the school against the wearing 
of the armbands with the words "strike," "rally" and "stop 
the killing" was not related to the suppression of "pure 
speech" or to the popularity or unpopularity of the ideas 
sought to be expressed thereby, or the administrator's view 
of the same. The restriction was related to the potentially 
disruptive situation at the school at that time. . . . The 
refusal of a student to obey the reasonable requests in this 
case was insubordinate and unprotected activity. (21, p. 93) 
One armband decision which found against school officials on the 
facts of the case still reinforced the concept of a special environment 
found in the educational setting. The court in Butts v. Dallas Independ­
ent School District (14) found on the facts before it that no substantial 
disruption actually occurred or could have reasonably been predicted as 
a result of students wearing black armband to school but stated as 
follows : 
Therefore, even in the school environment, where no doubt 
restraints are necessary that the First Amendment would 
not tolerate on the street, something more is required 
to establish that they would cause "disruption" than the 
ex cathedra pronouncement of the Superintendent. 
As to the existence of such circumstances, they [school 
officials] are the judges, and if within the range where 
reasonable minds may differ, their decisions will govern. 
But, there must be some inquiry, and establishment of sub­
stantial fact, to buttress the determination. (14, p. 732) 
The right to the enjoyment of a peaceful and calm school environment 
for nonprotesting students is not the only right which may be protected 
from protesters wearing armbands. In the case of Williams v. Eaton (22), 
black players on the University of Wycsning football team were dismissed 
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from the team for their efforts to wear black armbands during a football 
game with Brigham Young University. The black players wanted to protest 
the anti-black admission policies of Brigham Young and the Morman Church 
which supports Brigham Young. 
When challenged for their actions, Wyoming Iftiiversity officials, 
like the black athletes, defended their actions on first amendment grounds. 
They argued that their acts were in furtherance of the established first 
amendment policy of religious neutrality on the part of government in­
stitutions. They argued that allowing the football team members of a 
state supported school to wear black armbands to protest a policy of the 
opposing school based upon religious belief was a hostile expression by 
its team members toward the beliefs of a religious group, and that such 
action was constitutionally prohibited. In weighing the students' rights 
of expression and the school's responsibility to maintain religious 
neutrality, the court found in favor of the school officials. 
Other symbolic expression 
Federal courts have dealt with issues of symbolic expression in 
areas other than armbands. In the Colorado case of Hernandez v. School 
District Number One (23), the issue revolved around the wearing of black 
berets. At the beginning of the school year, a group of students of 
Mexican descent requested and received permission fraa the principal to 
wear berets and long hair while in school. They argued the berets and 
long hair would serve as symbols of Mexican culture, unity among Mexican-
Americans, dissatisfaction with society's treatment of their race and 
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their desire to improve that treatment. The principal, who was himself 
of Mexican descent, permitted the wearing of black berets and long hair 
on a trial basis, and for a time, no problems arose. 
Many of the same students later requested that they be allowed to 
leave classes on September 16 to participate in a Mexican Independence 
Day parade and demonstration. Even though there had been problems of 
disruption and violence at another high school in the city the previous 
September, the principal approved the students' request. In conjunction 
with the September 16 celebration, the school sponsored special programs 
on Mexican heritage and culture. 
After September 16, the peaceful environment of the school rapidly 
deteriorated. Students wearing the berets became arrogant and boisterous 
and tried to run the affairs of the school. The black beret became a 
symbol of the students' power to disrupt the conduct of the school and 
the exercise of control over the student body. 
Many students wearing black berets became engaged in disruptive 
activities. They walked down the halls of the school during class time 
shouting "Chicano power," blocked hallways, refused to identify them­
selves to teachers or explain why they were in the halls during class 
time. They showed disrespect for teachers, tried to persuade other stu­
dents to leave the classroom to join them in the halls and caused dis­
turbances in the cafeteria, in general, the students wearing the black 
berets created an atmosphere of apprehension, tension and disruption in 
the school 
In an effort to call attention to the growing problem, nonprotesting 
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students threatened to form vigilante groups. School officials tried 
with a mixed result to persuade the protesting students to refrain from 
disrupting the school. Finally, because the beret had become a symbol 
of disruption, students were ordered to refrain from wearing the berets 
in school. Those who refused to comply with the order were suspended. 
When the suspended students challenged school officials' actions in 
court, the court hearing the case did not have a difficult time deciding 
on the facts that the students wearing the berets had exceeded their 
constitutionally-protected right of expression. The court reemphasized 
the proposition that disruptive conduct is not protected by the consti­
tution. 
Not enough emphasis can be placed on the point that the specific 
facts of each case of exercise of constitutional rights plays a large 
part in the final outcome. In Hernandez, black berets and long hair in 
themselves did not produce disruption of the educational environment. 
It was the acts of the students associated with the berets and long hair 
which caused the disruption. 
In some situations, however, it is the symbol itself which may be 
the root of the problem. In the decision in Melton v. Young (24), the 
provocative symbol was a replica of the Confederate flag worn as a shoul­
der patch on a jacket. 
The facts in Melton arose in Chattanooga, Tennessee, a city that had 
been racked during 1969 by racial violence. Previously all-white schools 
in the community had been forced to desegregate. The specific school 
at issue in the case had been all white, had "Rebels" as the school 
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nickname, the Confederate flag as the school symbol and "Dixie" as the 
school pep song. 
During the 1969-70 school year, the school had blacks enrolled for 
the first time, and the school had to be closed twice due to racial dis­
turbances . Much of the protest within the school was directed toward 
the school's symbol, pep song and nickname. In September and October, 
1969, black students walked out of pep assemblies protesting the use of 
the Confederate flag and the playing of "Dixie," At the half-time of 
one of the football games, black students tried to burn a Confederate 
flag on the field. Altercations broke out within the school with in­
creasing frequency. By October, 1969, school officials decided to drop 
the Confederate flag and "Dixie," and 1000 white students staged a 
walkout in protest. 
Considerable racial tension continued in the school and the town 
throughout the year. The police were called to school several times to 
maintain order. 
In September, 1970, the school opened peacefully and calmly. One 
student threatened the peace and calm, however, by wearing a jacket to 
school with a shoulder patch consisting of a replica of the Confederate 
flag. School officials reminded him of the existence of a school regu­
lation forbidding the wearing of "provocative symbols" upon student cloth­
ing and ordered him to either remove the patch, not wear the jacket to 
school, or to leave the school campus. He left and was suspended by 
school officials. 
The student challenged the action of school officials in federal 
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court. The court ruled that the school regulation against "provocative 
symbols" was too broad in scope and too vaguely worded to be used to 
control activities of speech and expression and struck down the rule as 
being unconstitutional. The court did, however, uphold the school offi­
cials* right, under the circumstances, to prohibit the wearing of the 
shoulder patch. The court pointed out that the right of free speech 
and expression is not absolute and may be controlled where there is a 
"clear and present danger" of disruption. The school officials were not 
required to wait for disruptions to actually occur in the second year. 
The court reiterated the point that limitations on the conduct of speech 
and expression must be narrowly construed, but that school officials 
have considerable leeway in controlling the when, where and how of 
speech and expression- The court in Melton said as follows: 
no thoughtful person would suggest that a student should be 
permitted to stand and sing "Dixie" in a classroom as the 
mood might strike him, nor even to recite the Oath of 
Allegiance in so unregulated a manner. Reasonable and non­
discriminatory regulations of time, place and manner are 
always permissible restrictions upon expression. (24, p, 96) 
In Melton and Hernandez, the symbols of protest, the Confederate 
flag and the black beret, were directly related to actual disruption or 
reasonably predicted disruption. The case of Guzick v. Debus (25) is 
somewhat different in that it involved a symbol not at all directly re­
lated to the predicted disruption. The federal courts upheld school 
officials' actions in restricting the symbolic expression anyway. 
The facts in Guzick involved an Ohio high school which was extremely 
tense due to racial unrest. School officials, cognizant of serious 
disruptions at nearby schools, worked diligently at keeping order at the 
high school. The school had a long-standing rule, consistently enforced, 
forbidding the wearing of buttons, badges, scarves and other means of 
expressing support for a cause or messages unrelated to education. There 
had been a history of inflammatory buttons in the racially mixed school. 
For instance, one student had been forced shortly after the assassina­
tion of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. near Easter, to remove a button which 
read "Happy Easter Dr. King." 
The difficult aspect of this case to understand is that the button 
at issue had nothing directly to do with racial tension. The button at 
issue supported a forthcoming anti-war demonstration which was to take 
place in Chicago. 
When a student refused to remove the anti-war button, he was sus­
pended and brought suit. The district court hearing the case reasoned 
that the rule against buttons and other insignia not related to school 
activities was a significant factor in preserving order in an already 
tense racial situation and dismissed the student's lawsuit. The school 
officials were determined by the court to be correct in their argument 
that allowing students to wear buttons would result in a substantial 
disruption of the school environment. The court found that the poten­
tial for eminent disruption in the school supported a no-symbol rule. 
On the issue of the anti-war button not being related to the specific 
potential cause of disruption, the court still found that the general 
rule was valid. It reasoned that students would be unable to understand 
the subtle distinction between the wearing of buttons which might cause 
39 
disruption and those which would not. The court also noted that a regu­
lation which distinguished between different buttons would be virtually 
impossible to administer. 
On review of the district court decision in Guzick, the court of 
appeals for the sixth circuit affirmed the district court's ruling (26). 
In ruling in favor of the school officials, the circuit court expressly 
affirmed the right of teachers and students to a peaceful educational 
environment. The court of appeals said as follows ; 
Denying Shaw High School the right to enforce this small 
disciplinary rule could, and most likely would impair the 
rights of its students to an education and the rights of 
its teachers to fulfill their responsibilities. 
The buttons are claimed to be a form of free speech. 
Unless they have some relevance to what is being consid­
ered or taught, a school classroom is no place for the 
untrammeled exercise of such rights. (Emphasis added.) 
(26, p. 600) 
Sit-ins and walkouts 
One of the most interesting and helpful federal court decisions for 
delineating student responsibilities was that handed down by the United 
States District Court in Pennsylvania in the case of Gebert v. Hoffman 
(27). In that case, several students sought an order from the court that 
would prohibit school officials from disciplining students engaged in 
sit-in demonstrations during and after school. The court found evidence 
that the sit-in disrupted the normal operation of the school in five 
different ways and then made a determination as to whether each was 
"material and substantial" or whether it was protected activity. The 
five causes of disruption were: The protesting students skipped classes 
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and encouraged other students to skip classes; the sit-ins forced some 
classes to be moved from their scheduled locations; students participat­
ing in the demonstrations moved through the halls noisily during class 
time; the demonstrators attracted nonparticipating students; and the 
school administrators supervising the protesting students were unable to 
attend to their regular duties. 
The court in Gebert concluded that only the last two of the five 
were protected activity. It refused to use the reactions of nonpartici­
pating students and administrators as the basis for a determination that 
the conduct of the participants was not protected. The other three 
activities were not protected, however, and the court ruled that the 
participating students could be disciplined. The court said as follows: 
"Appropriate discipline in the operation of the school" 
certainly requires students to attend their scheduled classes 
and to refrain from preventing other students from attending 
classes in their scheduled location. School officials may 
act to prevent demonstrating students frcm disrupting classes 
by moving noisily through the halls. One of the "special 
characteristics of the school environment" is the need to 
maintain order and discipline to promote the educational pro­
gram. We find that the actions of the students disrupted the 
educational program of the school and therefore that the action 
of the school officials in terminating the sit-in by suspend­
ing the students did not violate the First Amendment rights of 
the students. (27, p. 697) 
Several other federal court decisions have also affirmed the respon­
sibility of students to be in class, even when weighed against their 
first amendment rights of speech and expression. In Hobson v. Bailey 
(28), a seventeen-year-old black student challenged disciplinary action 
taken against her after she skipped school and encouraged others to skip 
school. She was truant on four consecutive Mondays and participated in 
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a walkout at the school as part of a community-wide protest in a non-
school related racial issue. While on suspension for those activities, 
she participated in picketing the school and encouraging other students 
to refrain from entering the school building- She was then expelled 
from school, but eventually allowed to return to school at another 
attendance center. She challenged her reassignment to another school on 
first amendment grounds. 
The court did not agree with the student's arguments that her con­
duct was protected. The court said as follows: 
It is the opinion of this Court that the defendant 
McCormick and other administrative personnel of the Board of 
Education were charged with the duty of offering public edu­
cation to the students of the City of Memphis and that their 
education could not be adequately offered unless the students 
were in school and relieved from disruptive interferences. 
While this Court does not find that any and all absences from 
school in furtherance of a racial protest require disciplinary 
action, regular and repeated absences which cause interference 
with the educational processes must not go unchecked. (Emphasis 
added.) (28, p. 1400) 
A similar result occurred in the case of Press v. Pasadena Independ­
ent School District (29), when an eighth-grade girl challenged her sus­
pension from school for participation in a walkout demonstration protest­
ing a school rule prohibiting girls from wearing pantsuits to school. In 
ruling that the walkout was not constitutionally protected, the court 
said as follows : 
It occurred upon school property and at a time when plaintiff 
and other demonstrators should have been engaged in classwork. 
Its occurrence interrupted the pedagogical regimen of the day. 
It is well settled that demonstrative activity such as this in 
secondary schools, which is disruptive of the educational 
process or is calculated to undermine the school routine, for­
feits the shield of the First Amendment. (29, p. 536) 
When federal courts are as sensitive to the disruptive nature of 
the lack of regular attendance as evidenced in the Hobson and Press deci­
sions, it is axiomatic that when walkouts are accompanied by disruptive 
assemblies and demonstrations they are not protected activity. Such was 
the result in Dunn v. Tyler Independent School District (30) and Tate v. 
Board of Education (31). 
Pure speech 
Although the freedom to speak our minds is one of the most funda­
mental and staunchly protected rights under the constitution, not all 
spoken words are protected, especially when uttered in the educational 
setting. In the case of Dillon v. Pulaski County School District (32), a 
student challenged his being disciplined for violation of a school rule 
against kissing in school and his defiant and disrespectful attitude 
toward a teacher. After the teacher had twice told the boy to stop kiss­
ing, the student replied in a disrespectful tone, "What a drag." The 
boy challenged being disciplined on the basis that his remark was free 
speech protected by the First Amendment. The court rejected his claim 
and found that disciplinary action for showing lack of respect toward a 
teacher and violating the school rule against kissing was valid because 
both were within the power of the school officials to regulate. In the 
court's view, both had the potential for disruption of the school environ­
ment. In upholding the actions of the school officials, the court 
stated as follows : 
Democracy at work requires that citizens leam to ques­
tion the decisions of those in authority, but these citizens 
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must also leam to voice their objections in a reasonable and 
effective manner. One goal of the educational process, there­
fore, should be to instill in students a respect for authority, 
rot only is this an important lesson to be learned by students, 
it also is necessary for the effective functioning of the edu­
cation system. (32, p. 56) 
The court in Dillon overturned the school's discipline, however, because 
it found that the school officials had not provided the boy with appro­
priate procedural due process. 
Another student learned that all speech is not protected in the 
case of Fentcgi v. Stear (33). The facts in Fenton involved a group of 
male high school students sitting in a car in a shopping center parking 
lot on a Sunday evening. The parking lot was located a few miles from 
the town where their school was located. When a teacher named Stear from 
their school drove by, one of the boys shouted, "There's Stear." Another 
replied, "He's a prick." 
On the next day, the second boy was met at the school door by an 
administrator and asked about his participation in the incident of the 
previous evening. The boy admitted his role in the incident and was given 
a three-day in-school suspension and not allowed to participate in the 
senior class trip to Philadelphia. He was later placed on "restriction" 
for seven days. Restriction meant that he had to sit at a designated 
table in the cafeteria at lunch time, could not talk to other students 
in the hallway between classes, could not participate in extracurricu­
lar activities and had to obtain permission whenever he left the school 
grounds during school hours. The disciplined student challenged the 
school administrator's authority alleging that his right to free speech 
had been abridged. The argument did not carry much weight with the 
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courc, however. The court noted in its decision that not all speech is 
protected by the constitution and listed fighting words, lewd and ob­
scene words and profane and libelous words as not being protected. The 
court then affirmed the actions of the school officials with the follow­
ing statement: 
It is our opinion that when a high school student refers 
to a high school teacher in a public place on a Sunday by a 
lewd and obscene name in such a loud voice that the teacher 
and others may hear the Insult it may be deemed a matter for 
discipline in the discretion of the school authorities. To 
countenance such student conduct even in a public place with­
out imposing sanctions could lead to devastating consequences 
in the school. (33, p. 772) 
While it is difficult to determine how much of the court's decision was 
based on the fact that the punishment given the student was relatively 
minor, the court did make note of the fact that actions taken by school 
officials did not deprive the student of an in-school education or 
graduation. 
Miscellaneous speech and expression issues 
Over the years, the federal courts have expanded the first amendment 
protection of free speech and expression into many areas. As a result, 
a number of activities merely related to speech and expression have be­
come first amendment issues. One of the most interesting and potenti­
ally important as precedent for future litigation is that of Trachtman v. 
Anker (34). 
Trachtman involved staff members of a high school newspaper who 
wanted to distribute a questionnaire on student sex attitudes, knowledge 
and experience to students in grades 9-12. School officials refused 
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to allow distribution of the questionnaire on the grounds that the news­
paper staff was inexperienced in handling research and that the project 
had the potential of inflicting psychological harm and damage on the 
students responding to the questions. Some of the newspaper staff mem­
bers and their parents brought suit against the school officials alleging 
violation of the staff members* right of free speech and expression. At 
the trial, school officials were able to establish, through expert testi­
mony, that psychological harm might predictibly come to some students as 
a result of participation in the survey. 
The district court ruled that school officials could prohibit the 
distribution to younger-aged children in grades nine and ten, but could 
not prohibit distribution to students in grades eleven and twelve. The 
court of appeals for the second circuit overturned the latter aspect of 
the ruling and upheld the school officials' total prohibition of the dis­
tribution. The court of appeals had the following to say about the 
authority of school officials: 
We believe that the school authorities are sufficiently ex­
perienced and knowledgeable concerning these matters, which 
have been entrusted to them by the community; a federal 
court ought not impose its cwn views in such matters where 
there is a rational basis for the decisions and actions of 
the school authorities. (34, p. 519) 
It also said as follows: 
Consequently where school authorities have reason to believe 
that harmful consequences might result to students, while they 
are on the school premises, from solicitation of answers to 
questions, then prohibition of such solicitation is not a 
violation of any constitutional rights of those who seek to 
solicit. (34, p. 520) 
Another interesting issue with implications for future litigation 
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arose in Buckel v. Prentice (35). In Buckel, a group of parents alleged 
that their rights of speech and expression were violated when school 
officials refused to send material prepared by them home with students 
of elementary age. The parents desired to have the students take home 
to their parents material opposed to official school policy regarding 
decentralization of the district's authority over individual schools. 
The parents argued that because the school sends materials about safety, 
music instrument rental, school lunch menus and musical and other pro­
grams home with students, that the school had created a public forum to 
which nonschool persons could not be denied access. 
The district court did not agree with the parents' argument and 
stated that distribution of school-related and safety information was a 
proper extension of the educational function of schools. When schools 
do so, it does not necessarily give rise to any right of access to stu­
dent distribution by parents or other citizens. 
The court did note, however, that a different result might occur if 
parents request to have something sent home with students which was meant 
to provide rebuttal to something which had previously been distributed 
to students by the school. The district court's ruling was upheld by 
the court of appeals (36). 
In Seyfried v. Walton (37), students attempted to force school offi­
cials to produce a play by alleging that the refusal to do so was a viola­
tion of their constitutional rights of free speech and expression. The 
school faculty sponsor had decided to produce the successful Broadway 
musical "Pippin," but felt that some portions of the script were 
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inappropriate for a high school production. She edited out those por­
tions she felt were Inappropriate. 
A complaint about the forthcoming production reached the superin­
tendent, who determined that due to an emphasis in the play on and ref­
erences to sexual activities, the musical, even as modified, was in­
appropriate as a high school production. His position not to produce 
the play was supported by the school board. 
The court ruled that the production of school plays was an integral 
part of the curriculum and as such, decisions on whether or not to pro­
duce a specific play should be left to the school officials involved. 
As long as the school officials did not attempt to censor ideas or per­
spectives and as long as scripts for the play were available and not 
banned by school authorities, the court could find no violation of the 
students* first amendment rights. 
Even though the school officials in the final analysis lost the 
case of Vought v. Van Buren Public Schools (38), it does hold some in­
teresting insights for school discipline. The case involved a sixteen-
year-old boy who was in possession of an admittedly obscene publication 
entitled "White Panther Statement." He was suspended from the school 
until a conference could be held with his parents, and at the conference 
he was warned not to again be found in possession of "obscene literature" 
in violation of school policy. 
At some later time, the boy was determined to be in possession of 
an issue of Argus magazine and suspended from school pending a school 
board meeting to consider his expulsion. The issue of Argus as a whole 
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was not determined by school officials to be obscene, but some specific 
words in it were. The school board expelled the boy, and he challenged 
its action as a violation of his first amendment rights. 
The district court did not at first accept his argument. It found 
that the facts involved a situation where the operation of the school and 
the rights of other students to be protected from obscene materials were 
involved and held that the right of school officials to control posses­
sion of obscene materials on school property did not violate the stu­
dent's first amendment rights. 
The court did find, however, that the boy's right to procedural due 
process had been violated and directed a new hearing before the school 
board on the issue of expulsion. At the hearing, the boy's attorney 
was able to establish that the "obscene" words in the boy's possession 
in alleged violation of the school rules were also available in books 
and magazines in the school library. 
When the school board expelled the boy a second time, the court 
overturned its action pointing out that the material in the school library 
was inconsistent with and caused confusion in light of the school rule 
on obscene literature. The rule was therefore determined to be unen­
forceable . 
Summary 
While the establishment of student rights in the area of speech 
and expression in Tinker has been carried on, expanded and better defined 
in subsequent federal court decisions, so too have limitations on the 
exercise of those rights been better defined. It has become quite clear 
that even when students are engaged in constitutionally-protected activ­
ities of speech and expression, they may not infringe upon the rights 
of their fellow students, teachers and school officials to a nondisrup-
tive educational environment. It can also be noted from court decisions 
that disruption of the school environment does not have to be violent to 
exceed the limitation cf "material and substantial disruption" (Gebert, 
Dillon and Hobson). From decisions, it can also be determined that 
actual disruption need not take place but rather only a reasonable pre­
diction of such disruption must be present (Melton, Guzick and Wise). 
The school environment is indeed viewed as special by the federal courts. 
While the decision in every case is based on established principles 
of law within the context of the facts presented, parameters of student 
responsibilities in some areas can be gleaned from a review of federal 
court decisions involving allegations of abridgment of free speech and 
expression by public school officials. Within the factual limitations 
of each case, it is reasonably clear to assume that students in public 
schools, even when exercising their rights of speech and expression, 
cannot engage in acts of disrespect and insubordination (Rhyne, Esteban, 
Haynes, Hill, Hernandez, Wise and Dillon), noise in the hallways during 
class time (Hernandez and Gebert), blocking access to class (Haynes, 
Hill and Hernandez), skipping classes (Gebert, Hernandez and Press), 
encouraging others to skip class (Hernandez, Gebert and Ehyne), disrup­
tive sit-in demonstrations (Gebert), psychological harm to fellow stu­
dents (Trachtman), issuing fighting and obscene words (Penton), property 
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damage (Esteban), and infringement of other persons' religious beliefs 
(Williams). Even when the federal courts rule against school officials, 
in student rights cases, they often narrow their findings to the facts 
of the case and expressly reiterate the point from Tinker that student 
rights do have limitations. 
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CHAPTER IV. STUDENT PBESS AND DISTRIBUTIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to review federal court decisions 
applying the first amendment freedom of press concept to student publi­
cations and distributions in the public school setting. The first seg­
ment of the chapter contains a brief discussion of federal court deci­
sions which have limited public school officials' authority over student 
publications and distributions, and the latter segment contains a more 
detailed discussion of decisions which, in whole or in part, help estab­
lish express or implied parameters of student responsibility. 
Student Rights 
No area of student rights litigation has constrained the authority 
and actions of public school officials more than that of student press 
and distribution. 
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in 
part, prohibits government from "... abridging the freedom of speech, 
or the press; . . . Because public schools are by their very nature 
government, the federal courts have had little difficulty applying first 
amendment constraints to situations involving student publications and 
distributions. An argument that an officially-sponsored school newspaper 
is not a newspaper in the usual sense, but instead a beneficial educa­
tional tool developed as a part of the curriculum and best left to dis­
cretionary decisions of school officials has not been sufficiently con­
vincing to foreclose federal court interference (39). 
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Neither has suspension of publication of an official school news­
paper successfully ended a legal challenge by the students. In the case 
of Reineke v. Cobb County School District (40), a high school principal 
suspended further publication of the official school newspaper when stu­
dents brought a lawsuit against the school for alleged censorship. The 
relevant facts in the case centered around two issues of the paper. In 
the first issue, the faculty advisor to the paper had, without discus­
sion with the students, deleted a paragraph which dealt with new teach­
ers' attitude toward homosexual teachers and had substituted the word 
"darn" for the word "damn" in a quote. While the students involved were 
somewhat upset by the changes made without their consultation, they took 
no specific action. When distribution of that issue of the paper was 
later halted by the principal and remaining copies confiscated, however, 
the students became very upset. 
Again, no immediate action was taken by the students. But, when two 
articles in the next edition of the paper were deleted, some of the 
journalism students brought suit. School officials immediately suspended 
publication of the paper. 
The principal defended his actions on several grounds. He said that 
photographs in the paper had been borrowed from other publications with­
out permission or copyright release; an article on Vietnam was in poor 
taste and possibly libelous; an article on football game tickets contained 
erroneous information; an article concerning the student body president 
was a personal attack upon the student; a quoted ten-year-old-segrega­
tionist statement by a current school board member might result in adverse 
53 
racial relationships; a letter to the editor would be falsely attributed 
to the wrong person; and the publications contained many spelling and 
grammatical errors. 
The court in Reineke analyzed the facts before it in light of the 
Tinker decision and narrowed the legal issue down to whether or not the 
school officials could demonstrate a reasonable belief that the prohib­
ited expression in the paper would have engendered a material and sub­
stantial disruption of school activities or interferred with rights of 
other students. With the exception of the copyright and libel issues, 
the court found that none of the censored articles could be prohibited 
by school officials. The court stated that mere controversy and minor 
errors in spelling and grammar were not sufficient grounds for abridging 
students' first amendment rights. 
On the issues of copyright and libel, the court ruled that while 
they were valid reasons to delay distribution while seeking legal ad- • 
vice, the reasons given by the principal were not good enough reasons 
for total suppression of the newspaper- The court ordered the release 
of the censored articles and ordered the school to reinstate publication 
of the newspaper. 
First amendment restrictions on the authority of school officials 
are not limited to official school newspapers, however. In Thomas v. 
Board of Education (41), four students successfully challenged minor 
disciplinary action taken against them for their participation in writ­
ing and distributing a thirteen-page sexual satire, that had been prepared 
for the most part off school grounds and had been distributed entirely 
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off school grounds. The literary work at issue was entitled "%rd Times" 
and contained articles satirizing school lunches, cheerleaders, class­
mates and teachers. It also contained an editorial on masturbation, and 
articles on sodomy, prostitution and castration. A banner printed on 
the front cover warned "uncensored, vulgar, immoral." 
The court in Thomas reiterated the point often made by federal 
courts that school officials, because of the special nature of the school 
environment, must be given latitude in prohibiting ordinarily protected 
first amendment rights of students. But, in the final analysis, it held 
that because most of the acts related to "Bard Times" occurred off school 
property, and no disruption of the school environment actually occurred 
or was reasonably predicted, the students could not be punished for 
their acts. 
A similar result occurred in Shanley v. Northeast Independent School 
District (42). In that case, the court made it very clear how it felt 
about attempted school control of first amendment rights of students when 
committed off school grounds. The court began its decision with the 
following language: 
It should have come as a shock to the parents of five high 
school seniors in the Northeast Independent School District of 
San Antonio, Texas, that their elected school board members had 
assumed suzerainty over their children before and after school, 
off school grounds, and with regard to their children's rights 
of expressing their thoughts. We trust it will come as no 
shock whatsoever to the school board that their assumption of 
the authority is an unconstitutional usurpation of the First 
Amendment. (42, p. 964) 
A number of school officials have learned as a result of cases taken 
into the federal courts that what they may have felt was in their 
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authority to control within the school setting must yield where provi­
sions of the first amendment relating to free press are concerned. Such 
was the situation in no less a forum than the United States Supreme 
Court in the case of Papish v. Board of Curators (43). 
In Papish, a graduate student at the University of Missouri School 
of Journalism was expelled for distributing an unofficial newspaper on 
campus which contained "indecent speech," The publishers of the paper 
reproduced a political cartoon on the front cover showing policemen 
raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice, The cartoon's 
caption read , With Liberty and Justice for All," Inside, the paper 
contained an article entitled "Motherfucker Acquitted" that discussed a 
New York city youth who was a member of an organization known as "Up 
Against the Wall, Motherfucker" and who had been on trial and acquitted 
on an assault charge. The supreme court ruled that neither the cartoon 
nor the story at issue could be labeled as constitutionally obscene or 
otherwise unprotected. The school's expulsion of the student was over­
turned. 
Another example of school officials being unable to exercise author­
ity in an area historically open to them was found in the case of Bayer 
v. Kinzler (44). In Bayer, a school principal ordered that distribution 
of a school-sponsored newspaper cease and seized undistributed copies. 
His objection was based solely on a four-page supplement containing sex 
information which the students had placed in each copy of the paper. The 
supplement was composed of articles dealing primarily with contraception 
and abortion. The articles were serious in nature and intended to convey 
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information. They were not alleged to be obscene. 
The court ruled that there was no likelihood that distribution of 
the supplement would cause material and substantial disruption or inter­
ference with school work and discipline. It, therefore, ordered the 
school officials involved to refrain from interfering with distribution 
of the newspaper containing the supplement. 
In reviewing cases involving student press and distribution, it is 
obvious that the federal courts do not generally like any prior restraint 
placed on the printed word. The court of appeals for the seventh cir­
cuit has even held that any school rule requiring prior review or approval 
of student publications is unconstitutional (45). 
While not all federal court decisions have been as restrictive on 
the issue of prior restraint as those in the seventh circuit, most are 
nearly so. In a court review of a school rule which required all non-
school sponsored publications be submitted to the principal prior to dis­
tribution, the court of appeals of the fourth circuit showed clearly in 
Baughman v. Frejenmuth (46), that the burden of proof for justification 
of a prior restraint rule lies with the school. The court said as 
follows : 
In the secondary school setting, first amendment rights 
are not co-extensive with those of adults, and while such 
rules of prior restraint may be valid, they nevertheless come 
to this court with a presumption against their constitution­
ality. (46, p. 1348) 
Frustration of school officials attempting to draft school rules 
authorizing administrative review prior to distribution by students was 
epitomized in the case of Nitzberg v. Parks (47). That case involved 
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a school rule on prior restraint which a federal district court deter­
mined to be unconstitutional. School officials submitted a redrafted 
rule to the court three times before the judge concluded that the lan­
guage drafted would pass constitutional scrutiny. On appeal, however, 
the court of appeals for the fourth circuit disagreed and found the rule 
constitutionally deficient in no less than six respects. Clearly, the 
federal courts do not look with favor on school rules of prior restraint 
on student publications. 
Student Responsibilities 
Prior restraint 
While the court of appeals for the seventh circuit has ruled that 
any school requirement of submission of publications in advance of their 
distribution is unconstitutional, the courts of appeal in the second, 
fourth, fifth and ninth circuits have approved the concept of prior re­
straint in narrowly-defined circumstances. In Eisner v. Stamford Board 
of Education (48), the court of appeals for the second circuit found that 
a school board rule requiring prior review by the administration was 
valid, but that it was constitutionally defective in that it lacked 
proper procedures for submission of the student publications for review 
by administrators. 
Even though the court of appeals for the fifth circuit ruled in 
Shanley v. Northeast Independent School District (42) that students re­
sponsible for publication and distribution of underground newspapers 
could not be punished by school officials under the then existing rule. 
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it did establish a limited prior restraint authority for school officials. 
The court in Shanley concluded that expression by students may be rea­
sonably regulated in manner, place and time, and may be subjected to 
prior screening under clear and reasonable regulations. Expression by 
high school students may be prohibited in advance of distribution only 
if it materially and substantially interferes with school activities, 
with the rights of teachers or other students, or is reasonably predicted 
to do so. But, the court in Shanley also concluded that expression by 
high school students can not be prohibited or controlled solely because 
other persons disagree with its content. 
Comparing the lengthy, detailed, legaily-phrased language of the 
school rule successfully challenged in Shanley with the court's four-page 
written disection of the rule, it is hard to imagine how a satisfactory 
prior restraint rule can actually be drafted in the fifth circuit. But, 
the decision does not leave school officials without some hope. The 
court in Shanley wrote the following about student rights; 
Tinker's dam to school board absolutism does not leave 
dry the fields of school discipline. This court has gone a 
considerable distance with the school boards to uphold its 
disciplinary fiats where reasonable. [Citations omitted.] 
Tinker simply irrigates, rather than floods, the fields of 
school discipline. It sets canals and channels through 
which school discipline might flow with the least possible 
damage to the nation's priceless topsoil of the First Amend­
ment. (42, p. 978) 
Regardless of the court's poetic offering of hope in Shanley that a 
rule requiring prior submission of student publications can be constitu­
tionally defended, it remains little more than theoretical in some fed­
eral court jurisdictions. The fourth circuit, for instance, has upheld 
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the concept of prior restraint rules in three separate decisions, but in 
all three, the specific rule challenged was determined to be constitu­
tionally defective (46, 47, and 49). 
In the ninth circuit, however, an oral prior restraint rule has 
been upheld in an unusual context. The decision in Nicholson v. Board 
of Education (50), involved a teacher who alleged that his employment 
contract was not renewed for, among other things, actions he took as the 
school's student newspaper advisor. After a number of controversial 
articles appeared in the student newspaper, the principal directed that 
articles on specific limited subjects be submitted to him in advance of 
publication for the purpose of ensuring their accuracy. The teacher 
alleged that his contract was not renewed, in part, for his refusal on 
several occasions to comply with the directive. When articles were sub­
mitted, the principal often expressed his disapproval of the content but 
never censored or denied publication of a submitted piece. 
When the teacher challenged the nonrenewal of his employment con­
tract on the basis that the principal could not constitutionally direct 
prior review as he had done, the court did not agree. The court wrote 
as follows : 
Writers on a high school newspaper do not have an 
unfettered constitutional right to be free from prepubli-
cation review. In fact, the special characteristics of the 
high school environment, particularly one involving students 
in a journalism class that produces a school newspaper, call 
for supervision and review by school faculty and adminis­
trators. Under the precise circumstances of this case admin-
istrative review of a small number of sensitive articles for 
accuracy rather than for possible censorship or official 
imprimatur does not implicate first amendment rights. 
(Emphasis added.) (50, p. 863) 
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A federal court in New York also upheld prior restraint of distribu­
tion of a school newspaper in the absence of a written school rule 
authorizing such action. In Frasca v. Andrews (51), the court was faced 
with a situation where a high school principal prevented distribution of 
the school newspaper on the last day of school in the spring semester and 
confiscated all the copies of the paper. The principal felt at the time 
of his actions, and later verified, that an uncomplimentary letter to the 
sports editor, purportedly speaking on behalf of the entire lacross 
team, was the work of only a few members of the team. He was also con­
cerned that some of the language, such as . .we will kick your greasy 
ass" and "pissed off" appearing in the letter and the sports editor's 
response was vulgar and obscene and that the letter and response appear­
ing in print might provoke a confrontation between the newspaper staff 
and the members of the lacrosse team. 
He also felt, and later verified, that a letter appearing in the 
paper which contained derogatory personal statements about a named stu­
dent leader was largely inaccurate. Because the paper was to be dis­
tributed on the last day of school, the named student would not have an 
adequate opportunity to properly defend himself to readers of the paper 
and the result would have devastating personal consequences for him. 
In first speaking to the issue of the absence of a rule authorizing 
prior restraint, the court in Frasea concluded than an express rule was 
not required when circumstances clearly justified the action taken, and 
the court found that the circumstances in the case did justify the prin­
cipal's actions. The key circumstances, in the eyes of the court. 
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were a prompt investigation and verification of the falsity of several 
important aspects of the publication and an inadequate opportunity to 
rebut, explain or correct errors. 
The court also felt that the principal was reasonably justified in 
his fear of a disruption occurring between newspaper staff members and 
members of the lacrosse team. The court, however, did not agree with the 
principal's actions on the basis of his obscenity argument. The language 
the principal objected to was considered by the court to be vulgar, but 
not obscene in the constitutional sense. 
In an area of conflicting first amendment rights, the federal 
district court in Nebraska upheld a portion of an Omaha School rule on 
prior restraint. In the case of Hernandez v. Hanson (52), the rule at 
issue provided that student distributions had to have the prior approval 
of the high school principal and that distributions by students could be 
prohibited by school officials when the content was "commercial in 
nature," "sectarian," or involved nonschool-related literature. 
The court in Hernandez upheld the concept of requiring prior approval 
of written distributions so long as appropriate procedural safeguards are 
provided. But, it struck down the specific provisions regarding com­
mercial and nonschool-related literature. The court reasoned that dis­
tribution of such material was not shown to be a sufficiently disruptive 
influence on the school environment. 
The court upheld the portion of the school rule involving the dis­
tribution of sectarian literature. It reasoned that if students were per­
mitted by school officials to distribute religious literature, it might be 
misinterpreted by some students and parents as an official government 
stamp of approval on the material. Such an appearance of school offi­
cials' approval of religious material in the school setting would vio­
late the first amendment mandate of separation of church and state. 
Justification for subsequent discipline 
While the federal courts have been reluctant to uphold school offi­
cials' actions with regard to prior restraint of student publications, 
they have not been as reluctant to uphold school officials' discipline 
of students after the fact. It can be concluded that school officials 
have mori latitude in holding students responsible for their actions 
related to student press and distribution than in prohibiting the acts 
in the first place. In neither situation, however, can students be 
disciplined solely for the ideas they express. 
In Dodd V. Rambis (53), sr''- ,1 officials successfully defended their 
action in suspending, and later expelling, several students who attempted 
to incite a student walkout. In the facts of the case, a walkout in­
volving 54 students protesting the school's enforcement of school rules 
dealing with student smoking and student attendance was staged on a 
Wednesday. The participating students gathered directly across the 
street from the high school within the sight and hearing of many students 
and faculty members. Many students remaining in class had to be re­
strained from viewing or joining the protesters. Students who partici­
pated in the walkout were suspended from school for one to three days. 
On the evening of the same day, several students met at a private 
home and drafted a leaflet which read as follows: 
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Let's Support Our Rights 
School Walkout : Friday 
Time--9:00 a .tn. 
Place—parking lot across from Eagles 
Stay off school property 
Meeting: For High School Students 
6:30 p.m. parking lot behind Kentucky 
Fried Chicken, tonight 
Support better Discipline Rules ! ! ! 
(53, p. 25) 
One hundred and twenty-five copies of the leaflet were printed for dis­
tribution to fellow students on the next day. 
On the morning of the next day, less than 24 hours after the walk­
out of the day before, each of the five students involved as plaintiffs 
in the lawsuit engaged in distribution of the leaflets. Most of the dis­
tribution occurred in the school halls prior to class and during pass­
ing periods between classes. 
After investigation by the principal, two of the five plaintiffs 
involved in the lawsuit were determined to be involved in the distribu­
tion and were suspended for three school days pending a subsequent hear­
ing to consider their expulsion. After hearing of the suspension of 
their comrades, the other students involved came forward, admitted their 
involvement and were also suspended. 
On Friday, the day of the planned walkout, only four students at 
the school walked out of their classes, A few days later, the boys in­
volved in the distribution of the leaflets were expelled for the remain­
der of the semester for violation of the following school rule : 
Any conduct which causes or which creates a reasonable 
likelihood that it will cause a disruption or material inter­
ference with any school function, activity, or purpose, or 
that interferes or a reasonable likelihood that it will inter­
fere with the health, safety, or well-being or the rigjits 
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of other students is prohibited. (53, p. 26) 
The following is an example contained in the rule of the type of conduct 
which could lead to suspension or expulsion: 
D. Interfering with school purposes or with the 
orderly operation of the school by using, threatening to 
use or counseling other persons to use violence, force, 
coercion, threats, intimidation, fear, or disruptive means. 
(53, p. 26) 
The court in Dodd (53) was faced squarely with a challenge to school 
officials' authority in disciplining students for distribution of leaf­
lets which advocated a "walkout" from classes in violation of a school 
rule. It found that distribution of the leaflets by the students is the 
type of conduct protected by the First Amendment, but that under the 
ruling in the Tinker decision, the school officials were confronted by 
circumstances which reasonably prompted them to forecast a serious dis­
ruption of the school environment. The fact that no serious disruption 
actually resulted from the actions of the disciplined students did not, 
in itself, invalidate the actions of the school officials. The actual 
walkout of students the day before, and a reasonable apprehension that a 
larger walkout would occur, as called for in the leaflets, resulted in 
the court ruling that the school officials had acted in a reasonable 
manner. The court concluded that the school officials could properly 
discipline the students, even by expulsion. It stated that a wide degree 
of discretion in determining appropriate punishment should be allowed 
school officials once a reasonable forecast of material disruption with 
the school's work is made. 
A similar result occurred in Baker v. Downey City Board of Education 
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(54), where two students were suspended for ten days for use of "pro­
fanity" and "vulgarity" in an underground newspaper. The court in Baker 
found that although the papers were distributed just off school grounds 
while students were on their way to school, they were distributed in 
such a way that it could be reasonably predicted that they would end up 
on school grounds. The court also found that the papers caused disrup­
tion of the school environment. Between twenty and thirty teachers re­
ported disruption to their classes caused by students reading and talking 
about the issues of "Oink" circulating in school. 
While some of the articles in the issue of "Oink" in question were 
critical of school staff members, the court noted that the students had 
not previously been disciplined for similar statements appearing in 
earlier issues of the paper. The court concluded that the new factors 
which brought about discipline for distribution of the current issue 
were the disruption resulting from the paper and the students' use of 
profane and vulgar terms. The court concluded that the students were not 
disciplined for what they said, but for the profane and vulgar manner in 
which they expressed their views. 
The court distinguished the situation before it from that in Tinker 
by noting that the students in Tinker did not express their views in 
similar vulgar and profane terms. The court concluded as follows: 
The right to criticize and to dissent is protected to high 
school students but they may be more strictly curtailed in 
the mode of their expression and in other manners of conduct 
than college students or adults. The education process must 
be protected and educational programs properly administered. 
(54, p. 527) 
Similar results in discipline imposed after publication and 
distribution occurred in two other federal court decisions as a result 
of incidents on postsecondary campuses. In Speake v. Grantham (55), a 
group of college students were disciplined for possession of leaflets 
containing false and misleading information and for falsely denying 
having any knowledge of the leaflets, 
A few days after several students were killed in demonstrations at 
nearby Jackson State College, a number of students at the school in­
volved in the case requested that the dean of students suspend classes 
for two days. Noting that only two days of classes remained before 
final examinations were scheduled, the dean replied in the negative. 
About two o'clock the next morning, several hundred leaflets containing 
false information that classes would be suspended on the last two days 
of school before final examinations, were discovered scattered about the 
campus. School officials conducted an immediate investigation and 
spotted several students in the early moring hours in and around a van 
parked near a dormitory entrance. School officials and law enforcement 
officers approached the van and questioned che students present. They 
denied any knowledge of the leaflets but refused permission to search 
the van. 
As the van with several students inside left the scene, it failed 
to stop at a stop sign and the law enforcement officers arrested the 
driver for failing to stop. One of the arresting officers looked through 
the window of the van and saw a stack of several hundred copies of the 
leaflets at issue. The students involved were later disciplined by 
school officials and challenged their discipline on the basis that their 
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acts were protected by the First Amendment. School officials testified 
at the trial regarding the importance of the last two school days before 
final exams and how the acts of the students in distributing the leaf­
lets would have resulted in academic chaos. 
The court ruled that the students were not punished for exercising 
their first amendment rights but for promoting or attempting to promote 
unrest and a threat of serious disruption of normal educational activi­
ties. It found that the school officials acted in an effort to control 
and regulate conduct which would have obstructed the educational func­
tions of the school and interfered with the rights of all the school's 
students. The court concluded as follows: 
First Amendment rights are not a license to trample upon 
the rights of others. They must be exercised responsibly and 
without depriving others of their rights, the enjoyment of 
which is equally precious. (55, p. 1278) 
In the second case involving postsecondary students, the court of 
appeals for the sixth circuit upheld discipline resulting from distribu­
tion of leaflets which contained false and inflammatory information (56). 
The court felt that the leaflets contained requisite language sufficient 
to justify the discipline imposed. 
An interesting set of facts involving competing student interests 
was addressed in the case of Williams v. Spencer (57) . In the Williams 
decision, the court of appeals for the fourth circuit, the same court 
which had previously determined in three decisions that prior restraint 
rules were invalid, had before it a situation in which a principal had 
halted the distribution of an underground newspaper after distribution 
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had begun and had banned further distribution of the paper on school 
property. The school rule involved did not require prior review of 
printed materials, but it did expressly authorize the principal to halt 
distribution of student publications once distribution had begun and to 
discipline students involved in the publication and distribution of any 
material which "encourages actions which endanger the health and safety 
of students." 
The basis for the principal's actions was the inclusion in the pub­
lication of an advertisement for the Earthworks Headshop, a store that 
specialized in the sale of drug paraphernalia. The advertisement pri­
marily promoted the sale of a waterpipe used to smoke marijuana and 
hashish, but it also advertised paraphernalia for cocaine usage. 
The court found that the advertisement encouraged the use of drugs 
and therefore did, in fact, endanger the health and safety of students. 
The court, also, found that an argument that the Tinker ruling required 
a finding of substantial disruption before first amendment rights could 
be interfered with was without merit. The court ruled that disruption 
is merely one justification for school authorites to restrain distribu­
tion of a publication, not the only one. 
The court in Williams expressly distinguished its ruling from the 
three previous prior restraint cases in that circuit. It strongly im­
plied that prior restraint by school officials requires greater court 
scrutiny than discipline imposed after distribution of student publica­
tions has occurred. It was also noted that commercial speech, although 
protected, is not entitled to the same high degree of protection as other 
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types of speech. 
The court in Williams also ruled that the procedure involved in the 
halting of the distribution was valid. Under the school rule, the prin­
cipal had to state in writing within two school days his reasons for 
halting a student distribution. Aggrieved students then had the right 
to appeal the principal's decision to the area superintendent, who was 
to render a written decision within ten school days. If the students 
requested a hearing before the area superintendent, the area superin­
tendent was required to hold the hearing within ten school days of the 
request and had to render a decision within five school days of the hear­
ing. If the students remained dissatisfied, they could appeal to the 
superintendent who had to respond within five school days. The superin­
tendent's decision was final. The court concluded that the procedure 
was "adequate and prompt." 
Another decision upholding school officials' protection of other 
students was that of Katz v. McAulay (58). Involved in the case was a 
47-year-old school rule against "soliciting funds from the pupils in 
the public schools." 
A few students in the school wanted to distribute leaflets solicit­
ing funds from fellow students for the legal defense of eight persons on 
trial for anti-Vietnam War demonstrations. School officials success­
fully defended the school rule on the basis that it was promulgated to 
protect school children from the annoyance of solicitors-
The court found that the rule was not aimed at free speech and 
press but at nonexpressive features of student conduct, namely. 
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pressures upon students of multiple solictations. The court noted that 
students are on the school premises because they are required to be there 
in order to obtain a formal education and solicitors seeking out a cap­
tive school audience would be in competition for the time, attention and 
interest of students and school staff. The obvious effects of solicita­
tion were considered harmful to the operation of the school. The court 
distinguished the facts before it from those in Tinker on the basis that 
the school officials in Katz based their actions upon a demonstrable 
harm to students rather than an unsubstantiated fear of disturbance. 
The court detailed its reasoning as follows: 
and it is foreseeable that pressure groups within the stu­
dent body are likely to use more than polite requests to 
get contributions, even from those who are in disagreement 
with the particular cause or who are, in truth, too poor to 
afford a donation. The Board's regulation appears to be 
reasonable and proper and has a rational relationship to the 
orderly operation of the school system. (58, p. 1061) 
Many of the court decisions discussed earlier, which found in favor 
of students on issues of prior restraint and improper procedures, 
strongly implied that student distribution was not totally beyond the 
control of school authorities. In Baughman v. Freienmuth (46), the court 
ruled that a school rule had insufficiently defined "obscene" and "libel­
ous" material for the purpose of prior restraint, but that such material 
clearly can be banned and punishment imposed after distribution by stu­
dents. The court distinguished normal student conduct rules from prior 
restraint constraints which must be narrow, objective and reasonable 
so as not to inhibit printed words. Under the Baughman decision, school 
officials can apparently ban obscene and unprivileged libel and 
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discipline students under rules prohibiting such materials, as long as 
it is not in the context of prior restraint. 
In another fourth circuit case, Quarterman v. Byrd (49), the court 
of appeals noted that the following language at issue in the case was 
inflammatory and potentially disruptive: 
. . .  W E  H A V E  T O  B E  P R E P A R E D  T O  F I G H T  I N  T H E  H A L L S  A N D  I N  
THE CLASSROOMS, OUT IN THE STREETS BECAUSE THE SCHOOLS BELONG 
TO THE PEOPLE. IF WE HAVE TO--WE'LL BURN THE BUILDINGS OF 
OUR SCHOOLS DOWN TO SHOW THESE PIGS THAT WE WANT AN EDUCATION 
THAT WON'T BRAINWASH US INTO BEING RACIST. AND THAT WE WANT 
AN EDUCATION THAT WILL TEACH US TO KNOW THE REAL TRUTH ABOUT 
THINGS WE NEED TO KNOW, SO WE CAN BETTER SERVE THE PEOPLE! !! 
(49, pp. 55-56) 
But, because the student was punished by school officials for violation 
of an unconstitutional prior restraint rule instead of distributing in­
flammatory and potentially disruptive language, the court found that he 
could not be punished. 
Even in the seventh circuit decision of Fujishima v. Board of Educa­
tion (45), which held that all prior restraint rules are unconstitutional, 
the court said that schools may reasonably control the time, manner and 
place of distribution. It expressly stated that a school might promul­
gate a rule prohibiting distribution of literature during a fire drill, 
as occurred in the case, as a regulation of time and place. 
Conduct and publications 
At least three federal court decisions have upheld school officials' 
discipline of students involved with distribution of student publica­
tions when serious improper conduct on the part of the students \«s also 
involved. In Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District (59), a 
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high school principal had several less than positive episodes with a 
student. The situation began when the principal purchased an underground 
newspaper from the student and scanned its contents. He noted several 
instances of coarse language and informed the student he was selling 
papers in violation of a school rule which required prior permission to 
distribute materials. The principal asked him to stop. The student dis­
regarded the request and the principal decided to suspend the boy for 
failure to comply with the prior submission rule and his request to stop 
selling the papers. 
Upon being informed in the principal's office that he was suspended, 
the boy walked out, slammed the door and shouted so that several persons 
overheard, "I don't want to go to this goddamn school anyway." During 
the period of his suspension, he returned to the school campus several 
times and each time was reminded that suspended students were not to be 
present on school premises. 
On the day the student and his parents were to meet with the prin­
cipal to discuss his return to school, the boy again sold underground 
newspapers to students on their way to school. The principal approached 
the boy, showed him a copy of the school's prior submission rule and 
told him that if he did not stop selling the paper, he would call the 
police. In response, the boy referred to the principal in "the common 
Anglo-Saxon vulgarism for sexual intercourse." 
The principal notified the boy's parents that he was again tempo­
rarily suspending their son for violation of the prior submission rule 
and the use of profanity. Later, a hearing was held and the boy was 
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suspended for the rest of the semester. 
The student and his parents challenged the suspension in federal 
court. The trial court ruled that the boy's rights had been violated 
and ordered him reinstated in school with credit allowed for work missed. 
On appeal to the court of appeals, the trial court was overruled. 
The circuit court felt that the boy's conduct in persisting to sell 
papers, returning to campus after being told not do so, and twice shout­
ing profanity at the principal outweighed his claim to first amendment 
protection and gave school officials sufficient grounds for disciplin­
ing him. The circuit court brushed over the issue of the validity of 
the prior restraint rule and concluded as follows ; 
We hasten to point out that by thus limiting our 
review in this case we do not invite school boards to pro­
mulgate patently unconstitutional regulations governing 
student distribution of offcampus literature. Nor, need­
less to say, do we encourage school authorities to use 
otherwise valid regulations as a pretext for disregarding 
the rights of students. Today we merely recognize the right 
of school authorities to punish students for the flagrant 
disregard of established school regulations; we ask only 
thst the student seeking equitable relief from allegedly 
unconstitutional actions by school officials come into 
court with clean hands. (59, pp. 1076-77) 
A similar result occurred in Schwartz v. Schuker (60), when a senior 
student was suspended for refusing to surrender to a school official 
copies of an underground newspaper he was distributing in violation of 
a school rule and advising another student to refuse surrender of his 
copies. While under suspension, he continued to c^ne on school grounds 
in defiance of school officials' orders. After an administrative hearing, 
it was determined that the boy would be required to graduate early, 
effective two weeks previously or transfer to another school. 
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The boy challenged the administrative ruling in federal court and 
the court upheld the ruling. In doing so, the court noted that it was 
hard for it to tell whether the boy was disciplined for first amendment 
actions or flagrant and defiant disobedience of school authorities. The 
court concluded as follows : 
While there is a certain aura of sacredness attached to 
the First Amendment, nevertheless those First Amendment 
rights must be balanced against the duty and obligation 
of the state to educate students in an orderly and decent 
manner to protect the rights not of a few but of all the 
students in the school system. The line of reason must 
be drawn somewhere in this area of ever expanding per­
missibility. (60, p. 242) 
Like the courts in Sullivan and Schwartz, the court in Graham v. 
Houston Independent School District (61), had before it a group of stu­
dents who flaunted the authority of the local school officials by pub­
lishing and distributing an underground newspaper in violation of a 
school rule to the contrary. There was testimony on the part of the 
students that a major purpose behind distribution of the underground 
aexjspspsr uss to flsunt the school rule. When students participating 
in the distribution were told to cease distribution of the paper imme­
diately or leave school until they would comply with school rules, they 
left the school. 
In analyzing the case before it, the court in Graham noted that the 
students involved were actually disciplined more for disobedience than 
for the actual distribution of protected material. The court also noted 
that this was in accord with the views expressed by the court in 
Schwartz. The court in Graham did distinguish the two situations, how­
ever, by saying that the activity resulting in discipline in Schwartz 
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was more flagrant than that in the case before it. It found, however, 
that the distinction was not controlling. Instead, the court felt that 
such judgments should be left to school officials. The court stated 
its view as follows : 
this court will not begin to intimate the extent to which 
a student may be disobedient before disciplinary measures 
are properly taken. That determination is within the 
province of the school administrators, (61, p. 1167) 
Summary 
From a review of federal court decisions lost by students and par­
ents in the area of student press and distribution, and inferences drawn 
from other cases, it is quite clear that the federal courts judiciously 
guard student rights to publish their own ideas and words almost as 
strongly as they protect the private press. Federal courts are especially 
reluctant to allow prior restraint rules to have a "chilling effect" on 
the printed words of students. 
In the area of discipline imposed after the fact, however, the fed­
eral courts seem to rely on much the same criteria as they did in the 
area of speech and expression. While the decision in each case is based 
upon established principles of law within the context of the facts pre­
sented, some parameters of student responsibility can be obtained from a 
review of federal court decisions involving allegations of abridgment of 
free press and distribution rights by public school officials. While stu­
dents cannot be disciplined for the ideas they print, they apparently can 
be held accountable by school officials for insubordination (Sullivan, 
Schwartz and Graham), use of profanity, vulgarity and obscenity (Baker 
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and Baughman), use of libelous words (Baughman), potential disruption 
(Frasca, Dodd, Speake, Katz and Quartennan), substantial disruption 
(Shanley and Baker), accuracy (Nicholson, Frasca, Speake and Norton), 
failure to uphold the mandate of separation of church and state 
(Hernandez) endangering health and safety (Williams and Fujishima), and 
failing to follow school rules that reasonably establish place and time 
for distribution of student publications (Shanley and Fujishima). 
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CHAPTER V. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
It is the purpose of this chapter to review federal court decisions 
involving issues related to procedural due process in the public school 
setting. This chapter includes a brief discussion of decisions which 
have established student rights in the area of procedural due process; 
however, primary emphasis will be given to those federal court decisions 
which were won by school officials or in which the courts have estab­
lished express or implied parameters of student responsibilities. Con­
sideration will also be given to federal court decisions that indicate 
that defects in procedural due process may be cured by subsequent action 
and that monetary damages awarded for mere procedural due process viola­
tions will be nominal. 
Student Rights 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
states in relevant part, "... nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; .... That 
language does not mean that states cannot take away the life, liberty or 
property of persons, only that when it does so, the state must provide 
"due process of law." 
Probably no other language in the Constitution has engendered more 
court decisions and discussion than the phrase "due process of law." 
Yet with all the discourse and all the decisions, the exact meaning of 
the phrase remains elusive. 
78 
The legal concept of due process actually includes two separate 
elements. "Substantive" due process deals primarily with the basic 
fairness or lack of fairness with which government treats its subjects. 
Relatively few federal courts have addressed the substantive due process 
concept in the context of discipline in the public schools (see Chap­
ter X). 
The other due process concept, "procedural" due process, has been 
the subject of numerous federal court decisions involving student dis­
cipline. It is with the latter that this chapter is solely concerned. 
Procedural due process is, by its very nature, a very flexible legal 
concept. It attempts to balance the government's responsibility to pro­
vide procedural due process with the particular life, liberty or property 
interest of the person involved. The federal district court in Nebraska 
in the case of Graham v. Knutzen (62) described the concept of procedural 
due process in the context of school discipline as follows: 
"Due process" is an elusive concept. Its requirements 
vary with the particular situation involved. At the heart 
of due process lies a balancing test wherein the loss of a 
particular right (here, the right to attend school) is 
weighed against the interest of the governmental authority 
(maintaining order and discipline in the schools). As the 
significance of the lost right increases, the governmental 
authority is held to a stricter standard of procedural 
safeguards. (62, p. 883) 
Whatever else procedural due process is, it remains little more than 
a process. It does not go to the merits or the wisdom of the decision. 
Its purpose is merely to aid in achieving a proper result. This important 
point was described in another Nebraska federal district court decision 
in Fielder v. Board of Education (63). In a footnote to the decision. 
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Chief Judge Warren Urban outlined his concept of the minimal procedural 
due process which should be granted to students being expelled from 
school and concluded that procedural due process has its limitations; 
I grant that failure to follow such procedures does 
not result inevitably in the making of a wrong decision. 
Neither does the following of them guarantee a right deci­
sion. Rules cannot make a decision-maker wise, but they 
can help him become knowledgeable and deliberate, (63, 
p. 731, n. 7) 
The primary purpose of procedural due process is, therefore, to require 
the decision-maker to make available an appropriate procedure which bet­
ter enables the decision-maker to make a fair and just decision. 
The most important federal court decision concerning procedural due 
process in the context of discipline of public school students is that 
of the United States Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez (64). That decision 
concerned a case in which a number of Columbus, Ohio, public school stu­
dents were suspended from school under a state statute that author­
ized school administrators to impose suspensions from school for up to 
ten days. Allegations against the students included refusing to follow 
a principal's order to leave a school auditorium, attacking a police 
officer who attempted to remove a student from the school auditorium, 
participating in a disturbance in a school lunchroom, and being present at 
a demonstration at a school other than the one designated for attendance. 
None of the students were given a due process hearing of any kind, either 
before or after they were suspended. For the first time, the supreme 
court was faced with the question of whether the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment required school officials to provide students 
a hearing before they could be suspended from school for ten days or less. 
80 
The supreme court first analyzed the circumstances to determine 
whether protected "liberty" or "property" interests were present. Since 
No life-threatening situation existed, there was no issue regarding 
"life" interests. The court determined that in a situation where stu­
dents were being suspended from school for even ten days or less, both 
liberty and property interests were present which required the protections 
of due process procedures. 
The court reasoned that because the state of Ohio, through its 
statutes, required local authorities to provide a free public education 
to residents between five and 21 years of age and required students to 
attend under compulsory education provisions, it had created in students 
a reasonable expectation of receiving an education. This reasonable ex­
pectation translated into a "property right." The court also concluded 
that the acts upon which the suspension were based would be placed in 
the students' school records and interfere with future opportunities for 
postsecondary education and employment. The court ruled that such inter­
ference with a person's reputation, honor or integrity translated into 
a protected "liberty right." The court also concluded that because edu­
cation is so important in the modem world, even suspension from school 
for as few as ten days is not so minor a penalty that fourteenth amend­
ment due process protections could be ignored. 
After concluding that procedural due process was required in the 
circumstances of a short-term suspension, the court addressed the problem 
of determining what specific elements of due process were required. It 
determined that unless it could be shown that a student posed a 
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continuing threat of danger to himself or others or an ongoing threat 
of substantial disruption of the school environment, an opportunity for 
a hearing had to be provided to students prior to suspensions being 
imposed. Students whose presence posed such dangers or threats could 
be removed immediately without a prior hearing, but opportunity for an 
appropriate hearing must follow as soon as practical. 
The court also concluded, as a minimum, that students who are the 
subject of potential suspension from school for ten days or less must be 
given oral or written notice of the allegations against them. In the 
event that a student denies the allegations, school officials must ad­
vise the student of the evidence against the student and give the stu­
dent a meaningful opportunity to present his or her side of the situa­
tion. Notice and hearing may occur immediately following the alleged 
misconduct, and no delay between the notice and hearing is necessary. 
What the court imposed on school officials in the Goss decision 
was little more than what most school administrators would have done 
anyway. All that was expressly required was that school officials en­
gage in a dialogue with the student in order to give the student an 
opportunity to explain his or her side of the story. Even if the school 
official had personally witnessed the conduct, notice and the rudimentary 
hearing were still required to allow the student the opportunity to pre­
sent mitigating factors or present the facts in what the student consid­
ered the proper context. 
The court in Goss expressly ruled that a student in danger of being 
suspended for ten days or less did not necessarily have the right to an 
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attorney, confront and cross-examine witnesses or call witnesses on his 
or her own behalf. The court felt that creating too much of an adver­
sarial situation out of the suspension process might destroy its effec­
tiveness as a disciplinary tool. 
The court noted the possibility, however, that in unspecified 
"unusual situations," involving short-term suspensions, more than the 
rudimentary procedures outlined might be required. Generally, the court 
left to school officials the discretion to determine whether to allow 
the student to present witnesses on his or her own behalf, cross-examine 
witnesses substantiating the allegations, question the accuser further, 
or in more difficult cases, secure the presence of legal counsel. 
In Goss, the supreme court did not expressly address the require­
ments of procedural due process in the context of more stringent disci­
pline than short-term suspensions. It did strongly imply, however, that 
suspensions longer than ten days and expulsions would require more formal 
procedures than those it expressly required for short-term suspensions 
(64, p. 584, 95 S. Ct. at 741). 
The Goss decision was rendered by the supreme court, the ultimate 
interpreter of the constitution. It must not be forgotten that any con­
trary court decision rendered prior to Goss being rendered in January, 
1975, has little or no precedential or practical value after that date. 
For instance, court decisions such as Banks v. Board of Public Instruc­
tion (65), rendered in 1970 which held that no hearing was required 
prior to imposition of a suspension from school, and portions of rulings 
such as Linwood v. Board of Education (66), where a suspension of seven 
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days or less was considered to be so minor a disciplinary penalty that 
it could be imposed without providing any due process procedures, must 
be considered of no value for the purpose of this study. 
While Goss stands as the leading case in procedural due process 
issues, numerous other federal court decisions have defined and deline­
ated public school students' rights to procedural due process. Some 
federal courts have ruled that the burden of providing appropriate due 
process procedures is on school officials and students cannot be ex­
pected to request them (63, 67). Hearings involving the possibility of 
long-term suspensions or expulsion have been found to require written 
notice of the time, place and date of the hearing and an explanation of 
the charges against the student sufficiently detailed to enable the 
student to prepare a defense (63, 67, 68, 69); the right to cross-ex­
amine witnesses against them (32, 63, 67); the opportunity for students 
to present their own views (63, 70); the decision be made by an impartial 
decision-maker (71, 72); the right to legal counsel (63, 67); the right 
to make a verbatim record of the hearing (63); a decision based only on 
the evidence introduced at the hearing (73); and a written finding of 
facts substantiating the decision (63, 73). 
At least two federal courts have ruled that when school officials 
follow one short-term suspension immediately with another, each suspen­
sion must be preceded by a hearing. The subsequent hearings must ad­
dress the primary question of whether the student presents a substantial 
danger to himself, other persons or property if readmitted (74, 75). 
Numerous federal court decisions have extended procedural due 
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process requirements to areas other than suspension and expulsion situa­
tions and have required that procedural due process be provided to stu­
dents in a variety of disciplinary circumstances. Some federal courts 
have ruled that involuntary student transfers to other attendance centers 
for disciplinary reasons (72, 76), suspensions of indefinite length where 
reentry to school is conditioned upon the occurrence of an event such 
as a parent conference (77), long-term suspensions (62), corporal punish­
ment (78), and three-day suspensions (79, 80) require due process pro­
cedures. Although several other federal courts have ruled to the con­
trary, at least one federal court has ruled that due process procedures 
must be afforded prior to a disciplinary removal from participation in 
athletics (81). 
Student Responsibilities 
Due to the inherent flexible nature of procedural due process in 
differing factual circumstances and the unsettled nature of some due 
process issues among the various federal court jurisdictions, it is dif­
ficult on a national scale to accurately predict federal court applica­
tion of specific elements of procedural due process in specific factual 
circumstances. More than any other area of student responsibilities con­
tained in this study, procedural due process is dependent upon the total­
ity of circumstances and the federal court jurisdiction involved. 
The United States Supreme Court decision in Goss v. Lopez (64) 
clearly established the rights of public school students to procedural 
due process for short-term suspensions, established a minimum 
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rudimentary hearing procedure that meets the requirements of due process, 
and strongly implied that greater due process is required when students 
are threatened with long-term suspension or expulsion. But, the decision 
also recognized the flexible nature of the application of procedural 
due process. A review of federal court decisions on procedural due 
process issues, both prior and subsequent to Goss, reveals a number of 
areas of express and implied flexibility remaining open to school offi­
cials in the area. 
Suspension 
In Goss, the supreme court expressly ruled that in the vast majority 
of student discipline cases where the potential penalty was a suspension 
of ten days or less, school officials were not required to alio".- the stu­
dent to be represented by an attorney, to call witnesses on his or her 
own behalf or to cross-examine witnesses against the student. The 
supreme court was concerned with the potential negative effect the impo­
sition of formal adversary proceedings would have on the maintenance of 
school discipline. The court stated its concern as follows; 
We stop short of construing the Due Process Clause to 
require, countrywide, that hearings in connection with short 
suspensions must afford the student the opportunity to secure 
counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses supporting 
the charge, or to call his own witnesses to verify his version 
of the incident. Brief disciplinary suspensions are almost 
countless. To impose in each such case even truncated trial-
type procedures might well overwhelm administrative facilities 
in many places and, by diverting resources, cost more than it 
would save in educational effectiveness. Moreover, further 
formalizing the suspension process and escalating its formal­
ity and adversary nature may not only make it too costly as a 
regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness 
as part of the teaching process. (64, p. 584, 95 S. Ct. at 
740-41) 
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Several subsequent federal court decisions have applied this aspect 
of Goss to specific circumstances. In Reinman v. Valley View Community 
School District (82), a federal district court in Illinois had before 
it a situation where a student was suspended for ten days for possession 
of a knife in school. The principal involved met with the boy and dis­
cussed the situation before imposing the suspension. There was no formal 
hearing held before the suspension was imposed. 
The boy's parents requested and received a hearing before the local 
board about one week after the boy's suspension began. At the hearing 
before the board, only a written report of the dean of students was pre­
sented to the board. No witnesses testified and there was no cross-
examination. After the board affirmed the principal's decision of a 
ten-day suspension, the boy and his parents brought suit alleging a 
violation of the boy's rights to procedural due process cm the grounds 
that he had not been allowed to confront witnesses against hûn, had no 
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and had not been allowed to make 
a verbatim recording of the hearing. The court in Reinman noted that 
the Goss decision had expressly declined to require full-scale hearings 
when suspensions of ten days or less are involved and ruled that because 
Goss required no more than a rudimentary hearing, and those requirements 
had been met by both the principal and the board, appropriate procedural 
due process had been afforded the boy. 
In Everett v. Marcase (72), students threatened with being trans­
ferred involuntarily to other attendance centers brought a lawsuit to 
require additional procedural due process in such transfers. The court 
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upheld the students' argument that Goss requirements should be applied 
to involuntary transfers between attendance centers but declined to go 
further. In response to the students' argument that they should be en­
titled to have their attorneys present, and even paid by the school, 
the court concluded that under the circumstances there was no practical 
advantage to having an attorney present. The court followed Goss and 
left the question of presence of an attorney to the discretion of school 
officials. It also denied the students' request that the school be re­
quired to pay their attorney fees. In response to the students' request 
for an expressed right to an appeal to a higher authority from a prin­
cipal's decision on transfers, the court determined that under the cir­
cumstances of an involuntary transfer for disciplinary reasons, the 
school could provide an appeal process, but no legal right to an appeal 
existed. 
In Boynton v. Casey (83), the federal district court in Maine was 
faced with the suspension and subsequent expulsion of a student who ad­
mitted the use of marijuana on school property in violation of a school 
rule. In challenging the suspension portion of the discipline, the stu­
dent and his parents alleged that the boy was denied procedural due 
process because he was denied permission by the principal to leave school 
at the time he was being questioned by the principal about the incident, 
he was not informed of his right to remain silent, he was not notified 
that he could have his parents present during questioning, and his par­
ents were not notified at the time of the questioning. In light of the 
decision in Goss, the court in Boynton found no legal basis in the 
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allegations and upheld the due process procedures used by the principal. 
In addition to federal court decisions following Goss, some have 
had to fill in or expand on what the supreme court said in that decision. 
In Sweet v. Childs (84), the court of appeals for the fifth circuit was 
faced with a situation which involved serious violence in a Florida 
school occurring after court-ordered desegregation. In that case, the 
court upheld the due process procedures involved in the expulsion of 
five students and the short-term suspension of many others. Dissatis­
fied with the result, the students requested a rehearing before the 
court on the issue of whether the notice and hearing given the suspended 
students was appropriate in light of the requirement in Goss that stu­
dents generally be given notice and hearing before being suspended. 
The students involved had been engaged in violent disruptions and 
sit-ins and many had left school before administrators had an opportunity 
to provide them with notice and a hearing. Notice of the suspensions 
from school was announced to the students over a local radio station. 
School officials argued they had no opportunity to give the sus­
pended students a hearing prior to the suspension. The disturbances 
and suspensions occurred on a Thursday. On Friday, most of the suspended 
students engaged in marches and protests outside the school setting and 
on Monday, school officials began meeting with parents and students in 
postsuspension conferences which lead to reinstatement of the suspended 
students. 
In considering the request for rehearing, the court noted that Goss 
did not require prior notice and hearings in all situations of student 
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suspensions. It recognized an exception for those students whose 
presence on school grounds posed a continuing threat to the academic en­
vironment or to the safety of persons or property. The court concluded 
that because the students comprised a serious threat to the school en­
vironment on the Thursday they were suspended, engaged in public demon­
strations away frcxn school on Friday and had postsuspension hearings 
beginning the following Monday, the school officials had not violated 
the students' right to procedural due process (84). 
In Hillman v. Elliott (79), a high school student was charged with 
being disrespectful to a teacher and using abusive language toward other 
students. The student's parents were notified that he was suspended and 
a meeting was arranged a few days later with the boy, his mother and the 
principal present. At the meeting the boy admitted using abusive lan­
guage toward another student. 
School officials later became concerned that their own school rules 
had not been followed in suspending the student and started the discipli­
nary process over. The parents were then provided a written notice of 
the charges and information that the hearing would be held in the prin­
cipal's office. After the hearing, the principal suspended the boy for 
three days and the boy and his parents brought suit in federal court. 
The boy and his parents alleged, in part, that because of the prin­
cipal's involvement in the earlier suspension proceeding and because 
the principal was an employee of the school, the principal was not an 
unbiased finder of fact to sit as an impartial decision-maker at the 
subsequent proceeding. The court rejected the arguments noting that 
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there was no real evidence showing that the principal was actually 
biased. The court refused to disqualify the principal from being the 
hearing officer on the mere basis that he was personally familiar with 
the circumstances. In rejecting the argument that the hearing had to 
be conducted by someone not employed by the school, the court noted that 
the argument had no legal basis. 
In Coffman v. Kuehler (80), a federal district court in Texas had 
before it an issue of sufficiency of hearing procedures before the im­
position of a suspension of three days for an absence from school with­
out reasonable cause. The court ruled that a principal's discussion of 
the offense with the boy adequately met the requirements of a rudimentary 
hearing required by the Goss decision. 
The interesting aspect of the case dealt with the boy's father's 
intervention in the matter. Within two hours of the suspension, the 
boy's father met and visited with the principal about the suspension. 
The charges against the boy were explained and discussed. The father 
had a good grasp of the situation from information his son had provided 
him. The court found that had there been any procedural defect with the 
first hearing provided the boy, it was effectively cured by what it con­
sidered a second hearing with the boy's father. 
Expulsions and long-term suspensions 
The supreme court has not rendered any decision which expressly 
outlines minimum procedural due process requirements for suspensions from 
school for longer than ten days or for expulsions. It did strongly imply 
in the Goss decision, however, that long-term suspensions and expulsions 
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require more formal procedures than are required for situations of sus­
pensions of ten days or less (64, p. 584, 95 S. Ct. at 741). 
In the absence of a supreme court decision giving direction to the 
lower federal courts, federal court decisions in the area of procedural 
due process rights for long-term suspensions and expulsions are sometimes 
confusing and misleading. It is important in reviewing lower federal 
court decisions to remember that different and sometimes conflicting re­
sults are possible. Any planning or rule development by school officials 
based on federal court decisions must take into account the underlying 
facts of each case, the jurisdiction in which the case was decided, and 
if it preceded the Goss decision, whether it has been modified by it. 
Those federal court decisions which preceded Goss and which, in whole or 
in part, are in direct conflict with its terms, have to the extent they 
are in conflict, been excluded from this review. 
Expulsion--notice requirements 
The Tainiîn.ui!i amount of time required by due process to be giver, to 
students and parents between notification of the time, place and date 
of the hearing and the hearing itself varies depending on the circum­
stances. A complicated factual situation with numerous witnesses might 
reasonably take several weeks preparation. A single issue with few dis­
puted facts might require only a few days. In any event, reasonable 
consideration should always be given to granting requests for extensions 
of time for preparation. Unless there is a request for an extension of 
time, any amount of time given in a notice of a hearing is likely ade­
quate. 
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In the decision in Whitfield v. Simpson (70), a federal court in 
Illinois ruled that a two-day notice of a pending expulsion hearing was 
adequate time to obtain legal counsel and prepare for the hearing. The 
court noted that while a longer period of time between the notice and 
hearing would have been desirable, there had been no request made for 
additional time for preparation. The court ruled that in the absence of 
such a request before the hearing began, the student and parents would 
not be allowed to complain later about inadequate preparation time. 
One of the most frequently contested aspects of procedural due 
process has been the adequacy of the charges against the student listed 
in the notice. This is especially important because the scope of the 
hearing is usually limited to the statement of the charges provided the 
student in advance of the hearing. It is from the statement of charges 
that a student must prepare a defense to contested allegations. When 
a student admits or does not contest the allegations of misconduct, the 
adequacy of the statement of charges is not as important as when they are 
disputed. The primary purpose of a disciplinary hearing is, after all, 
to make a factual determination of culpability. 
In a 1982 decision in McClain v. Lafayette County Board of Education 
(85), the court of appeals for the fifth circuit ruled that notice of the 
charges given a 14-year-old student and his parents prior to an expul­
sion hearing was deficient. The boy had admitted bringing the knife to 
school but had claimed that he inadvertently forgot that it was in his 
pocket when he left home. The court concluded that since the boy had ad­
mitted having a switchblade knife in his pocket in violation of school 
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rules, nothing unfair had occurred in the context of procedural due 
process. 
A similar result occurred in the decision in Long v. Thornton Town­
ship High School District (86), decided by a federal district court in 
Illinois. In the Long decision, a student challenged his expulsion, 
in part, on the ground that he had not been notified of the charges 
against him with sufficient specificity. The notice to him and his par­
ents stated that he was charged with assaulting another student but did 
not name the other student involved. The court ruled that since the boy 
admitted striking another student, the alleged victim's name missing from 
notice of the charges did not deprive the student of procedural due 
process. 
Even when a student contests the facts surrounding allegations in 
hearings, the federal courts do not require that the charges of miscon­
duct be stated as clearly and distinctly as they would be in a criminal 
proceeding. A federal district court in Louisiana expressly stated as 
much in its decision in Whiteside v. Kay (87). The court in Whiteside 
also expressly ruled that school officials did not have to include in 
the notice a list of potential witnesses against the student and a sum­
mary of their anticipated testimony. The position that procedural due 
process does not require providing a list of witnesses and a summary of 
their testimony was also taken by federal courts in Linwood v. Board of 
Education (66), and Keller v. Fochs (68) . 
There have been relatively few federal court decisions which have 
ruled against the student on the issue of inadequate specificity of 
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detailed notice of charges. One of those was the decision in Pierce v. 
School Committee (88). That decision involved allegations of inadequate 
notice of charges by a boy who was expelled, in the end, for provoking 
his classmates by blowing his nose on a replica of the American flag. In 
the preceding two years, the boy had been disciplined with 13 detentions 
and 14 suspensions for acts such as engaging in disrespectful behavior, 
fighting and insubordination. 
In challenging the adequacy of his notice of charges, the student 
in Pierce argued that language in the notice of charges such as ". . . 
cOTistant disruptions and disrespectful manner and behavior," and "... 
insolent, defiant, disrespectful, insubordinate and persistent in his 
general misconduct over an extended period of time," was too vague to 
give him adequate notice of the specific charges against him. The court 
disagreed and ruled that in light of the student's extensive discipline 
record, the statement of charges given was adequate. 
In the decision in Alex v. Allen (89), a student challenged his re­
moval from school partially on the basis that notice of the specific 
incidents involved were not provided at the same time he received notice 
of the hearing and that when he later received notice of the charges, 
they did not specifically state the school regulations he was alleged 
to have violated. The court ruled that while notice of specific charges 
had to be provided in advance of the hearing in time to prepare a defense, 
they did not have to be provided at the same time as notice of the time, 
place and date of the hearing and that school officials did not have to 
list the specific irules alleged to have been violated, if the charges 
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were otherwise clear from the notice. 
Expulsion—confrontation and cross-examination 
A number of procedural due process issues have arisen with regard 
to the extent to which a student may compel the attendance of witnesses 
and confront and cross-examine witnesses. Not all federal court decisions 
in the area have been found in favor of the student. 
In Greene v. Moore (90), a student expelled for throwing coffee on 
a band director and then throwing the empty cup at him argued that pro­
cedural due process required that when requested to do so, school offi­
cials must require the presence of teachers to testify on the student's 
behalf regarding the student's good conduct in their classes. The court 
did not agree. Neither did the court of appeals for the seventh cir­
cuit in Linwood v. Board of Education (66) when a student argued that 
procedural due process required the ability for stuJcucs charged with 
misconduct to compel the attendance of witnesses through such means as 
subpoenas. 
Two federal court decisions which preceded the Goss decision stated 
quite clearly that procedural due process did not require confrontation 
and cross-examination of witnesses. In Boykins v. Fairfield Board of 
Education (91), the court of appeals for the fifth circuit had before it 
a situation where the evidence against a student at an expulsion hearing 
before the school board consisted of the principal's limited testimony 
from first-hand knowledge, and mostly his reading and paraphrasing state­
ments made by teachers responding to his investigation inquiries. The 
court ruled that "hearsay" evidence of the principal's conversations with 
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teachers was admissible at an expulsion hearing. It went on to distin­
guish between teachers actually testifying against a student and those 
who were merely present or available. The court stated that the right 
to cross-examine applied to the former, not the latter. 
In Whitfield v. Simpson (70), a federal district court in Illinois 
ruled that testimony through the use of affidavits did not violate pro­
cedural due process requirements when there was other substantial evi­
dence in the hearing record to sustain the decision. The court noted 
that strict court rules of evidence regarding hearsay evidence are in­
applicable to an administrative hearing involving student discipline. 
Similar results have also occurred in two decisions handed down 
subsequent to the Goss decision. In Whiteside v. Kay (87), a student 
contested his expulsion from school which resulted from an altercation 
with a coach. After discussing the incident with the student in the 
manner outlined in Goss, the principal suspended the boy for five days 
and notified his parents that he would recommend to the superintendent 
that the boy be expelled for the remainder of the year. 
The boy's mother requested and received a hearing before a school 
disciplinary committee. At the hearing, the principal testified and read 
written statements prepared by the coach involved and another teacher who 
witnessed the incident. The coach and witness did not personally give 
testimony. The disciplinary committee upheld the principal's recanmenda-
tion to expel the boy, and the boy's mother appealed to the school board. 
The boy was represented by legal counsel before the board and was given 
an opportunity to tell his version of the story again. Without hearing 
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other witnesses and basing its decision on the record made before the 
disciplinary committee, the board voted to affirm the decision of the 
disciplinary committee. 
In reviewing the procedural due process issues before it, the court 
in Whiteside recognized the balancing process necessary for a determin­
ation of appropriate procedural due process and explained the competing 
interests as follows: 
The question of due process essentially is a ques­
tion of interest analysis. The student has an interest 
in avoiding unfair or mistaken exclusion from the educa­
tional process, while the educational authorities have an 
interest in maintaining order and discipline in the school 
system. (87, p. 720) 
In its analysis of the competing interests, the court ruled that proce­
dural due process, in the context of expulsion from school, did not re­
quire the right to cross-examine witnesses testifying through written 
statements. 
This view was also followed in a 1982 decision rendered by the court 
of appeals for the fifth circuit in KcGlain v. Lafayette County Board of 
Education (85) where the student involved did not actually deny a charge 
of bringing a switchblade knife to school in violation of a school rule. 
Since the boy did not deny the facts, and there was never any doubt of 
guilt, there arose no right to cross-examine student witnesses whose 
tape-recorded statements were played at the hearing. Because cross-ex­
amination of witnesses is directly related to the establishment of fact, 
when the facts are not contested, the right to cross-examine witnesses 
does not arise. 
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A particularly difficult issue of confrontation of witnesses occurs 
when the primary witnesses against a student are the student's peers. 
While many school officials are reluctant to have student accusers face 
the accused, unless there is some clear indication of the likelihood of 
retaliation against student witnesses, school officials should strongly 
consider using their testimony. 
While this study has not discovered any federal court decisions 
directly concerned with the issue of confrontation of student witnesses, 
several cases were found which implied that student witnesses could be 
treated differently than adult witnesses. In Dillon v. Pulaski County 
Special School District (32), the court overturned the expulsion of a 
student on the ground that the student was not allowed to cross-examine 
a teacher who was the primary witness against him. In doing so, however, 
the court recognized a limit on the right to confront witnesses in 
school disciplinary proceedings. It stated that in some situations where 
student accusers might be the victims of reprisals, ostracism, or psycho­
logical trauma, anonymity might be appropriate. This view was also 
voiced in Graham v. Knutzen (77) in the context of long-term suspen-
s ions. 
In the case of DeJesus v. Penberthy (73), the court ruled that stu­
dent witnesses could not submit crucial testimony in the form of written 
statements at an expulsion hearing. The court noted, however, that in 
the case of some student witnesses, confrontation and cross-examination 
might inhibit rather than improve the likelihood that a board would hear 
the truth and stated that such student testimony could be taken before 
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the board out of the presence of the accused. The accused would have to 
be given a summarized statement of the testimony and the board would 
have the burden of establishing that the student testimony involved 
would have been inhibited had it not been heard out of the presence of 
the accused. 
Expulsion—right to representation 
While several federal court decisions have ruled that long-term sus­
pensions and expulsions require the right to be represented by legal 
counsel, none were found which indicate that school officials have a 
responsibility to pay for or provide legal counsel for a student. Two 
decisions were reviewed which expressly ruled that public school offi­
cials are not required to provide legal counsel for students threatened 
with long-term suspensions or expulsion. They were Linwood v. Board of 
Education (66) , and Boykins v. Fairfield Board of Education (91). 
In Graham v. Kautzen (62), the issue was not whether students had a 
right to be represented by legal counsel, but whether students had a 
right to be represented by someone who was not an attorney. The right 
to representation by legal counsel was provided for in school rules. The 
court said that it could not find any legal authority which stated that 
procedural due process included the right to be represented by a non-
lawyer and denied the students' request for an express statement of 
right to lay representation. 
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Expulsion—impartial decision-maker 
An area of frequent legal challenge to disciplinary decisions in 
the educational setting is the allegation that the student was precluded 
from receiving a fair hearing because the decision-maker, whether it is 
the school board, administrator or hearing officer, was biased against 
the student. While a few courts have ruled in favor of the student on 
the specific facts before them, most courts reviewing the issue have 
ruled in favor of school officials on the legal issue. This is largely 
due to a presumption of honesty and integrity which courts have accorded 
school officials sitting as finders of fact in disciplinary hearings-
The leading decision on the point is that of Hortonville Joint School 
District v. Hortonville Education Association (92). In Hortonville, the 
Iftiited States Supreme Court had before it an appeal from a decision of 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court which had ruled that a local school board 
was not sufficiently impartial when it voted to terminate the employment 
of teachers who were on strike in violation of state law.' The Wisconsin 
court based its decision on the animosity existing between the public 
employer and employees in a collective bargaining breakdown and an en­
suing illegal strike and refusal to return to duties. The sole issue 
before the United States Supreme Court was whether the procedural due 
process requirement of an unbiased decision-maker precluded the local 
school board from making the decision to terminate the striking teachers. 
The court ruled that it did not. In doing so, it noted that a presump­
tion of honesty and integrity exists in local boards with decision-making 
power that mere familiarity with the facts, taking a position in public 
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or prior involvement in the matter were insufficient to overcome. 
In Long V. Thornton Township High School District (86), a student 
challenged his expulsion partially on the ground that school board mem­
bers were prejudiced by their prior involvement in the matter. The 
court ruled that mere prior involvement in an issue before a local school 
board did not disclose a sufficient prejudice to overcome a presumption 
of unbias. 
In Jenkins v. Louisiana State Board of Education (93), six students 
challenged their removal from Grambling College on the basis of a preju­
diced decision-maker. The school's disciplinary hearing board had pre­
viously held a hearing and imposed a penalty on the students. A court 
ordered a rehearing before the disciplinary hearing board and when it 
again disciplined the students, they alleged the board was prejudiced by 
the earlier proceedings and by the fact that the college president, who 
had appointed the board members, was one of the witnesses against the 
students. 
The court in Jenkins ruled that it could not conclude that the hear­
ing board members were biased without a clear showing of actual prejudice. 
Mere alleged prejudice was not enough; it had to be clearly shown on the 
facts of the case. 
In Pierce v. School Committee (88), a student challenged his expul­
sion, in part, by arguing that one of the members of the school committee 
voting to expel him was biased because the boy had referred to the com­
mittee member in writing as a "fascist pig." The court ruled that making 
the remark did not in itself establish actual prejudice and 
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refused to overturn the decision to expel the student. 
Mere exposure to some of the facts in advance of the hearing does 
not necessarily mean that the decision-maker is improperly prejudiced. 
In Gonzales v. McEuen (67), a federal court in California overturned the 
expulsion of several students on procedural due process grounds but 
expressly upheld the concept that mere exposure to evidence before a 
hearing is insufficient grounds on which to question the fairness of 
the decision-maker. The court concluded as follows on the point: 
A school board would be amiss in its duties if it 
did not make sane inquiry to know what was going on in the 
district for which it was responsible. Some familiarity 
with the facts of the case gained by an agency in the per­
formance of its statutory role does not disqualify a deci­
sion maker. (67, p. 464) 
On some occasions, an attorney for a student involved in a disci­
plinary hearing may attempt to determine at the beginning of the hearing 
whether individual school board members are prejudiced against the stu­
dent. The attorney sometimes requests permission to ask individual 
board members questions about their prior involvement and knowledge of 
the facts similar to what an attorney does in the selection of jurors in 
a trial. The practice is called voir dire examination and has apparently 
not often been an issue raised in federal courts reviewing student dis­
ciplinary proceedings. In the decision of Chamberlain v. Wichita Falls 
Independent School District (94), the court of appeals for the fifth 
circuit ruled that a teacher not permitted to conduct a voir dire exam­
ination of individual board members at her termination hearing was not 
denied procedural due process. Conceptually, the result would likely be 
the same in a student disciplinary proceeding. 
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A subissue of the impartial decision-maker issue is that of the 
role played by the attorney for the decision-maker. In Alex v. Allen 
(89), a district court in Pennsylvania heard a challenge to a thirty-day 
suspension from school based, in part, on an allegation of improper 
participation by the school board attorney. In the hearing before the 
board, the attorney acted as the prosecutor, ruled on objections raised 
by the student's attorney and advised the board in its deliberations. 
The court in Alex found that because the boy was represented by an 
attorney, given full opportunity to present his side of the story and 
otherwise given a fair hearing, the multiple role played by the board's 
attorney did not violate the student's right to procedural due process. 
Because there are several other court decisions to the contrary on the 
issue of board attorneys' multiple roles in disciplinary proceedings, 
the decision in Alex should be considered valid only in its factual con­
text , especially that it involved only a thirty-day suspension from 
school. 
Expulsion--other issues 
The foregoing issues of procedural due process represent those which 
are commonly at issue in federal court reviews of procedural due process 
issues. Several other issues of procedural due process have been re­
viewed by federal courts which have resulted in rulings against argu­
ments put forth by students and parents. In a previously mentioned 
decision by the court of appeals for the seventh circuit in Linwood v. 
Board of Education (66), several issues of alleged procedural due process 
violations not previously discussed were rejected out-of-hand by the 
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court. The court in its pre-Goss ruling stated that procedural due 
process in student expulsion situations did not require that student 
disciplinary hearings be open to the public, charges be proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt, a unanimous decision be rendered, or a written 
opinion be issued outlining the finding of facts on which the decision 
is based. The court's ruling in Linwood on the issue of a requirement 
of a written decision was expressly followed in a later decision in 
Long V. Thornton Township High School District (86). 
The ruling in Linwood on the lack of a requirement of an open 
public hearing was in agreement with an earlier ruling by a district 
court in Massachusetts in the case of Pierce v. School Committee (88). 
Pierce also ruled that procedural due process in the context of student 
expulsions does not require that a verbatim record be made of the hearing. 
Other types of discipline 
While some federal court decisions have extended the requirements of 
procedural due process to other areas of student discipline, such as in­
voluntary transfer between attendance centers and participation in ath­
letics, others have declined to do so. One decision that refused to 
extend the right of procedural due process to interscholastic competi­
tion was Dallam v. Cumberland Valley School District (95). In that case, 
a 15-year-old boy was declared ineligible for one year under a rule 
which made students ineligible for transferring between schools without 
a like change of residence of his parents. The boy was allowed to con­
tinue to practice and be instructed, but he could not play in interscho-
lastic competition. The court ruled that there was no property interest 
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in interscholastic competition which gave rise to a right to procedural 
due process. The court explained its rationale that each school activ­
ity does not in itself give rise to a protected right as follows: 
It seems to us that the property interest in education 
created by the state is participation in the entire process. 
The myriad activities which combine to form that educational 
process cannot be dissected to create hundreds of separate 
property rights each cognizable under the Constitution. Other­
wise, removal from a particular class, dismissal from an ath­
letic team, a club or any activity, would each require ultimate 
satisfaction of procedural due process. (95, p. 361) 
Several subsequent court decisions have arrived at the same conclu­
sion. They include the courts of appeals for the tenth circuit in Albach 
V. Qdle (96), the sixth circuit in Hamilton v. Tennessee Secondary School 
Athletic Association (97), and the first circuit in Herbert v. Ventetuolo 
(98). 
In the decision entitled Fowler v. Williamson (99), a student 
challenged his being barred from graduation ceremonies for wearing blue 
jeans to the ceremonies. The court in Fowler ruled that there is no 
property right in participation in graduation ceremonies and, therefore, 
procedural due process was not required. 
A somewhat different issue of extension of procedural due process 
rights to areas other than suspension or expulsion was the subject of 
Pegram v. Nelson (100). In that case, a 14-year-old ninth-grade boy 
was accused, along with t^zo other boys, of participating in the theft 
of a billfold. The boys were observed near the scene of the theft and 
the billfold was found in a restroom known to have been used by the boys. 
The two other boys involved admitted their guilt and implicated the third 
boy in written statements. The third boy denied the charge, but declined 
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to give school officials the names of persons who could support his 
innocence. The boy's father was telephoned and asked to come to school 
where the matter was discussed with the boy in his presence. 
After a full discussion, the principal suspended the boy from school 
for ten days and placed him on probation for the rest of the school year, 
four months. Probation included exclusion from all after-school activi­
ties. The boy's father later talked to the principal and gave him the 
names of other students who had knowledge of the incident. The principal 
talked to the named students but later informed the father that he would 
not alter his previous decision. 
The court in Pegram ruled that the principal's actions clearly met 
the Goss decision's requirement for procedural due process for suspen­
sions but it also considered the issue of whether the rudimentary due 
process procedures required in Goss were adequate when a ten-day suspen­
sion was accompanied by a four-month probation. The court noted that 
while denial of one or several extracurricular activities does not give 
rise to a right to procedural due process, a total exclusion from extra­
curricular activities does. The court ruled, however, that the appropri­
ate due process for probations was the same as that required for short-
term suspensions. Since the boy had clearly received the type of proce­
dural due process required in Goss, he was not entitled to more. The 
court also rejected the argument that allegations of theft against the 
boy created a greater liberty interest which required greater due process. 
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Subsequent Due Process Proceedings 
Many school officials have learned after the fact that a particu­
lar student may not have been afforded appropriate procedural due process. 
Some have proceeded in a "let the chips fall where they may" attitude. 
Others have attempted to take constructive approaches to the problem. 
One potential constructive approach is the holding of a second hearing 
which includes appropriate due process requirements. This may be accom­
plished in at least two ways. One way would be to have a higher author­
ity hear the matter on appeal. 
In Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District (59), the court 
of appeals for the fifth circuit was faced with a situation in which a 
student had twice used profanity toward the principal. After a hearing 
before the principal, the principal determined that the boy should be 
disciplined. The student appealed to an assistant superintendent who 
held a second hearing in which all the evidence previously heard was 
again considered. The court said that the principal's sitting as the 
decision-maker in the first hearing was inappropriate because he had 
been the victim of the student's alleged misconduct. However, since be­
fore the discipline was carried out, the matter was reviewed in its en­
tirety a second time by an assistant superintendent, the boy's right to 
procedural due process was not violated. The concept that a procedural 
defect in a hearing might be cured by providing appropriate due process 
procedures in an appeal hearing was also approved in Greene v. Moore 
(90). 
Another approach would be to remove all mention of the previous 
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faulty hearing and discipline from the student's record and hold a 
second hearing at the same level of authority. This approach was ex­
pressly approved by the court of appeals for the eighth circuit in 
Strickland v. Inlow (69). In Strickland, a local school board had sus­
pended three girls for allegedly spiking the punch at an extracurricu­
lar event. The problem centered around inadequate notice of the time, 
place and date of the hearing. The school officials involved argued 
that they had held a second hearing two weeks after the first which 
cured prior procedural defects. The court expressly stated that a defect 
in due process afforded in the first hearing could be cured by a second 
hearing, but on the facts before the court, it was not. Because the 
school board had prepared a written statement of its findings of facts 
before the second hearing began and distributed the findings during the 
hearing, the court ruled that the second hearing was nothing more than 
a sham and mere ratification of the earlier decision. There was nothing 
in the record that showed that the board actually considered the issue 
anew and the court found that the second hearing had not, in fact, cured 
the procedural defect in the first hearing. 
The view that school officials can hold a second hearing to cure a 
due process defect in the original hearing was part of the court's de­
cision in Williams v. Vermilian Parish School Board (101). The court in 
Williams also stated that the amount of time lapse between the first 
hearing and the curative hearing was not important. 
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Damages 
School officials who may have inadvertently violated the procedural 
due process rights of students, and who for one reason or another have 
not seen fit to provide for a subsequent hearing, can take some strength 
in knowing that monetary damages awarded to the students receiving in­
adequate due process may be nominal. Such was the result in the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Carey v. Piphus (102), 
The Carey decision involved several elementary and secondary stu­
dents in Illinois who had been suspended from school for 20 days and who 
had not been provided adequate procedural due process. The district 
court did not award any damages to the students. It said that the stu­
dents had not shown any specific monetary injury resulting from being 
out of school for 20 days. The court of appeals for the seventh circuit 
overruled the district court and held that the students were entitled to 
damages regardless of proof of actual injury (103). 
The suprsES court disagreed izith both Ic-'er courts and ruled that in 
the absence of proof of actual injury, students whose procedural due 
process rights were violated, but whose suspensions were justified on 
the facts, are entitled to recover only nominal damages not to exceed 
one dollar. Of course, if a student can show that his procedural due 
process rights were violated and if he had been provided an opportunity 
for a fair hearing, he would not have been found guilty and punished, 
the student will be given an opportunity to prove actual damages in ex­
cess of the nominal damages. 
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An award of one dollar as nominal damages actually occurred in 
Darby v. Schoo (104) and in Dillon v. Pulaski County Special School Dis­
trict (32). Dillon was a case where the school officials refused to 
allow a student to cross-examine a teacher who had allegedly been the 
victim of the student's insubordinate behavior and Darby involved an in­
definite suspension. 
Summary 
While students and their parents have lost a significant number of 
federal court decisions on procedural due process issues and federal 
courts have expressly and impliedly placed limitations on the extent of 
student rights in the area, it remains difficult to establish well-defined 
lines between student rights and student responsibilities in the area. 
Due in part to the inherent flexibility of procedural due process re­
quirements based upon specific factual circumstances and in part to some­
times conflicting court decisions among the various federal court juris­
dictions, it is not feasible to establish parameters of student respon­
sibility on a national level. However, each locality should be able to 
establish parameters of student responsibility in the procedural due 
process area by reviewing court decisions from both a national and local 
federal court jurisdictional perspective. 
Due to the supreme court decision in Goss v. Lopez, the parameters 
of student responsibility for short-term suspensions of ten days or less 
are more easily determined thaa those for long-term suspensions and ex­
pulsions. In the areas of short-term suspensions, school officials are 
Ill 
generally not required to provide students with the right to confront 
or cross-examine witnesses (Goss and Reinman), call upon the accused 
student's witnesses for testimony (Goss), allow legal counsel (Goss and 
Everett), or provide a presuspension hearing if the student poses a 
serious danger or threat to the school environment (Goss and Sweet). 
Some courts have plainly refused to extend the Goss requirements of a 
rudimentary hearing to such things as warning the student of the right to 
remain silent (Boynton), having the student's parents present (Boynton), 
making a verbatim record (Reinman), and having the hearing conducted by 
scsjieone not employed by the school (Hillman). 
Due to the absence of a supreme court ruling on the procedures re­
quired for long-term suspensions and expulsions, many conflicts of inter­
pretation have arisen as to the specific requirements of procedural due 
process for long-term suspensions and expulsions. Nevertheless, a re­
view of federal court decisions has revealed a significant number of 
federal court decisions that show that student rights in the area of 
procedural due process are not unlimited. Federal courts have found 
that students facing possible long-term suspensions or expulsion are not 
entitled to a notice of charges that is as specific and detailed as that 
required for criminal charges (Whiteside), as specific a notice of 
charges when the facts are admitted as when they are contested (McClain 
and Long), a more specific notice of allegations when in the context of 
the circumstances the notice is sufficiently clear (Pierce and Alex), a 
longer time to prepare a defense in the absence of a request for addition­
al time (Whitfield), a list of witnesses and their expected testimony 
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(Linwood and Keller), the right to cross-examine all witnesses against 
the student (Boykins, Whitfield, Whiteside and McClain; contra ., Dillon, 
Fielder and Gonzales), cross-examine student witnesses (Dillon, Graham 
and DeJesus), compel the attendance of witnesses (Greene and Linwood), 
representation by an attorney paid for by the school (Boykins and Lin­
wood) , lay representation (Graham), make a verbatim record of the hear­
ing (Pierce; contra., Fielder), a written decision outlining the finding 
of facts (Linwood and Long; contra., Dejesus and Fielder), proof of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt (Linwood), a hearing open to the public (Lin­
wood and Pierce), and a unanimous decision on the part of a multiple-
member finder of fact (Linwood). While the courts are split on the issue 
of an impartial decision-maker, the differing results have occurred 
largely on the specific facts involved. Most courts agree that a pre­
sumption exists that the decisionmaker is unbiased (Hortonville, Long, 
Jenkins, Pierce, Gonzales and Chamberlain). 
Not all types of student discipline involve a sufficient legal in­
terest to require imposition of procedural due process. For instance, 
participation in school activities such as, graduation ceremonies 
(Fowler) and athletic participation (Dallam, Albach, Hamilton and 
Herbert; contra., Davis) has been ruled not to be of sufficient interest 
to warrant the requirements of procedural due process. 
In the event that school officials do not provide a student with 
appropriate procedural due process, the school officials may cure proce­
dural defects througji subsequent hearings. This may be accomplished on 
appeal before the removal from school is imposed (Sullivan and Greene), 
113 
or by removing the earlier hearing results from the student's record and 
holding a second hearing (Strickland and Williams). 
Should procedural due process not be afforded a student, the mone­
tary damages awarded may not be great. If a defect in procedural due 
process did not make any difference in finding a student guilty of mis­
conduct, only nominal monetary damages may be awarded the student 
(Carey, Dillon and Darby). 
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CHAPTER VI, VALIDITY OF SCHOOL RULES 
In this chapter, the purpose is to review federal court decisions 
involving issues related to the validity of rules of behavior promul­
gated and enforced by public school officials. This chapter contains a 
brief description of student rights in the area of legal challenges to 
the validity of school rules; however, primary emphasis has been given 
to those federal court decisions which were won by school officials or 
in which the courts have established express or implied parameters of 
student responsibilities. Due to the jurisdictional geographic influ­
ence on the result of decisions involving student dress codes, as dis­
cussed in Chapter VIII, decisions involving school rules related to hair 
styles and attire have been excluded from this chapter. 
Student Rights 
It is quite clear from a review of federal court decisions that stu­
dents must obey valid school rules. The key issue is, of course, the 
determination of whether a school rule is "valid." Federal courts faced 
with issues of validity of school rules and, thus, their enforceability, 
have focused their review primarily on four different but related legal 
issues. Those four included whether a rule is reasonable, whether stu­
dents had or should have had notice of the proscribed conduct, whether 
the rule was drafted in clear and unambiguous language and whether the 
rule did not infringe upon constitutionally-protected rights. When any 
of these four questions are answered in the negative, the courts are 
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likely to invalidate the enforceability of a school rule. 
The first criterion of a valid school rule is that of reasonable­
ness. A school rule must be reasonable in terms of common sense, and 
it must be related to a legitimate educational purpose. The rule must 
pertain to conduct which relates to and affects school management. 
Reasonable school rules include those designed for the purpose of main­
taining order, discipline and decorum in the school environment (31). 
A school rule that proposes to discipline a student who starts a 
fight would be reasonable because fighting disrupts the school environ­
ment and directly affects the management of schools. A school rule that 
proposes to discipline students for speeding on a public highway, when 
no school event or activity is involved, would be difficult for school 
officials to defend on the basis of reasonableness. Because school offi­
cials are vested with authority over educational matters only, not law 
enforcement, the necessary school nexus is lacking in the latter rule. 
There are many areas of student conduct in which the direct effect 
on school management is not easily determinable. Those areas, such as 
conduct of students toward teachers away from the school premises, 
create difficulty for reviewing courts. The issue becomes one of fact­
finding. Did the out-of-school conduct of the student prohibited by the 
school rule have a sufficient relationship to good school management? If 
it did, the student may be punished; if not, punishment is not appropri­
ate (33). 
Except for a few federal court decisions overturning student dress 
codes on the ground that they were not reasonably related to the 
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purposes of education, only one decision has been found in this study 
which overturned a school rule on the ground of being unreasonable (105). 
This dearth of case law could have several causes. However, due to the 
significant number of rules which have been upheld by the federal courts 
as being reasonable, it can be assumed that the vast majority of courts 
reviewing the issue of reasonableness have resolved the issue in favor 
of school officials. The courts tend to work from a presumption of 
legality of school rules (106, p. 488). 
The second criterion of a valid school rule is notice. Whenever an 
educational institution establishes a standard of student conduct where 
a violation may result in disciplinary action against students, the in­
stitution must provide a warning of the proscribed conduct to the stu­
dents in a form and manner which is likely to give students adequate ad­
vance notice of the proscribed behavior. The notice may be given orally, 
in writing or a combination of the two. The important thing is that 
students have the opportunity to know what conduct is forbidden to them 
before they are held accountable by school officials for misconduct (55). 
The third criterion of a valid school rule is that it not be writ­
ten in vague terminology or cover too broad an area so that it infringes 
upon constitutional rights. Much of the time, there is little dispute 
as to the type of conduct which is meant to be covered by a school rule. 
Sometimes, however, words used in drafting rules do not convey a suffici­
ently precise message about the proscribed conduct. This especially be­
comes a problem when students' actions involve constitutionally-protected 
rights. 
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A leading decision on the issue of vagueness and overbreadth is one 
issued by the court of appeals for the seventh circuit in Soglin v. 
Kauffman (107). In Soglin, the court was presented with a challenge 
to a University of Wisconsin student conduct code which warned students 
that they were subject to discipline for engaging in "misconduct." 
The district court ruled that the word "misconduct" did not by it­
self give students a sufficient standard against which to measure their 
actions and was, therefore, too vague to be enforceable. It also found 
that because the term "misconduct" included many degrees of student 
offenses which schools could not prohibit in the context of protection 
of constitutional rights, that the term was unconstitutionally overbroad 
in its scope. 
On appeal, the court of appeals in Soglin noted that school rules 
containing standards of discipline for students must be properly pro­
mulgated and must be expressed in reasonably clear terminology. The 
court concluded, as did the district court, that "misconduct" is not an 
adequate standard to assist students, school officials or judges in de­
termining whether a specific act by a student fits its prohibition. 
The district court decision was affirmed. 
In Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District (108), a school 
district, by rule, delegated the establishment of attendance center rules 
to principals. The only standard in the district rule was that rules of 
a school play a necessary role in "promoting its best interests." When 
two students challenged their being disciplined for publishing and dis­
tributing an underground newspaper, school officials attempted to defend 
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their actions based on their authority to pronote the school's best in­
terest. There were no express rules prohibiting the type of student 
conduct involved. 
The court in Sullivan ruled that the phrase "promoting its best 
interests" was too vague to provide students and school officials with 
objective standards by which to measure student behavior. In finding 
the phrase vague, the court concluded that times are changing and "gen­
eralities can no longer serve as standards of behavior when the right to 
obtain an education hangs in the balance" (108, p. 1346), 
The fourth criterion of a valid school rule is that it can not in­
fringe upon constitutionally-protected rights. Most decisions on the 
issue of infringement of constitutional rights by rules are related to 
issues of vagueness discussed immediately above. When a rule comes close 
to infringing on constitutional rights, especially those contained in 
the First Amendment, school officials must take great care to see that 
the rule does not unduly infringe upon those rights (107, 108, 109). 
However, it is also true that no rule promulgated by school offi­
cials may infringe directly upon the constitutional rights of students. 
In Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent Community School District (1), a 
rule promulgated by district principals forbidding the wearing of black 
armbands as "silent protest" was ruled a violation of the students' con­
stitutional rights. Neither could a rule subject all students to a 
search at the mere whim of school officials. Reasonable cause must 
exist for a school search. (See Chapter VIII.) And, neither can 
schools, in usual circumstances, prohibit the distribution of any and 
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all published materials (109) , nor ban all student demonstrations on a 
college campus (110). 
Student Responsibilities 
Reasonableness 
In reviewing challenges to school rules, the federal courts invari­
ably begin from the position that the school rule is reasonable, and the 
person challenging the rule must carry the burden of showing that it is 
not. The courts usually recognize the limitations of their expertise 
in educational matters and defer issues of reasonableness to the judg­
ment of the educators involved. This position and the philosophy behind 
it were well-stated in Speake v. Grantham (55). The decision in Speake 
involved the discipline of university students, but the philosophy ex­
pressed is equally applicable to elementary and secondary students, if 
not more so. The court said as follows: 
Unless university and college officials have authority to 
keep order, they have no power to guarantee education. The 
power of the authorities to oversee, to formulate rules and 
regulations, and to rule is a necessary element in order to 
provide and promote education. Consequently, the judiciary 
must exercise restraint in questioning the wisdom of specific 
rules and the manner of their application, since such matters 
are ordinarily the product of school administrators rather 
than the courts. In formulating regulations, including those 
pertaining to the discipline of school children, school offi­
cials must be reasonable. It not for the courts to con­
sider whether such rules are wise or expedient, but merely 
whether they are a reasonable exercise of the pcwer and dis­
cretion of the school authority. Regulations which are essen­
tial in maintaining order and discipline on school property 
are reasonable; that is, if they are necessary for the orderly 
presentation of classroom activities or contribute to the 
maintenance of order and decorum within the educational system 
or contribute to the proper operation of public school systems. 
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which is one of the highest and most fundamental responsi­
bilities of the state, they are necessary and reasonable. 
(55, p. 1272) 
This view has also been expressed by numerous other courts (18, 32, 38, 
110, 111). 
More important than the philosophical outlook of the courts is their 
actual application of that philosophy to factual situations before 
them. The following is a partial listing of school rules which have 
been approved by federal courts as being reasonable: Prohibition of 
students' show of affection and kissing in the school hallway (32); 
Prohibition against defiant attitude and show of disrespect toward teach­
ers (32, 89); Prohibition against distribution of publications which en­
courage "actions which endanger the health and safety of students; (57); 
Prohibition against the solicitation of funds from studencd (58) ; Pro­
hibition against older student participation in contact sports (112); 
Prohibition against loitering in areas of heavy hallway traffic (89); 
Prohibition against rowdy behavior and running in the school building 
(89); Prohibition against possession of dangerous drugs (113, 114); Pro­
hibition against skipping classes and skipping detention (63); Prohibi­
tion against wearing message buttons in tense circumstances (26); Pro­
hibition against demonstrations in school buildings (110); Prohibition 
against participation in mass gatherings which are unruly or unlawful 
(18); Prohibition against possession of obscene materials on school prop­
erty (38); Prohibition against bringing knives and other weapons to 
school (111); Prohibition against outsiders visiting school buildings 
without permission (109); Prohibition against the use of vulgar speech 
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and simulated drinking on the school stage (115); Prohibition against 
taking cans and bottles into a school building (116); Prohibition against 
creation of disturbances in school assembly (31); and Prohibition of the 
granting of official school recognition to groups which refuse to affirm 
in advance that they are willing to adhere to reasonable school rules 
(117). 
Notice 
Clearly, the preferable way to give notice of proscribed conduct 
to students is to reduce properly promulgated rules to writing and make 
copies available to students (55, 118). In McClain v. Lafayette County 
Board (85), a school rule prohibiting the possession of a switchblade 
knife was contained in a student handbook which was given and read to 
students on the first day of school. Even the student's mother admitted 
reading the rule in the handbook. As a result, there was no issue in 
the case of lack of notice. Neither was there an issue of lack of notice 
in Sword v. Fox (110) where a student handbook contained rules regulat­
ing student conduct as well as definitions of uncommonly-used language 
found in the school rules. 
In Zamora v. Pomeroy (114), school rules expressly prohibited the 
possession of marijuana on school property and contained a provision that 
stated that student lockers remained the property of the school and 
could be searched at any time by school officials. The rules were con­
tained in a student handbook which was given to and read by the student 
involved. When the student later challenged his discipline for posses­
sion of marijuana found as a result of a locker search, the court 
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determined that the school rule had placed the student on notice that 
the locker was in the joint control of both him and school officials. 
The student, therefore, was unable to contend successfully that he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the locker which was protected by 
the Fourth Amendment. 
Two court decisions have reviewed issues involving notice of the 
proscribed acts being published in college newspapers. In Gardenhire v. 
Chalmers (119), a federal district court in Kansas upheld a University 
of Kansas rule published in the school newspaper which prohibited the 
carrying of firearms on campus. In Center for Participant Education v. 
Marshall (120), a Florida court upheld enforcement of a Florida State 
University president's executive order published in the school newspaper. 
In the latter decision, the student verified his having read the notice 
by his informing school officials that he did not intend to comply with 
the order. University officials then gave the student an oral warning 
to not violate the president's order. 
While providing written rules to students normally negates conten­
tions of lack of proper notice, rules announced orally are equally valid. 
In Graham v. Houston Independent School District (61), the school prin­
cipal had announced to the student body on two occasions that students 
were not to distribute unauthorized material on school grounds. Stu­
dents challenging the rule admitted that they knew of the prohibition 
at the time they distributed unauthorized material and the court upheld 
enforcement of the rule. 
In Hill V. Lewis (20), a principal faced with a quickly developing 
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situation of threatened serious disruption was forced to promulgate a 
new rule to prevent the disruption from occurring. On the morning of 
the anticipated disruption, teachers were instructed by the principal to 
ask students to remove armbands before allowing them to go into the 
classroom and to send anyone refusing compliance to the office. In the 
office, students were again requested to remove the armbands. Those who 
refused were suspended. In Hill, the notice of prohibition against the 
wearing of armbands came in the form of directives from teachers and the 
principal to remove the armbands. When challenged, the newly promul­
gated oral directive was upheld. 
There are situations, however, where student discipline has been 
upheld in the absence of notice of a rule and in some situations, even 
in the absence of a rule. Such situations often involve facts where the 
students were reasonably expected to have known that their conduct was 
inappropriate. This has usually involved serious disruption and violence. 
There seems to be a negative correlation between the presence of violence 
and disruption and the requirement of express notice given by school 
rules. 
In Rhyne v. Childs (16), school officials disciplined a large num­
ber of students involved in a general melee between blacks and whites, 
destruction of property, and a walkout by students. When the students 
challenged their being disciplined on the basis of the absence of writ­
ten rules, the court did not agree. The court said the following about 
a requirement of written rules in the context of student violence ; 
Due Process is not affronted when students are disci­
plined for violations of unwritten rules when misconduct 
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challenges lawful school authority and undermines the 
orderly operation of the school. (16, p. 1090) 
In Dunn v. Tyler Independent School District (30), the court was 
faced with a situation involving violent disruption of a newly integrated 
high school and a walkout by nearly 300 students. When students chal­
lenged being disciplined for their acts in the federal district court, 
the court ruled that because the school had no express rule prohibiting 
the conduct engaged in by the students, they could not be disciplined. 
On appeal, the court of appeals noted that there are "grey areas" of stu­
dent conduct where rules are necessary, but stated that attendance is 
not one of them, and overruled the district court decision. The court 
of appeals concluded that no student needs to be told by a rule that 
students are expected to attend class and that school officials can dis­
cipline students involved in a mass refusal to attend class. 
In Frasca v. Andrews (51), a principal had halted the distribution 
of an official school newspaper because it posed a substantial threat of 
altercation between two segments of the student population and contained 
false information which would cause a student irreparable injury. The 
students challenging the principal's action argued that the absence of an 
express written rule authorizing the principal to act as he did left the 
principal without power to restrain school publications. The court did 
not agree and said the following regarding unwritten rules in the cir­
cumstance : 
the power of school officials in a proper case to prevent 
distribution within the school of material which is libel­
ous, obscene, disruptive of school activities, or likely to 
create substantial disorder, or which invades the rights of 
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others, does not disappear merely because the school board 
has failed to adopt written policies requiring review in 
advance of distribution. Written policies and guidelines 
undoubtedly have a pedagogical value; they probably help to 
avoid problems such as have arisen in this case, by offer­
ing to students a clearer indication of what is permitted 
and what is proscribed. In addition, when a prior restraint 
is actually imposed they enhance a sense of fairness and 
provide an opportunity for discussion, negotiation, and 
compromise in order to accommodate competing interests. All 
of that may be desirable, but is not required by the consti­
tution. (51, p. 1050) 
A similar result occurred in a decision involving a university publica­
tion in Norton v. Discipline Committee (56). 
One especially interesting decision upholding the discipline of 
students in the absence of an express rule or notice was that entitled 
Basson v. Boothby (118). The decision in Hasson is representative of 
cases at the far end of the spectrum of decisions upholding discipline 
by school officials in the absence of express rules. The case involved 
three students who drank beer off school premises and then proceeded to 
go to a school-sponsored dance, A teacher at the dance detected the 
odor of beer, and two of the students aisitted to hi= that they had been 
drinking beer. There were no disturbances, the students were not drunk, 
and they were not excluded from the dance. 
The next week, however, the boys were temporarily removed from 
athletic participation by their respective athletic team coaches and when 
the principal learned of the incident, he directed that the boys be 
placed on probation for one year, subject to periodic review. Probation 
meant exclusion from all school activities and other minor punishments. 
There were no established rules which expressly prohibited student in­
volvement with alcohol. 
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The record in the case showed that coaches regularly disciplined 
athletic team members who consumed alcohol, and that the principal had 
an established practice of placing students involved with alcohol on 
probation for a year. The boys involved in the case knew of the former 
aspect of school custom and practice, but the latter was not known to 
them or the general public. 
The students challenged their discipline by the principal on the 
basis that their rights were violated through the enforcement of an un­
published rule. In analyzing the students' arguments, the court recog­
nized the desirability of written school rules but noted that students 
may be punished in some circumstances in the absence of published rules. 
The court concluded that because the boys were generally aware that in­
volvement with alcohol was wrong and could at least be the subject of 
punishment by coaches, the proper function of notice of a school rule 
was met under the circumstances. 
Vagueness 
Federal courts have frequently ruled that statutes enforced by crim­
inal penalties must be written in clear, narrow language in order to pro­
vide persons with notice of the prohibited conduct. The federal courts 
do not usually apply the same concept to school rules, however. With one 
exception (121), all federal court decisions reviewed in this study, 
which discussed the issue, stated that school rules are not required to 
meet the same rigorous tests of clarity and narrowness that are required 
of criminal statutes (56, 66, 89, 107, 122). 
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A leading decision on the issue of vagueness of school rules is 
that of the eighth circuit in Esteban v. Cenral Missouri State College 
(18). The students involved in the case had been disciplined for their 
participation in aggressive and violent demonstrations. School rules 
prohibited student participation in mass gatherings which were "unruly" 
or "unlawful." The court in Esteban discarded the students' argument 
that an analogy should be drawn between school rules and criminal stat­
utes and ruled that the terms "unlawful," and "unruly" were not vague or 
too broad in the context of the facts in the case. The court concluded 
that the students should have known that their violent conduct was pro­
hibited by the rule. 
Many other courts have concluded that challenged language used in 
school rules has not been so vague or overbroad as to make the rule unen­
forceable. Some of the words and phrases found not to be vague in the 
factual context of specific decisions include the following: "[B]oycott, 
sit-in, stand-in, and walkout" in the context of mass student demonstra­
tions (30); "Obstruction or disruption of , . . university activities" 
in the context of distribution of false and inflammatory literature (55) ; 
"[p]rofanity or vulgarity" in the context of an underground newspaper 
(54); "Encourages actions which endanger the health or safety of students" 
in the context of an advertisement for drug paraphernalia in a high school 
newspaper (57); "[olangerous drug" in the context of marijuana possession 
(113); "tolangerous drug" in the context of a student who overdosed on 
a drug while in school (123); "[M]aterial of a false, seditious and in­
flammatory nature" in the context of distribution of literature intended 
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to cause disruption of school activities (56); "[clross disobedience" 
and "misconduct" in the context of twice pulling false fire alarms (76); 
"Assaults" in the context of an altercation (124) ; and "Conduct unbe­
coming an athlete" in the context of an unprovoked assault on a fellow 
basketball-team member resulting in a broken jaw (81). 
It is sometimes obvious that federal courts make an effort to find 
meaning in school rules which are ambiguous on their face. They have 
s onetimes made sense of ambiguous school rules by upholding rules when 
adequate definitions are located elsewhere within school rules (122, 
123), reading two or more rules together to give meaning to otherwise 
ambiguous individual rules (125), and reading state statutes together 
with school rules when neither is sufficiently clear by itself (66, 73). 
Federal courts, however, may no longer have to stretch the imagina­
tion to uphold a school rule against a challenge on the ground of vague­
ness. A recent decision by the United States Supreme Court entitled 
Board of Education v. McCluskey (126) should result in substantially 
fewer court reviajs of school rules on the issue of vagueness. In 
McCluskey, the supreme court had before it a factual situation which 
involved a high school student who left the school grounds after his 
first-period class and consumed alcoholic beverages until he became 
intoxicated. Later the same day, the boy returned to school to go on a 
band trip, was apprehended by the principal and suspended from school. 
He was later expelled for the rest of the semester by board action. The 
student did not deny drinking alcoholic beverages. 
There were three school rules involved in the case, with the third 
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one being at the center of controversy. The record in the case did not 
show clearly which of the rules had been applied by the board to the 
situation. The first rule authorized suspension from school for good 
cause and the second defined good cause to include "sale, use or pos­
session of alcoholic beverages or illegal drugs." The third rule pro­
vided that students would be expelled if they had on school property or 
at school functions "... used, sold, been under the influence or, 
been in possession of narcotics, or other hallucinogenics, drugs or con­
trolled substances classified as such by Act 590 of 1971, as amended." 
Act 590 was a state law which expressly excluded alcohol from its cover­
age. 
In McCluskey, the district court had ruled that because Act 590 
expressly excluded alcohol from its coverage and because alcohol was not 
generally considered in common understanding to be a drug, alcohol could 
not be considered a "drug" under the third rule. School officials, there­
fore, could not discipline the student for being under the influence of 
alcohol. The district court concluded that punishment of the boy vio­
lated his right to substantive due process and ordered him reinstated in 
school with all reference to the incident removed from his school records. 
The court of appeals affirmed the district court decision. The United 
States Supreme Court reversed the district court and the court of appeals 
and iruled that its previous decision in Wood v. Strickland (127) pre­
cluded federal courts from interpreting school rules differently than a 
local school board construes its own rules. 
In Wood, the court of appeals for the eighth circuit had interpreted 
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a local school rule involving "intoxicating liquor" differently than the 
local school board and overturned the local board's expulsion of three 
students. The students involved admitted knowing that their actions 
were wrong. The supreme court said as follows in Wood: 
In light of this evidence, the Court of Appeals was ill ad­
vised to supplant the interpretation of the regulation of 
those officers who adopted it and are entrusted with its 
enforcement. 
Given the fact that there was evidence supporting 
the charge against the [students J, the contrary judgment 
of the Court of Appeals is improvident. It is not the 
role of the Federal Courts to set aside decisions of 
school administrators which the Court may view as lacking 
a basis in wisdom or compassion. (127, pp. 325-26, 95 S. 
Ct. at 1002-3) 
The supreme court noted in McCluskey that an interpretation of a school 
rule by a promulgating board may be so unusual or extreme that it could 
violate students' substantive due process rights, but that was not the 
case on the facts before it. 
Infringement of protected rights 
Obviously, the federal courts do not approve of school rules which 
are worded so ambiguously that they infringe upon the constitutional 
rights of students. Neither do they approve of rules which directly 
infringe upon students' rights. It should not be forgotten, however, 
that no right is absolute and on occasion constitutional rights of stu­
dents must yield to the interests of the school community at large. 
This point was evident in the decision entitled Tate v. Board of Educa­
tion (31). In Tate. a group of black students were disciplined for vio­
lating a school rule which stated that "it is strictly against the rules 
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to create a disturbance in assembly." The black students involved 
created a disturbance by noisily walking out of a pep assembly in the 
middle of the program when the pep band played "Dixie." The court up­
held the discipline of the students on the basis that the rule was rea­
sonably designed for the purpose of maintaining order and discipline 
in the school environment. 
In Sword v. Fox (110), college students disciplined for staging a 
demonstration in a school administration building challenged the validity 
of a school rule which required students to file a request to hold demon­
strations and prohibited the holding of demonstrations in school build­
ings. The purpose of demonstrations was never asked and permission had 
never been refused. Several had been required to move to other locations. 
The court upheld the school rule in Sword on the basis that it was 
nondiscriminatory and was reasonably related to the purposes of educa­
tion. The court noted that a ban on all demonstrations would be in­
valid, but a rule which required mere registration and denied the right 
to demonstrate in specific places was valid. The ri^t of students to 
express themselves through demonstrations had to yield to the rights of 
the school community as a whole to a peaceful educational environment. 
Similar results of noninfringement have occurred in other federal 
court decisions. In other cases, students' rights have not been in­
fringed upon by school rules which authorized locker searches (114), 
authorized searches of elementary-age students (125), prohibited solici­
tations (58), prohibited the wearing of message buttons in tense school 
situations (26), required submission of written materials prior to 
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distribution (42) and prohibited demonstrations which resulted in dis­
ruption of the school environment (30). 
Mandatory punishment 
Several court decisions have dealt with the constitutionality of 
school rules which contain mandatory punishments. Most have ruled that 
punishments in school rules stated in mandatory terms are not to be taken 
literally. In Mitchell v. Board of Trustees (111), a student challenged 
a school rule which stated that any student who brings a knife or other 
weapon on school grounds "shall" be expelled. The court ruled that even 
though the rule mandated expulsion, the board had inherent authority 
to impose a lesser penalty if it desired. This view was also taken in 
Dunn V. Tyler Independent School District (30) and Fisher v. Burkbumett 
Independent School District (123). 
Summary 
The federal courts have consistently upheld the legal ^/alidity and 
enforceability of school rules when four criteria are met. School rules 
have been upheld when they have been reasonable in common sense termi­
nology and reasonably related to the purposes of education (Speake); when 
they have provided notice of the proscribed conduct (McClain, Zamora, 
Graham and Hill), have been established by custom and practice (Hasson) 
or have involved inherently improper conduct (Dunn, Rhyne, Frasca and 
Norton); when they have not been written in vague or overbroad termi­
nology (Esteban); and when they have not infringed upon the 
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constitutional rights of students (Tate and Sword), Federal courts 
give deference to the interpretation of school rules given by the school 
officials responsible for their promulgation and enforcement (Wood and 
McCluskey). 
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CHAPTER VII, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
It is the purpose of this chapter to review federal court decisions 
involving issues related to search and seizure in the public school set­
ting. This chapter begins with a discussion of decisions which have 
established student rights in the area of search and seizure; however, 
primary emphasis is given to those federal court decisions which were won 
by school officials or in which the courts have established express or 
implied parameters of student responsibilities. 
Student Rights 
The issue of search of students and lockers in the public school 
setting is one which is commonly misunderstood by public school officials. 
For this reason, an effort has been made in this chapter to review 
issues of student rights in more detail than in some of the other chap­
ters contained in this study. 
Consent 
If a student is of an age and ability level to understand the conse­
quences of his or her actions and provides school officials with informed 
consent to search the student's person, locker or possessions, no ques­
tion about the legality of the search arises. To be valid, however, con­
sent must be given freely and voluntarily. Coercion of any kind inval­
idates consent. In a decision rendered by a federal district court in 
Texas in Jones v. Latexo Independent School District (128), the court 
ruled that school officials' threats of a forced search and threats to 
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call the students' mother negated consent to be searched given by three 
siblings. 
Several federal courts have ruled that college students cannot by 
contract or rule give college officials express or implied consent to 
search their dormitory rooms (129, 130). This is especially true when 
college officials are joined by police in a search for evidence of crim­
inal activity (131). 
Neither can college officials condition attendance or privileges on 
a waiver of the right to be free from unreasonable searches (129). This 
includes the right to be free frcm unreasonable and arbitrary searches 
as a condition of entrance into a rock concert performed in a college 
facility; especially when there have been no signs posted or other 
notice given that entrance to the event is conditioned upon implied con­
sent to be searched (116). 
Reasonableness of the search 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States reads 
in relevant part as follows : 
The rights of people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, . . . 
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches, only "unreasonable" 
searches. That is an important distinction upon which most federal 
courts addressing questions involving the search of students in the 
public school setting have focused their attention. Reasonableness fits 
into the middle of a spectrum reflecting the amount of evidence needed 
136 
to justify a search. On the one end of the spectrum is "mere suspicion" 
3nd on the other is "probable cause." Suspicion is not adequate to 
justify a search and probable cause is such a high degree of certainty 
that its presence will justify the issuance of a search warrant. 
In a decision arising in New York entitled Bellnier v. Lund (132), 
a federal district court had occasion to discuss the difference. The 
facts involved a fifth-grade student who shortly after arriving at school 
one day informed the teacher that three dollars was missing from his coat 
pocket. Noting that no persons had left the room, the teacher concluded 
that the missing money was still in the room. Assisted by a student 
teacher, the teacher conducted a thorough inspection of coats hanging 
in the coatroom, books, desks, and students' pockets and shoes. When 
the money was not found, the teacher and other school officials took the 
boys and girls to their respective restrooms and ordered them to strip 
down their underclothes. The students were thoroughly searched. The 
strip search lasted about fifteen minutes and the entire search lasted 
about two hours. The missing money was not found. 
The court stated in the Bellnier decision that a search in the pub­
lic school setting does not require a showing of probable cause. All that 
is normally required to search students is the existence of facts which 
provide reasonable grounds for the search. Reasonable cause, however, 
must be particularized with respect to the individual students suspected 
of being guilty. Because there was no reason to suspect that each stu­
dent in the fifth-grade class possessed the missing money or evidence of 
its theft, the search was invalid under the Fourth Amendment. 
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A similar result occurred in M. M. v. Anker (133). In that case, 
another federal district court in New York had before it a case involv­
ing the search of a fifteen-year-old female. School officials attempted 
to justify their search on the basis that the girl was found alone in a 
classroom during a fire drill, had another student's bookbag in her 
possession, which she returned when requested by the other student, had 
a history of being in theft-suspicious situations, refused at first to 
identify herself and admitted taking posters off the classroom wall as 
presents for her sister. Nothing was known to be missing from the room. 
A school official took the girl into her office and ordered her to 
empty her bookbag. When the girl complied, the school official thought 
she saw the girl secrete something that looked like drug paraphernalia 
into her jeans. The school official contacted another school official 
and they had the student disrobed and searched. Nothing improper was 
found. 
In M. M., the court recognized that since the girl admitted taking 
the posters school officials had adequate grounds for disciplining her, 
but ruled that the information acted upon for the initial search did not 
constitute sufficient justification for a search. The court said as 
follows about the lack of evidence that something was actually missing: 
To justify searching a high school child for a possible 
stolen object, it is indispensable that there be a re­
liable report that something is missing, and not a re­
port, however reliable, that the suspected student had 
an opportunity to steal. (133, p. 839) 
On appeal, the district court decision in M. M. was affirmed (134). 
In its decision, the court of appeals for the second circuit noted in a 
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brief decision that although a search of students in schools can be based 
on less than probable cause, as the search becomes more intrusive, the 
standard required for a search changes from "reasonable cause" to 
"probable cause." The court of appeals concluded that when a school 
official conducts a highly intrusive search, such as a strip search, the 
standard of probable cause must be met. 
The issue of reasonableness of a search involving trained dogs was 
reviewed by a federal district court in Texas in Jones v. Latexo Independ­
ent School District (128). The court ruled that a dog trained to sniff 
out and detect contraband and alert its trainer to the presence of con­
traband did not provide school officials with adequate reason to justify 
a search of a student's person, locker or vehicle. The court ruled that 
the dog's sniffing was itself a search and when those subjected to sniff­
ing are mere students rather than students believed to be in possession 
of contraband, the search was illegal. The court alluded to general 
searches of the students as "fishing expeditions" and concluded that they 
were not pennitced under the Fourth Amendment. The court noted that 
reasonable cause to search must apply to a specific person or persons. 
A federal district court in Indiana ruled in Doe v. Renfrew (135) 
that the "alert" of a sniffing dog to the presence of contraband, for the 
purpose of a strip search, does not by itself create sufficient reason­
able cause to believe that a student is in possession of contraband. 
That portion of the decision was affirmed on appeal to the court of 
appeals for the seventh circuit (136) . 
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Intent of the search 
While most federal courts have used a test of reasonableness to 
determine whether a search by school officials was valid in other than 
strip search cases, they have generally done so to the exclusion of the 
higher standard of "probable cause." However, when the function of edu­
cation is entangled with that of law enforcement, the degree of evidence 
needed to legally justify a search of a student goes up markedly. 
In the decision entitled Picha v. Wielgos (137), a high school 
principal received a telephone call alleging that three students in his 
school possessed illegal drugs. Upon advice of his superintendent, he 
called the police. When the police arrived, the students were strip 
searched. No drugs were found. The court ruled that police involvement 
in the search raised the standard needed for the search from "reason­
able cause" to "probable cause." 
A similar result occurred in Piazzola v. Watkins (131) when two 
prisoners in jail successfully challenged their convictions for possession 
of marijuana. The court ruled that college authorities had the right to 
enter college dormitory rooms under their control for reasonable searches 
only so long as the search furthered the school's educational purpose. 
When a search is conducted by school officials in conjunction with law 
enforcement authorities, as was the situation in the case, probable 
cause is required for the search. That meant that the warrantless search 
involved in Piazzola was not legally justified. 
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Evidence at administrative hearings 
For many years, the only penalty imposed against law enforcement 
officers by the federal courts for an illegal search was the exclusion 
from trial of any evidence obtained. This court-imposed penalty is 
called the "exclusionary rule." Several federal courts have applied the 
exclusionary rule to evidence of student misconduct obtained through 
searches later determined to be illegal under the Fourth Amendment. 
In Smyth v. Lubbers (129), a federal district court in Michigan 
ruled that no disciplinary action could be taken against a college stu­
dent on the basis of evidence seized during an illegal search of the stu­
dent's dormitory room. College officials were ordered to provide the 
student with a new hearing which excluded the improperly obtained 
evidence or dismiss the charges. 
In a Texas district court decision in Caldwell v. Cannaday (113), a 
school board was directed by a court not to consider evidence at a stu­
dent expulsion hearing which was obtained illegally by law enforcement 
officers. The law enforcement officers had acted on a tip from an in­
formant that the students' car contained drugs, stopped the car along 
the highway and searched it. Even though the police had sufficient time 
to obtain a warrant to search the automobile, they decided against it. 
In Jones v. Latexo Independent School District (128), another Texas 
district court ruled that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal 
search involving dogs trained to sniff out contraband could not be used 
in a school disciplinary proceeding. Because school officials had no 
other evidence of violation of school rules, the suspension and other 
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penalties imposed upon the students were ruled improper. 
Liability for illegal searches 
For many years, the exclusionary rule was the only penalty imposed 
by the federal courts for illegal searches. Only recently have the courts 
considered monetary damages for searches violating the Fourth Amendment. 
It was only natural that potential liability for illegal searches also 
be extended to apply to school officials. In Pica v. Wielgos (137), 
actions of school officials were so intertwined with the actions of law 
enforcement officials that the court ruled that school officials could 
be held liable for damages if they were responsible for the illegal 
search. An identical result occurred in Potts v. Wright (138). 
In Doe V. Renfrow (135), a district court ruled that a strip search 
of a student as a result of a dog sniffing program at school violated 
the student's rights under the Fourth Amendment. On the issue of lia­
bility, however, the court ruled that the school officials acted in good 
faith with regard to the welfare of the students and were, therefore, 
immune from liability. 
On appeal to the court of appeals, the district court ruling in Doe 
was upheld, except on the issue of liability. The court of appeals left 
no doubt that it felt the girl involved had been severely wronged when it 
said as follows; 
It does not require a constitutional scholar to con­
clude that a nude search of a thirteen-year-old child is 
an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude. 
More than that; it is a violation of any known principle 
of human decency. Apart from any constitutional readings 
and rulings, simple common sense would indicate that the 
conduct of the school officials in permitting such a nude 
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search was not only unlawful but outrsgeous under "settled 
indisputable principles of law." (420 U.S. at 321 95 S. Ct. 
at 1000) 
Wood V. Strickland, supra, accords immunity to school 
officials who act in good faith and within the bounds of 
reason. We suggest as strongly as possible that the conduct 
herein described exceeded the "bounds of reason" by two and 
a half country miles. It is not enough for us to declare that 
the little girl involved was indeed deprived of her consti­
tutional and basic human rights. We must also permit her to 
seek damages from those who caused this humiliation. . . . 
(135, pp. 92-93) 
The case was remanded back to the district court for a determination of 
appropriate damages. 
Strip searches of students 
In the course of this study, five federal court decisions were dis­
covered which involved strip searches of students in the public school 
setting (132, 133, 135, 137, 138). School officials did not win any of 
the five. Clearly, the federal courts do not condone strip searches of 
students in the public school setting in situations involving anything 
less than extreme emergencies or the presence of a search warrant. 
Student Responsibilities 
Consent and other exceptions to a warrant 
As stated previously, not all searches are prohibited by the Fourth 
Amendment. If someone with the proper authority over the premises 
grants permission for a search, the search is not illegal. Differing 
factual circumstances, of course, can give rise to issues of consent, 
such as whether the person giving permission for a search had the author­
ity to do so, and whether the consent was improperly coerced. Both of 
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these issues were present in a decision of a New York federal district 
court in Overton v. Rieger (139). The decision in Overton is interest­
ing for several reasons. For one thing, the situation involved in the 
case evolved into a lengthy legal history including a New York Supreme 
Court decision which was struck down by the United States Supreme Court 
in 1968 and sent back for reconsideration (140). On reconsideration, 
the New York Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier decision that the 
search of the student was justified on the facts presented. 
The facts in the case involved a vice-principal who opened a stu­
dent's locker for police when they appeared at school with a search war­
rant. The police found drugs in the locker and began criminal prosecu­
tion of the student. Legal problems with the prosecution developed when 
it was discovered that the search warrant was invalid. 
It was the vice-principal's testimony at the trial that saved the 
day for the prosecution. He testified in the state court proceedings that 
he would have searched the student's locker on the basis of any report 
that illegal items were in the locker, whether or not the information 
was accompanied by a search warrant or whether or not the warrant was 
valid. He was obviously not coerced into opening the locker and his 
primary concern was getting contraband out of the school environment. 
The state supreme court ruled that not only did the vice-principal have 
the authority to open and inspect a locker when he believed something 
improper was contained in it, under the circumstances, he also had a duty 
to inspect the locker. 
The federal district court in Overton upheld the previous state 
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court rulings as being proper. In effect, the court affirmed the state 
court decisions which found that a high school vice-principal, given 
responsibility for supervision of student conduct and school facilities, 
could give consent for the search of a student locker. 
The right of school officials to search a locker or to give consent 
for a search is often dependent upon the expectation of privacy which 
students may have in their lockers. In the decision entitled Zamora v. 
Pomeroy (114), the court of appeals for the tenth circuit found that a 
school had diminished students' reasonable expectations of privacy through 
a written notice to them at the beginning of the school year informing 
them that the lockers remained the property of the school and were sub­
ject to search by school officials. The court ruled that the school had 
created a joint control over the lockers which negated a student's con­
tention that a school locker was the private domain of the student. 
Consent and warrants are not the only justifications for searches 
in the educational environment. Courts have developed a number of situa­
tions justifying searches in the criminal law area which may, on occasion, 
have application to the school setting. Several were applicable on the 
facts in Speake v. Grantham (55). In Speake, students involved in the 
distribution of leaflets designed to create disruption on a Mississippi 
campus denied the presence of any leaflets in their van and refused con­
sent for school officials to search the vehicle. When the van was later 
stopped by school security officers for failing to stop at a stop sign, 
several hundred of the leaflets were observed by the officers through 
the window. When the students later challenged their being disciplined 
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by school officials on the ground that evidence of the leaflets in the 
van should have been excluded from consideration, the court noted that 
the "search" of the van fit several exceptions to the requirement of a 
search warrant. The court stated that warrantless searches are permitted 
when the search is contemporaneous with a lawful arrest, including a 
traffic ticket, and when evidence of improper activity is in "plain view." 
The discipline imposed against the students was upheld. 
Reasonableness of the search 
As stated previously, the federal courts often use two criteria in 
determining the legality of school searches. The first is whether under 
the circumstances the search was reasonable. Nearly every federal court 
decision which has discussed school searches, even those lost by school 
officials, have clearly indicated that the special nature of the school 
environment requires that school officials not be held to the "probable 
cause" standard for a search but to the lesser "reasonable cause" 
standard (128, 132, 133). 
In the decision in M. v. Board of Education (141), a student in­
formant approached an assistant principal and told him that he had wit­
nessed another student involved in the exchange of what he thought to be 
drugs and that the other student appeared to possess a large sum of 
money. The named student was taken aside by the assistant principal and 
ordered to empty his pockets. The boy had marijuana in his pocket and 
was immediately suspended and later expelled for possession of a danger­
ous substance. When the boy challenged the validity of the assistant 
principal's action forcing him to empty his pockets, the court found that 
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the information provided by the student informant gave the assistant 
principal sufficient reason to conduct a search of the student. 
Information provided by student informants was also held to be 
reasonable cause to justify a search of a girl's purse in Bahr v. Jenkins 
(142). In the Bahr decision, several students involved in setting off 
a small type of legal firecracker called "party poppers" in school were 
caught by school authorities. When they implicaced another girl, 
school officials approached her and demanded that she open her purse for 
their inspection. She refused and was suspended from school for five 
days. The purse was never opened, but the lawsuit was conducted as 
though it had been. 
The court involved in the Bahr decision originally issued its de­
cision orally. As a result, much of the legal discussion often present 
in written decisions was replaced by folksy philosophy- In regard to 
searches of students for disciplinary purposes, the court said as 
follows : 
And I think the following consideration is also dictated 
by common sense and practical experience. If you have 95 calm, 
orderly kids who are willing to lea m something, and you have 
5 kids who want to entertain themselves by causing a disturb­
ance, you better do something about the 5 kids and do it quickly 
or you are going to have 100 kids who are causing a disturbance 
and nothing is going to be learned that day, 
I think in light of these considerations, it stands to 
reason that if a few kids are setting off firecrackers, throw­
ing paperwads, squirting squirt-guns, setting off stink-bombs 
and all the other things that kids would like to do in school 
rather than leam their lessons, the teachers, in order to do 
their jobs, accomplish the goals of the institution, and do 
what the taxpayers expect them to do, have to impose some swift, 
firm discipline. I don't think they can stop to obtain a war­
rant, go down to the courthouse before a neutral and detached 
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magistrate, or consult a lawyer as to whether exigent circum­
stances exist in that kind of situation—that is, a situation 
that involves a petty disciplinary problem that just has to 
be corrected and be dealt with so the school can get on with 
the business of the day. 
The teachers have to find out who has the firecrackers, 
the squirt-guns, the bean-shooters, the slingshots, the stink-
bombs, confiscate them quickly, impose some kind of appropriate 
punishment and get the situation under control before they have 
a major confrontation on their hands, and get on with trying 
to teach the kids something that day so the taxpayers can get 
their money's worth out of what they established the school for. 
If the teachers have to have a federal case made out of every 
petty disciplinary incident, the whole purpose of having any 
discipline at all and any rules of conduct would be defeated. 
(142, p. 487) 
In regard to community expectations, the court said as follows: 
Although the court does not adopt the doctrine of jji loco 
parentis across the board, as has been suggested, my own philos­
ophy is that most parents send their children to school to leam 
something, and they know they are going to have to have some 
discipline if they are going to leam something. I know my par­
ents sent me someplace where they hoped I would have some dis­
cipline. I sent my children someplace where I hoped they would 
have some discipline. I think teachers and administrators have 
a tough time trying to fulfill the responsibility that is dele­
gated to them by the parents. I think teachers and administra­
tors are essential to our society and civilization, and the fact 
that they have some disciplinary authority is absolutely essential 
to their getting the job done. If it hadn't been for the teachers 
who imposed discipline on me that I didn't like at the time, I 
don't think I would be sitting up here right now. I am the first 
to admit it. (142, p. 489) 
Several court decisions reviewing the use of dogs to sniff out con­
traband have upheld the use of the dogs to establish the necessary rea­
sonableness for a valid search. In Doe v. Renfrew (135), a dog brought 
into an Indiana classroom indicated to its trainer that a certain student 
had contraband in her possession. The girl denied any wrongdoing and a 
search of her pockets failed to yield any evidence of drugs. The girl 
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was taken into a restroom and forced to submit to a strip search. No 
drugs were found. It was later determined that the dog's signal to its 
trainer had been misinterpreted. Earlier in the day, the girl had played 
with her own dog which was in heat. 
The district court in Doe found that a trained dog's signal to its 
handler that drugs may be concealed on a student's person was sufficient 
legal reason to justify a school official's search of the girl's pockets. 
But, the court said that the dog's actions were not adequate grounds to 
justify a strip search. Strip searches were held to require the stand­
ard of probable cause sufficient to obtain a search warrant. 
In Zamora v. Pomeroy (114), a dog trained to sniff out drugs was 
used in a New Mexico school to locate contraband in student lockers. The 
dog was paraded by student lockers located in the hallway of the school. 
When the dog signaled that a locker contained contraband, the locker 
was marked. If the dog signaled that contraband was present in any one 
locker on three passes, it was opened by school officials and searched. 
The search of one locker revealed marijuana, a leather belt and 
nothing else. The student who was assigned the locker denied that the 
marijuana was his and argued that he had not personally used the locker 
for several months. The court ruled that on the basis of the dog's 
sniffing, the school officials had adequate reason to search the locker. 
In the decision in Stem v. New Baven Community Schools (143), the 
issue of reasonableness of a search centered around the use of a false 
mirror in the boys' restroom. Through the false mirror, an employee 
of the school observed a student purchase marijuana from another student. 
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The employee notified the principal who called the student into his 
office. He told the boy that if he cooperated he would not call the 
police. The boy handed the marijuana over to the principal and was sus­
pended from school for the rest of the semester. The court ruled that 
the report of the employee who had observed the drug transaction through 
the false mirror gave the principal reasonable cause to believe that 
the student had marijuana on his person and that on the basis of the re­
port, the principal was justified in requiring the boy to empty his 
pockets. 
Intent of the search 
While federal courts generally recognize the special nature of the 
school environment and generally uphold searches of students based upon 
reasonable belief that the particular student involved possessed some­
thing which violated school rules or which would have a disruptive in­
fluence on the educational environment, they also review the purpose of 
the search. Searches for educational purposes are usually upheld as 
valid. Searches for the purpose of law enforcement are usually held to 
be invalid. Whenever school officials concern themselves with seeking 
out evidence of criminal conduct rather than violations of school rules, 
or when law enforcement officers are involved in a search of students, 
the federal courts take a close look at the facts to see that the educa­
tors involved have not forgotten their proper function as educators. 
In a federal district court decision arising in Oregon entitled 
Bilbrey v. Brown (125) a group of parents challenged the legality of a 
school rule which allowed elementary-age students to be searched when 
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"probable cause" existed that a student violated a school rule. The 
court upheld the rule's validity and noted that the rule's "probable 
cause" test was a higher standard than is actually required before a 
student may be searched. The court explained that the distinction re­
sulted from special consideration given the school environment and ex­
plained the distinction as follows: 
The law recognizes that elementary school students 
have not yet achieved the maturity of adults. For this 
reason, school officials are charged not only with further­
ing the education of students but also with protecting the 
health and safety of students while they are at school. 
These responsibilities obligate school officials to control 
students' behavior and the items they are allowed to 
possess on the premises. Such objects may range from the 
relatively innocuous--a water pistol used to disrupt the 
class--to the deadly--a handgun which endangers the safety 
of others. 
The students' interest in privacy must be balanced 
against the necessity of school officials to be able to 
maintain order and discipline in the school and to fulfill 
their duties under the iji loco parentis doctrine to protect 
the health and safety of their students. To require school 
officials to obtain a warrant before ever searching a stu­
dent would unduly hamper their effectiveness in performing 
So long as a school is pursuing its legitimate inter­
est in maintaining the order, discipline, safety, super­
vision and education of students, the Fourth Amendment does 
not require that a warrant be obtained before searching a 
student. Such searches are reasonable under the first clause 
of the Fourth Amendment. (125, p. 28) 
In Bellnier v. Lund (132), a New York case in which the strip search 
of an entire class of fifth-grade students was found to be illegal, the 
court ruled that two criteria had to be met for a search to be valid. 
The court expressly stated that in order for a search of students to be 
valid, the search must include reasonable grounds to search the specific 
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students searched and the search must be in furtherance of a legiti­
mate educational purpose, such as the maintenance of discipline and pun­
ishment of misconduct. 
In the district court decision in Doe v. Renfrew (135), the court 
upheld the search of students which had been subjected to sniffing by 
a dog, but only when a strip search was not involved. There were many 
law enforcement officers present and the dogs used were owned by various 
law enforcement agencies. In upholding the validity of the search, the 
court took great care to point out that the law enforcement people in­
volved had agreed that no arrests or criminal prosecutions would result 
from the search. The court found under the circumstances that the in­
volvement of law enforcement officers did not alter the basic educational 
function of the actions of the school officials involved. 
In the factual context in Doe, the law enforcement personnel and 
their dogs were considered aides to school officials in carrying out 
their educational duty of maintaining discipline. The court made it very 
clear that its ruling would have been different had there been evidence 
of law enforcement involvement for other than educational purposes: 
In conducting the pocket search, as well as the other 
searches in question, the school officials clearly were 
not concerned with the discovery of evidence to be used in 
criminal prosecutions, but rather were concerned solely 
with the elimination of drug trafficking within the schools. 
It cannot be disputed that the school's interest in main­
taining the safety, health and education of its students 
justified its grappling with the grave, even lethal, threat 
of drug abuse. The pocket search was conducted in further­
ance of the school's legitimate interest in eliminating 
drug trafficking within the school. 
It should be noted at this point that had the role of 
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the police been different, this court's reasoning and con­
clusion may well have been different. If the search had 
been conducted for the purpose of discovering evidence to 
be used in a criminal prosecution, the school may well have 
had to satisfy a standard of probable cause to believe. 
Picha V. Wielgos. supra. Furthermore, this court is not 
here ruling whether any evidence obtained in the search 
could have been used in a criminal prosecution. This court 
is ruling that so long as a school is pursuing those legit­
imate interests which are the source of its loco parentis 
status, "maintaining the order, discipline, safety, supervi­
sion, and education of the students within the school." 
(Picha V. Wielgos, supra, 410 F. Supp. at 1221), it is the 
general rule that the Fourth Amendment allows a warrantless 
intrusion into the student's sphere of privacy, if and only 
if the school has reasonable cause to believe that the 
student has violated or is violating school policies. (135, 
p. 1024) 
In Zamora v. Fomeroy (114), a search resulting frcmi a dog sniffing 
student lockers was upheld even though law enforcement officers and mem­
bers of the district attorney's staff were present- The court noted 
that the district attorney had guaranteed school officials that his in­
volvement would not be considered to be in his official capacity and 
that no charges or arrests would result from the search. 
In M. V. Board of Education (141), the court upheld a principal's 
search of a student based on information provided by a student informant. 
The court noted that the facts involved were distinguishable from those 
in court cases involving student searches ruled invalid because of police 
involvement. InM., the court ruled that where school officials are act­
ing without the aid of law enforcement personnel, the lesser standard of 
"reasonable cause" should be applied to student searches. 
In the decision in Keene v. Rogers (144), the dismissal of a stu­
dent from the Maine Maritime Academy, a state and federally-funded quasi-
military academy, was upheld on the basis that evidence obtained through 
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a search of the student's vehicle was obtained legally. Security offi­
cers at the academy observed American flags draped in the windows of 
the student's van in the school parking lot and suggested that they be 
removed. The student removed two of the flags, but left two others-
The commandant of midshipmen directed the security officers to search 
the van for evidence of a stolen flag and desecration of an American 
flag. 
At the insistence of the security officers, the student opened his 
van. The security officers found a can of beer, marijuana and frayed 
American flags. On the basis of the evidence found in the van, the stu­
dent was determined to be in violation of the academy's rules of student 
conduct and was dismissed only a few weeks before his planned grad­
uation. 
The student challenged his dismissal from the academy on the ground 
that the search of his van violated the Fourth Amendment, The court ruled 
that the intent of the search was for the purpose of enforcing the 
school's disciplinary code and insuring proper conduct by students. The 
court noted that no outside law enforcement personnel participated in 
the search and no criminal prosecution was likely. The search of the van 
was ruled to be in the reasonable exercise of authority of the school 
officials and did not infringe upon the student's constitutional rights. 
In United States v. Coles (145), the search of the luggage of a job 
corps student in a special training program was ruled valid in a sub­
sequent criminal prosecution. The court noted that the search of the 
student's luggage by job corps officials was for the purpose of ensuring 
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a proper disciplinary atmosphere at the job corps center. Law enforce­
ment officers were not directly involved in the search. They were noti­
fied after the search revealed the presence of marijuana. 
Sniffing dogs 
In the course of this study, four federal court decisions were found 
which involved the use of dogs to sniff out contraband in the public 
schools. The results of the decisions were not in agreement. 
The decision of a district court in Texas in Jones v. Latexo Inde­
pendent School District (128) went the farthest in limiting school offi­
cials' use of dogs in searches. The court in Jones ruled that it was a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment to use dogs to sniff out contraband 
on the person of students or in students' lockers or vehicles. The 
court of appeals for the fifth circuit, in which Texas is located, has 
apparently indirectly modified the Jones decision. 
In Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District (146), the 
fifth circuit ruled that dogs sniffing inanimate objects in public 
places, such as student lockers in hallways and student vehicles in 
school parking lots, did not constitute a search in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. The fifth circuit in Horton did, however, follow 
J ones in ruling that in the absence of a specific reason to believe a 
student possessed contraband, a dog's sniffing of the students' persons 
constituted a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
The search of student lockers in a school hallway as a result of 
sniffing by dogs was also upheld in Zamora v. Pomeroy (114). It must be 
cautioned that the Zamora decision involved only the involuntary transfer 
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of a student to another attendance center. It did not involve suspension, 
expulsion or loss of grades or credits toward graduation. 
The decision of a district court in Indiana in Doe v. Renfrew (135), 
upheld by the court of appeals for the seventh circuit (136), is in 
conflict with the holdings in Jones and Horton on the issue of the use 
of dogs to search students. In Doe, the district court ruled that a 
Jog's sniffing of students for the purpose of searching pockets and 
purses did not violate the Fourth Amendment. More intrusive searches of 
the student's person, such as a strip search, however, required a more 
substantial justification than a dog's, indication to its trainer that 
contraband was present. 
Use of evidence obtained in school searches 
Obviously, evidence of violations of school rules obtained through 
valid searches can be used in disciplinary hearings (114, 141, 142, 144) 
and even in criminal prosecutions (139, 145). However, the federal 
courts are split on the issue of whether or net evidence obtained through 
an invalid or illegal search may be presented at a school disciplinary 
hearing. In Morale v. Griegel (130), the district court in New Hampshire 
ruled that a search of a college dormitory room for a stolen stereo re­
sulting in the finding of marijuana was an illegal search. The search 
was determined by the court to be for law enforcement purposes, even 
though no law enforcement personnel was present. The court reviewed vari­
ous court decisions involving the "exclusionary rule," and found that it 
did not apply to school disciplinary hearings. The court ruled even 
though evidence of drugs in the dormitory room was obtained illegally, 
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it could be used as evidence in a school disciplinary proceeding. 
Liability for illegal searches 
The federal courts are also split on the issue of liability for 
illegal searches by school officials. While several courts have ruled 
that school officials may be liable for illegal searches of students, a 
New York court ruled in Bellnier v. Lund (132) that school officials in­
volved in the strip search of an entire fifth-grade class were not 
liable for monetary damages because they were engaged in the good faith 
fulfillment of their educational responsibilities. Because the court 
found the law on student searches to be "unsettled" it did not consider 
it appropriate to hold the school officials involved liable for infringe­
ment of student rights. The court felt that liability should be imposed 
only if the school officials should reasonably have known beforehand 
that their acts would violate the constitutional rights of students. 
Summary 
The federal courts have been consistent in upholding the validity of 
searches in the public school setting when two important criteria have 
been met. The search must be based on a reasonable belief that a partic­
ular student has violated school rules or is a threat to the education 
environment and the search must be for an educational purpose and not 
for the purpose of law enforcement. Satisfactory reasons for a search 
by school officials have involved reliable informants (M. and Bahr), 
sniffing dogs (Doe and Zamora; contra., Jones and Horton), and a two-way 
mirror (Stern). Appropriate educational intent has been found when law 
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enforcement officials have not been involved in the search (Bibrey, 
Bellnier, Keene and Coles), and when they have been present only for the 
purpose of aiding the educators involved (Doe, M. and Zamora). 
The use of dogs to sniff for contraband in school has been upheld 
for the purpose of searching student lockers (Horton and Zamora ; contra., 
Jones), vehicles on school property (Horton; contra., Jones), and the 
students themselves (Doe; contra., Horton and Jones). School officials 
in control of facilities have been found to be authorized to give con­
sent for searches (Overton; contra., Piazzola, Smyth and Moral). 
Evidence obtained through valid searches of students has been used 
against students in school disciplinary proceedings (Zamora, Speake, M., 
Bahr, Stem and Keene) and in criminal proceedings (Overton and Coles). 
Even when evidence has been found in an illegal search, its use as evi­
dence has been upheld in a disciplinary proceeding (Morale; contra., 
Smyth, Caldwell and Jones). School officials involved in searches of 
students in violation of the Fourth Amendment have been held not to be 
liable for their actions (Bellnier; contra., Picha, Doe and M. M.). No 
federal courts have upheld the legality of strip searches of students in 
the absence of a search warrant (Potts, Picha, Bellnier, M. M., and Doe). 
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CHAPTER VIII. DRESS CODES 
It is the purpose of this chapter to review federal court decisions 
involving legal issues related to student dress codes established and 
enforced by public school officials. More than any other area of the 
law related to the public scLool setting contained in this study, the 
issue of student dress codes is controlled by the geographic location of 
the federal court faced with the issue. The courts of appeals in the 
first, fourth, seventh and eighth circuits have ruled that dress codes 
violate various legal righcs of students. The courts of appeals in the 
fifth, sixth, ninth and tenth circuits have ruled that dress codes are 
within the valid exercise of authority of public school officials. The 
courts of appeals for the second and Washington, D.C. Circuits have 
apparently not expressly ruled on the issue, and the Court of Appeals 
fr^r the Third Circuit has issued three different and conflicting deci­
sions on the issue (see Appendix). 
No less than nine appeals were made from circuit court decisions to 
the supreme court between 1968 and 1975 on the issue of student dress 
codes. The supreme court declined to hear all nine. The surprising and 
perplexing aspect of the denial of the appeals is that the nine decisions 
were not in agreement. Seven upheld public school authority for promul­
gating and enforcing dress codes and two favored student's rights. Nor­
mally, when two or more circuits disagree on a legal issue, the supreme 
court accepts an appeal and decides the issue. Such action resolves the 
matter nationally and restores consistency to federal court handling of 
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identical issues. 
Perhaps the supreme court was attempting to tell people that the 
issue was not worth its time. Maybe the justices were concerned that 
they could not themselves resolve the issue with any clarity. Whatever 
the reason was for denial of the appeals, the fact remains that had the 
supreme court accepted an appeal on the issue in the late 1960s, a con­
siderable amount of litigation expense and court time would have been 
saved by the issuance of a definitive decision. By mid-1974, state and 
federal court decisions involving student hair codes numbered over 150. 
The majority of those decisions were rendered by federal courts (147). 
Because the issue of dress codes is one which fairly evenly divides 
the federal court jurisdictions, this chapter will be divided into two 
relatively equal segments of student rights and student responsibilities. 
Since the courts of appeal for most circuits have ruled on the issue, 
emphasis in this review will be placed on decisions of the courts of 
appeal. 
The phrase "dress code" may be something of a misnomer in the con­
text of the decisions reviewed in this chapter. The vast majority of the 
federal court decisions found in this study deal exclusively with issues 
of facial and cranial hair. It may have been more appropriate from a 
topical standpoint to entitle the chapter "appearance code." but because 
the prevailing terminology in the decisions and the educational community 
remains "dress code," this study will yield to the weight of past usage. 
With only a few exceptions, the student dress codes considered were 
very similar. Most required boys' hair to be clean and neat, trimmed 
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around the ears and back of the neck and no longer in back than the top 
of the shirt collar. Eyebrows could not be covered and little or no 
part of the ear covered. Boys had to be clean shaven and sideburns 
were not to extend below the bottom of the ear lobe. 
Student Rights 
The courts of appeal for four circuits have, for a variety of rea­
sons and in a variety of factual circumstances, upheld allegations of 
violation of student rights resulting from the promulgation and enforce­
ment of student dress codes. The court of appeals for the first circuit 
has ruled in favor of student rights in Richards v. Thurston (148); the 
fourth circuit in Massie v. Henry (149); the seventh circuit in Breen v. 
Kahl (150); Crews v. Clones (151); Arnold v. Carpenter (152) and Hols-
apple V. Woods (153); and the eighth circuit in Bishop v. Colaw (154). 
School rationale rejected 
One of the most interesting aspects of the federal court decisions 
regarding student dress codes is the rationale which school officials 
have commonly given to federal courts in an effort to justify imposition 
of dress codes and which courts have rejected. The list is lengthy but 
informative. It tends to give insight into the differing views of sig­
nificance attached by judges and school officials to the situations. A 
list of reasons includes the following: Boys' long hair takes too long 
to dry after physical-education showers (151, 155); Long hair on boys 
presents an added safety hazard around bunsen burners in science class. 
161 
welding equipment, power shop equipment and trampolines (149, 151, 154, 
155, 156); Boys with long hair tend to be rowdy and disruptive (153, 
154, 156, 157); Boys with long hair have a poor attitude toward school 
(153, 154, 156); The local community objects to long hair on boys (154, 
156, 157); Long hair on boys makes it difficult to distinguish boys from 
girls in the supervision of restrooms and locker rooms (154, 155); Long 
hair on boys tends to polarize the boys in school into long hair versus 
short hair confrontations (154, 156, 157); Boys with long hair depart 
from the norm and distract fellow students (149, 150, 151, 156, 157); 
Boys with long hair perform lower academically (150, 153, 156, 157); 
Dress codes teach discipline (106, 150); And, schools enacting dress 
codes are acting in the place of parents (150, 156). Also interesting 
are some of the more unique reasons given to justify school dress codes, 
but which have also been rejected by courts. A partial list of those 
reasons include the following; Allowing high school students to wear 
long facial and cranial hair adds psychological pressure to emulate 
the older students to junior high students attending school in the same 
building (155); Long hair creates disadvantages with teachers who do not 
like long hair for boys (155); Long hair on boys adds to sanitation prob­
lems ;.ith swimming pool filters (154); The teacher cannot see the stu­
dent's eye motion during typing class (106); And, the rule was developed 
by a committee of students, teachers and administrators (152). 
For one reason or another, all of the above reasons given as justifi­
cation for a school dress code were rejected by federal courts holding 
that students' interest in personal grooming outweighs the state's 
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interest in controlling personal grooming. Some arguments for justifi­
cation were found not to be well-based on the facts, others were con­
sidered illogical and for others it was determined that the school's 
objective could be served by less onerous alternatives to enforcement 
of dress codes. For whatever reasons articulated by courts rejecting 
attempts to justify student dress codes in the public courts, the under­
lying view that comes from a reading of the court decisions is a doubt 
that student dress codes are really reasonable. The fourth circuit made 
the point subtly in Massie v. Henry: 
Unquestionably, the issue is current because there is abroad 
a trend for the male to dress himself more extravagantly both 
in the nature, cut and color of his clothing and the quantity 
and mode of his facial and tonsorial adornment. The shift in 
fashion has been more warmly embraced by the young, but even 
some of the members of this court, our male law clerks and 
counsel who appear before us have not been impervious to it. 
With respect to hair, this is no more than a harkening back 
to the fashion of earlier years. For example, many of the 
founding fathers, as well as General Grant and General Lee, 
wore their hair (either real or false) in a style comparable 
to that adopted by plaintiffs. Although there exists no de­
piction of Jesus Christ, either reputedly or historically accu­
rate, Ke has always been shown with hair at least the length 
of that of plaintiffs. If the validity and enforcement of 
the regulation in issue is sustained, it follows that none of 
these persons would have been permitted to attend Tuscola 
Senior High School. (149, p. 780) 
In the eighth circuit decision in Bishop v. Colaw (154), two of the 
judges impliedly raised the issue of reasonableness of such school rules. 
In his concurring opinion. Judge Aldrich made the following observations; 
A recent law review has concluded, after summarizing the 
cases, 
"What is disturbing is the inescapable feeling that 
long hair is simply not a source of significant distrac­
tion, and that school officials are often acting on the 
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basis of personal distaste amplified by an overzealous 
belief in the need for regulations." (84 Harv. L. Rev. 
1702 at 1715 (1971). The connection between long hair 
and the immemorial problems of misdirected student activ­
ism Slid negativism, whether in behavior or in learning, is 
difficult to see. No evidence has been presented that hair 
is the cause, as distinguished from a possible peripheral 
consequence, of undesirable traits, or that the school 
board, Delilah-like, can lop off these characteristics with 
the locks. Accepting as true the testimony that in St. 
Charles, Missouri, the longer the student's hair, the lower 
his grade in mathematics, it does not lead me to believe 
that shortening the one will add to the other. Indeed, the 
very fact that such evidence is offered would seem to sup­
port the periodical's conclusion. 
The area of judicial notice is circumscribed, but I 
cannot help but observe that the city employee who collects 
my rubbish has shoulder-length hair. So do a number of our 
nationally famous Boston Bruins. Barrel tossing and puck 
chasing are honorable pursuits, not to be associated with 
effeteness on the one hand, or aimlessness or indolence on 
the other. If these activities be thought not of high in­
tellectual calibre, I turn to the recent successful candi­
dates for Rhodes Scholarships from my neighboring institu­
tion. A number of these, according to their photographs, 
wear hair that outdoes even the hocky players. It is pro­
verbial that these young men are chosen not only for their 
scholastic attainments, but for their outstanding character 
and accomplishments. What particularly impresses me in their 
case is that they feel strongly enough about their chosen 
appearance to risk the displeasure or a scholarship committee 
doubtless including establishmentarians who may be expected 
to find it personally distasteful. 
It is bromidic to say that times change, but perhaps 
this is a case where a bromide is in order. (154, pp. 1077-78) 
In his concurring opinion in Bishop, Judge Lay stated his opposi­
tion to dress codes with less subtlety and expressly laid the issue at 
the doorstep of school officials. His remarks state clearly the tone 
often received through inferences and innuendos when reading other court 
decisions on the issue of student dress codes. Judge Lay wrote as 
follows : 
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The question confronting us is whether there exists any 
real educational purpose or societal interest to be 
served in the discipline the school has adopted. After 
due consideration I fail to find any rational connection 
between the health, discipline or achievement of a par­
ticular child wearing a hair style which touches his ears 
or curls around his neck, and the child who does not. 
The gamut of rationalizations for justifying this restric­
tion fails in light of reasoned analysis. When school 
authorities complain variously that such hair styles are 
inspired by a communist conspiracy, that they make boys 
look like girls, that they promote confusion as to the 
use of restrooms and that they destroy the students' 
moral fiber, then it is little wonder even moderate stu­
dents canplain of "getting up tight." In final analysis, 
I am satisfied a comprehensive school restriction on male 
student hair styles accomplishes little more than to pro­
ject the prejudices and personal distastes of certain 
adults in authority on to the impressionable young student. 
(154, p. 1078) 
Legal basis for decisions overturning dress codes 
Students and parents challenging the legality of student dress codes 
for public school students have not been at a loss for constitutional 
language alleged to support their views. At various times and frequently 
in the same case, students and parents have alleged that promulgation 
and enforcement of student dress codes violated the student's constitu­
tional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, 
Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The students and parents, however, have had a difficult time estab­
lishing the specific language of the constitution which gives them the 
relief they seek. This is reflected in the difficulty the federal courts 
have had in singling out and expressing specific constitutional language 
which establishes the right of students to dress as they deem appropriate. 
Regardless of the specific constitutional provision determined by the 
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courts to be relevant, seldom is there a lengthy legal analysis present 
in decisions and little actual difference lies among them. This is 
especially true of those decisions involving the Ninth and Fourteenth 
Amendments (158). 
The courts of appeals for the first, third and fourth circuits have 
found the Fourteenth Amendment to be the basis for protecting student 
rights in the area of student dress codes. In Richards v. Thurston (148), 
the court of appeals for the first circuit determined that the right to 
be free from intrusions into personal grooming was a substantive right 
protected by the "liberty" provision of the Due Process Clause. This 
view was expressly followed by the third circuit in the decision of 
Stull V. School Board (158). The court in the Stull decision sounded 
almost haphazard in its legal analysis of where the right to personal 
grooming was actually rooted. The court said as follows; 
We agree that the differences in the above mentioned 
conceptual approaches to the problem are in considerable 
measure semantic and that there is indeed a common theme 
in all of these cases. However, it is our view that the 
First Circuit's approach was correct; we therefore pre­
fer to follow it and hold that the governance of the 
length and style of one's hair is implicit in the liberty 
assurance of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. (158, p. 347) 
This view was also followed by the fourth circuit in Massie v. Henry 
(149). 
The court of appeals for the eighth circuit in Bishop v. Colaw (154) 
solved the problem of determining the source of the right to personal 
grooming by combining them under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court 
explained itself not too clearly with the following language: 
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Some have referred to the right as "fundamental," 
others as "substantial," others as "basic," and still 
others as simply a "right." The source of this right 
has been found within the Ninth Amendment, the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
privacy penumbra of the Bill of Rights. A close read­
ing of these cases reveals, however, that the differ­
ences in approach are more semantic than real. The 
common theme underlying decisions striking down hair­
style regulations is that the Constitution guarantees 
rights other than those specifically enumerated and 
that the right to govern one's personal appearance is 
one of those guaranteed rights. 
* * * * *  
We believe that, among those rights retained by the 
people under our constitutional form of government, is 
the freedom to govern one's personal appearance. As a 
freedom which ranks high on the spectrum of our socie­
tal values, it commands the protection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause. (154, p. 1075) 
The combining of obscure and undefined rights to wear one's hair as stu­
dents see fit and grouping them under the Fourteenth Amendment also 
occurred in the seventh circuit decisions in Breen v. Kahl (150) and 
Crews V. Clones (151). 
While no decision has apparently been rendered by the court of 
appeals for the second circuit on the issue of student dress codes, the 
federal district court in Connecticut, one of the three states in the 
second circuit, has ruled in favor of a student on the issue. The 
Connecticut court expressly held in Crossen v. Fatsi (159) that school 
boards have the legal authority to adopt a standard of personal grooming 
for students, but a lack of design in the dress code to avoid disruption 
and distraction and its failure to clearly define grooming standards 
invaded a student's right to privacy under the Ninth Amendment. 
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Several federal court decisions have indicated that student dress 
codes violate the Fourteenth Amendment provisions requiring that states 
afford their citizens "equal protection of the laws." The court of 
appeals for the fourth circuit in Massie v. Henry (149) found that stu­
dent dress codes violated the Fourteenth Amendment and "have overlapping 
equal protection clause considerations." There was no explanation given 
of what was meant. 
In a later decision in Crews v. Clones (151), the fourth circuit 
again raised the equal protection issue. The court ruled that dress 
codes justified on the grounds of safety of boys in school activities 
such as shop, gym and chemistry, which do not require girls in the same 
classes to cut their hair, violate the boys' right to equal protection 
under the law. 
The federal district court for Vermont ruled that distinguishing 
student athletes with long hair from student athletes with short hair 
and not allowing the former to participate in athletics violated the 
long-haired students' right to equal protection of the law. The deci­
sion was entitled Dunham v. Puisifer (160). 
Dress codes for student activities 
Several federal courts, faced with the legal issues of student 
dress codes in the context of student extracurricular activities, have 
found that dress codes, even in the context of activities, are not en­
forceable, The highest court to rule on the issue was the court of 
appeals for the fourth circuit. In its decision in Long v. Zopp (161), 
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the court of appeals for the fourth circuit reviewed a haircut rule im­
posed by a football coach. The coach's rule prescribed a "hair code" 
during the football season and throughout the year. The student in­
volved in the case observed the coach's rule during the football season 
but allowed his hair to grow longer than the prescribed length after the 
season ended. Because of his off-season noncompliance, the boy was 
denied an earned football letter at year's end. The coach's actions 
were later supported by higher school officials. 
The court in Long applied the fourth circuit's decision in Massie v. 
Henry (149) striking down student dress codes in the academic setting 
to all school activities. It found that any valid reason for a haircut 
rule during football season, such as cleanliness, ended when the foot­
ball season ended and determined that the boy was entitled to receive 
his letter for football. 
An earlier decision in the federal district court in Vermont went 
a little farther than the court in Long and ruled that school officials 
were not able to justify a hair-length code during the athletic season. 
In Dunham v. Pulsifer (160), the Vermont court had before it three stu­
dents who had been removed from the tennis team by the coach for viola­
tion of an athletic grooming code. There was no dress code for the gen­
eral student body or other student activities, only athletics. The 
three boys involved were ranked one, two and three on the tennis team 
and were among six of eight team members disciplined under the rule. 
The three boys were also school class and academic leaders. There had 
been no problems of discipline or adverse public reaction resulting from 
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their hair styles. 
The court overturned the athletic grooming code in Dunham on the 
basis that it violated the students' rights to equal protection. The 
court reasoned that the classification of athletes into two groups, 
those with long hair and those with short hair, and denying athletic 
participation to the former and not the latter was arbitrary, unreason­
able and unjustified. The court noted that a number of professional 
athletes wore long hair and would be unable to participate under such 
a rule. The court concluded that student rights did not end at the con­
clusion of the academic day: 
Putting the question in a rhetorical sense, what is the 
nature of the right threatened by the hair code? Before 
this unnamed right is labeled and in an effort to comb 
this problem into a neater part, it should be observed 
that the Constitution does not stop at the public school 
doors like a puppy waiting for its master, but instead 
follows the student through the corridors, into the class­
room and onto the athletic field. (160, p. 417) 
The federal district court in North Dakota, following the court of 
appeals for the eighth circuit in Bishop v. Colaw (154), ruled that a 
school grooming code prohibiting a boy from participating in athletics. 
Future Farmers of America and band was a violation of the boy's con­
stitutional rights. The court in Dostert v. Berhold Public School Dis­
trict No. 54 (162) did not accept the arguments of school officials that 
participation in athletics is a privilege, not a right, that contest 
judges in band and F.F.A. activities would give lower marks in competi­
tion to boys with long hair, that long hair interferes with vision dur­
ing athletic competition and that such rules contribute to team disci­
pline, dedication and unity. 
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Female hair case 
Special attention should be given to the case of Sims v. Colfax 
Community School District (106). It appears to be the only girl's hair­
cut case in the nation. In Sims, the court was faced with a nonsexist 
rule which required both boys and girls to keep their hair length to no 
longer than one finger width above the eyebrow. Apparently the female 
student involved in Sims preferred another hair style. She was sus­
pended from school for violation of the grooming rule. 
The court found in Sims that the student's Fourteenth Amendment 
rights were involved and the school rule, therefore, did not enjoy the 
usual presumption of constitutionality given most school rules. In 
weighing the girl's rights against the school's justification for the 
rule, the court found school officials' arguments lacking and ruled that 
the grooming code was unconstitutional. 
The court noted that the case was the nation's first student hair­
cut case involving a female and could not resist a little humor. The 
court said as follows : 
The Court well knows that the field of female coiffure 
is one of shifting sand trodden only by the most reso­
lute of men. The Court thus undertakes this journey 
with some trepidation. Since time immemorial attempts 
to impose standards of appearance upon the fairer sex 
have been fraught with peril. Arbiters of hirsute 
fashion, perhaps understanding the chameleon nature of 
the subject matter, have approached the problem with 
more innovation than insight. Against this delicate 
social milieu and ever mindful of the equal protection 
clause, this Court undertakes to comb the tangled roots 
of this hairy issue. (106, p. 486) 
171 
Second circuit decisions 
The court of appeals for the Washington, D-C. and second circuits 
appear to be the only circuit courts which have not addressed the legal 
issues of student dress codes. Court decisions within both jurisdic­
tions, however, reflect what a likely result would be. The second cir­
cuit is made up of the states of New York, Connecticut and Vermont 
and the federal district courts in those states have addressed the same 
or similar issues. 
The federal district court for Vermont ruled in Dunham v. Puisifer 
(160) that students engaged in participation in a high school tennis 
team have a constitutionally-protected right to personal grooming which 
cannot be taken away in the absence of a compelling state interest. No 
compelling state interest was found to exist in the case. It is logical 
to assume that an extension of the rationale used in Dunham would apply 
to an issue of student dress codes in the academic setting as well. 
In Crossen v. Fatsi (159), the federal district court in Connecticut 
ruled that school boards have the authority to adopt standards of per­
sonal grooming for students, but the rule must be designed to prevent 
disruption of the school environment and it must clearly define the stand­
ards by which grooming is to be judged. The court found that the fol­
lowing rule, as applied to a student with a full beard and mustache, 
was unduly vague and uncertain and left too broad a discretionary 
authority to the "arbitrary whim" of the school administrators. 
Students are to be neatly dressed and groomed, maintain­
ing standards of modesty, and good taste conducive to an 
educational atmosphere. It is expected that clothing and 
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grooming not be of an extreme style or fashion. (159, 
p. 115) 
Strange as it may seem, no New York federal court decision on the 
issue of student dress codes was found in this study. The decision in 
Harris v. Kaine (163), however, provides some guidance as to how a fed­
eral court in New York might rule on the issue. In Harris, the court 
ruled that an army reservist had a right to wear his hair in any style 
he chose. The court found that the army was unable to justify its groom­
ing restrictions. It is logical to assume that if the army could not 
justify grooming restrictions for its reservists, a school would have a 
difficult time justifying a student dress code. 
The court of appeals for the second circuit has ruled on the issue 
of dress codes but not in the public school setting. In IVen v. Barry 
(164), the court had before it a case involving a policeman's challenge 
of a municipal employer's dress code. The district court dismissed the 
policeman's lawsuit on the basis that it did not present a sufficient 
legal question for federal courts to resolve. The court of appeals re­
versed the dismissal and expressly followed the first, fourth, seventh 
and eighth circuit student dress code decisions and ruled that the con­
stitution limits the right of states to interfere with the personal 
appearance of its citizens. The court of appeals remanded the lawsuit 
to the district court for a determination of whether the police dress 
code could be justified by the municipal employer. 
It appears from the second circuit's decision in Dwen and the dis­
trict court decisions in that circuit that a student dress code issue 
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arising in that circuit would likely result in a decision against school 
officials. But, there is no certainty on the point. The court of 
appeals ruled in East Hartford Education Association v. Board of Educa­
tion (165), with all the judges of the circuit participating, that a 
public school teacher's rights were not violated by a school rule which 
required male teachers to wear a necktie to class. The judges felt that 
the teacher dress code resulted in the teachers becoming better role 
models for students and improved classroom decorum. 
Student Responsibilities 
The courts of appeal for four circuits have denied the arguments 
of students and parents that student dress codes violate the rights of 
students. The court of appeals has ruled in favor of school officials 
on the issue of dress codes in the fifth circuit in Ferrell v. Dallas 
Independent School District (166), Stevenson v. Board of Education (167), 
and Karr v. Schmidt (168); the sixth circuit in Jackson v. Dorrier (169), 
and Gfell v. Rickelman (170); the ninth circuit in King v. Saddleback 
Junior College District (171); and the tenth circuit in Freeman v. 
Flake (172). 
Fifth circuit cases 
The court of appeals for the fifth circuit was the earliest court 
of appeals to review the legal issues of student dress codes, and the one 
which has most strongly closed the issue to future litigation. The first 
decision by the fifth circuit involving student dress codes was the 
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1968 decision of Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District (166) . 
Although that decision preceded Tinker v. pes Moines Independent Com­
munity School District (1) by about ten months, it had a great influ­
ence on subsequent decisions in the fifth and other circuits. 
In Ferrell, the court was faced with a situation in which three stu­
dents were denied enrollment in a public high school because they wore 
"Beatle"-type haircuts. They alleged that as members of a musical group 
called "Sounds Unlimited," they had to maintain hair styles in common 
usage in the entertainment field. 
In district court, school officials had provided testimony which 
they alleged showed a serious disruption to the educational environment 
resulting from long hair. There were instances of a group of boys hold­
ing a boy with long hair down and cutting his hair with scissors, harass­
ment and obscene language directed toward boys with long hair, and a 
danger of fights breaking out between boys with long hair and boys with 
short hair. The district court concluded that school officials had acted 
reasonably in establishing a student dress code and in refusing to admit 
the boys to school. 
The court of appeals agreed. It found that the instances of dis­
ruption were sufficient to justify the actions of school officials in 
barring the entrance of the boys to school and that such actions did not 
unduly infringe upon the students' fourteenth amendment rights. The 
court also declined to accept the students' argument that their hair 
length was a mode of expression protected by the First Amendment. With­
out expressly ruling on the first amendment question, the court noted 
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that no rights are absolute and that the school's interest in maintain­
ing a disruption-free environment overrode any interest the students had 
in wearing long hair. 
While it would be interesting to speculate whether the result in 
Ferrell, based upon the disruption caused by long hair, would have been 
the same had it been decided after Tinker rather than before it, it is 
clear that subsequent cases in the fifth circuit were generally faithful 
to the ruling in Ferrell. There were two deviations, however. 
In Griffin v. Tatum (173), the fifth circuit had before it a situa­
tion where a district court in Alabama had not followed the Ferrell de­
cision and had struck down a student dress code. The student involved 
met the dress code requirements in every respect except that his hair 
was cut "block" style in the back rather than the required "tapered" 
cut. The court of appeals in Griffin overturned the district court's 
action in striking down the entire dress code but agreed with the dis­
trict court that it was unreasonable for school rules to distinguish 
between block and tapered hair styles. 
The second, and apparently greater, deviation from Ferrell arose in 
a district court decision in Dawson v. Hillsborough County, Florida 
School Board (157). In that decision, the district court overturned a 
student dress code as applied to two brothers. The brothers had not had 
any previous disciplinary problems and wore their long hair in a neat, 
clean fashion. The court ruled that there had been no disruptions of the 
school environment as had occurred in Ferrell and there was no reliable 
evidence to show that the hair code was necessary. On the basis of the 
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record before the district court, the fifth circuit affirmed the deci­
sion (174). 
The somewhat inconsistent decisions in the fifth circuit came to a 
conclusion with the decision in Karr v. Schmidt (168). In that case, a 
district court in Texas had ordered the enforcement of a dress code to 
cease. There had been testimony to the effect that some minor disturb­
ances had occurred as a result of long hair, but nothing serious had 
happened. 
While an appeal to the fifth circuit was pending, the fifth circuit 
ordered the district court's order stopping enforcement of the dress code 
to be temporarily set aside. That action allowed the school to con­
tinue enforcing its dress code. The student involved then appealed to 
Justice Hugo Black of the supreme court to intervene as the circuit 
justice for the fifth circuit and vacate the fifth circuit's action. 
Justice Black, in his reply, made it very clear that he did not think 
the legal issue of student dress codes was important enough for the 
federal courts to review. He wrote in part as follows: 
The only thing about it that borders on the serious to me 
is the idea that anyone should think the Federal Constitu­
tion imposes on the United States courts the burden of 
supervising the length of hair that public school students 
should wear. The records of the federal courts, including 
ours, show a heavy burden of litigation in connection with 
cases of greater importance--the kind of litigation our courts 
must be able to handle if they are to perform their respon­
sibility to our society. Moreover, our Constitution has 
sought to distribute the powers of government in this Nation 
between the United States and the States. Surely the federal 
judiciary can perform no greater service to the Nation than 
to leave the States unhampered in the performance of their 
purely local affairs. Surely few policies can be thouught of 
that States are more capable of deciding than the length of 
the hair of schoolboys. There can, of course, be honest 
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differences of opinion as to whether any government, 
state or federal, should as a matter of public policy 
regulate the length of haircuts, but it would be diffi­
cult to prove by reason, logic, or common sense that the 
federal judiciary is more competent to deal with hair 
length than are the local school authorities and state 
legislatures of all our 50 States, Perhaps if the courts 
will leave the States free to perform their own consti­
tutional duties they will at least be able successfully 
to regulate the length of hair their public school stu­
dents can wear. (175, p. 144, 91 S. Ct. at 593) 
The fifth circuit followed Justice Black's position in its decision 
in Karr, and rejected the student's arguments that his rights under the 
First, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments had been violated. 
The court ruled that because there was no legal basis upon which students 
could support a claim against dress codes, they should no longer be 
allowed to bring such claims in any of the federal courts in the circuit; 
Given the very minimal standard of judicial review to 
which these regulations are properly subject in the fed­
eral forum, we think it proper to announce a per se rule 
that such regulations are constitutionally valid. Hence­
forth, district courts need not hold an evidentiary hear­
ing in cases of this nature. Where a complaint merely 
alleges the constitutional invalidity of a high school 
hsir and groaning regulation, the district courts are 
directed to grant an immediate motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. 
(168, pp, 617-18) 
Dichotomy of case law favoring school officials 
The long line of cases in the fifth circuit, especially the first 
and last previously discussed, represent very well the dichotomy of fed­
eral court decisions upholding the promulgation and enforcement of stu­
dent dress codes. In Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District (166), 
the court of appeals determined that enforcement of a dress code did not 
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infringe upon the rights of students, because the school officials 
involved had been able to establish that disruptions to the school en­
vironment had resulted from boys wearing long hair. That was likely 
the reason the court of appeals affirmed the district court decision in 
Dawson v. Hillsborough County, Florida School Board (174), overturning 
a dress code after the district court Judge had found no disruption of 
the school environment had occurred in the case. 
The case of Karr v. Schmidt (168) was an entirely different matter. 
In that case the court said, in effect, that the issue of student dress 
codes was not one of sufficient constiutional significance with which 
the federal courts need deal. 
The courts in the other circuits upholding the legality of stu­
dent dress codes have taken one or the other approach. Either they have 
found evidence of reasonableness to justify a student dress code on the 
facts before them, or they have simply said that the issue was a matter 
for local discretion and not worth their time. 
Two decisions out of the sixth circuit fall into the former cate­
gory. In Jackson v. Dorrier (169), the district court had found several 
specific instances of disruption of school activities related to long 
hair on boys and noted that the students involved in the case had created 
problems of school discipline by deliberately flouting the well-publi-
cized school dress code. In Gfell v. Rickelman (170), the court ruled 
that a reasonable relationship between the dress code adopted by school 
authorities and the general purposes of education existed. There was 
evidence of only minor actual disturbances, but the court considered 
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them sufficient to justify a student dress code. 
In the first case on the issue of student dress code to come before 
the third circuit, the facts made it relatively easy for the court to 
follow the line of cases based on the reasonableness of actions of school 
officials. The student involved in Gere v. Stanley (176) had shoulder-
length hair and a goatee. The record showed that the educational environ­
ment ment was disrupted because other students refused to sit near the 
boy in class and the school cafeteria. They did so in class because 
his hair was dirty and in the cafeteria because he had a habit of allow­
ing his hair to fall into his food and then throwing his hair back over 
his shoulders sending food particles flying. The court ruled under the 
circumstances that the hair-length rule was justified. 
The court of appeals for the ninth, tenth and third circuits on the 
other hand have ruled that the issue of student dress codes is not one 
of sufficient substance for federal courts to review. In King v. 
Saddleback Junior College District (171), the court of appeals for the 
ninth circuit joined a case dealing with a student dress code at a junior 
college together with one dealing with a high school dress code. In 
both cases, the respective district courts had ruled that student rights 
were violated by the dress codes and ordered the schools to cease en­
forcement of the dress codes. The court of appeals reviewed the consti­
tutional issues raised by the students, found them all lacking in sub­
stance and ruled that such decisions should thereafter be left to the 
professional judgment of the educators involved. Both cases were ap­
pealed to the supreme court, but the supreme court declined to hear 
180 
the appeals. 
From the very beginning of the decision in Freeman v. Flake (172), 
the court of appeals for the tenth circuit made it clear that it did 
not feel that the issje of student dress codes was one for resolution 
by federal courts. It began its decision as follows: 
Regulation of hair styles of male students in state 
public schools is becoming a matter of major concern to fed­
eral courts if one is to judge by the ever-increasing liti­
gation on the subject or by the days of court time ex­
pended, and the lengthy briefs presented, in the cases now 
before us. We are convinced that the United States Consti­
tution and statutes do not impose on the federal courts the 
duty and responsibility of supervising the length of a stu­
dent's hair. The problem, if it exists, is one for the states 
and should be handled through state procedures. (172, p. 259) 
The court in its decision, briefly skimmed over allegations of viola­
tion of the First, Forrth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amend­
ments and noted that: 
The hodgepodge reference to many provisions of the 
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment shows un­
certainty as to the existence of any federally pro­
tected right. (172, p, 260) 
The court ordered the three cases from Utah, New Mexico and Colorado, 
which had been combined for decision, to be dismissed for failure to 
state a legal basis on which a federal court could grant relief. 
The tenth circuit has even rejected arguments of Indian parents 
that school hair-cut rules infringe upon their religious and cultural 
values. In Hatch v. Goerke (177), the court upheld a school rule which 
required a student of Indian descent to cut his hair braided in tradi­
tional Indian style. 
The court of appeals for the third circuit, with all judges 
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participating, voted four to four, with one judge concurring in part 
and dissenting in part, in Zeller v. Donegal School District (178), to 
affirm a district court decision to dismiss a complaint involving a 
high school soccer player's noncompliance with an athletic dress code as 
lacking in a legal issue which the federal courts could address. The 
court expressly followed the views expressed by the tenth circuit in 
Freeman v. Flake (172). 
Health and safety issues 
In those decisions which have upheld the legality of student dress 
codes, the courts have often taken issues of health and safety into 
their consideration of whether school officials were justified in their 
actions. This was most obvious in Gere v. Stanley (176), where students 
refused to sit by a student with dirty hair which was occasionally dipped 
in the student's cafeteria food. It was also present in cases like 
Gfell V. Rickelman (170), where school officials merely alleged safety 
problems around bunsen burners in science classes and near power machin­
ery in industrial arts classes. But, even many of the courts which have 
ruled that student dress codes are illegal have expressly or impliedly 
stated that health and safety reasons would justify limitations on stu­
dent appearance. 
In the fourth circuit decision in Massie v. Henry (149), the court 
implied limitations would be appropriate under certain circumstances 
when it said that a student can exercise a personal right to grooming, 
. .so long as he does not run afoul of considerations of safety. 
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cleanliness and decency" (149, p. 728). In Breen v. Kahl (150), the 
court of appeals for the seventh circuit, in overturning a student dress 
code, noted that the record did not suggest that the length of the hair 
involved "... constituted a health problem or a physical obstruction 
or danger to any person. ..." (150, p. 1037). The reasonable infer­
ence to be received is that elements of health, safety and decency are 
important considerations in cases involving student dress codes. 
Several courts have expressly stated that health and safety issues 
are important. In a dissenting opinion to a supreme court refusal to 
hear an appeal of a student dress code decision. Justice William Douglas 
argued that hair styles are a personal matter and should be left to in­
dividual preference. He expressly noted, however, that an epidemic of 
head lice would justify a requirement to wear hair short (179). A 
federal district court in Iowa in Turley v. Adel Community School Dis­
trict (156), noted that disruption arising out of hostile acts of stu­
dents toward students with long hair was not the type of disruption to 
the educational setting that would justify a dress code. The court 
stated that such disruptions "... must flow from the hair itself, 
namely health problems, safety problems, distraction of other students 
in their academic pursuits or actual disruption by the long haired stu­
dent himself" (156, p, 409), The federal district court in New Hampshire 
ruled in Bannister v. Paradis (180) that schools can prohibit students 
from wearing dirty and unsanitary clothing and clothing which is immod­
est or obscene. 
183 
Clothing 
Even though the title of this chapter implies that issues involv­
ing the right to wear certain types of clothing are contained within, 
very few federal court decisions were found which dealt with the appli­
cation of dress codes to wearing apparel. One of the only cases found 
which dealt directly with the issue of clothing was one decided by a 
district court in Arkansas in Wallace v. Ford (181). The students in­
volved in the case challenged several aspects of a dress code involving 
clothing and hair styles. Because Arkansas is in the eighth circuit, 
and that circuit had ruled in Bishop v. Colaw (154) that student dress 
codes were unconstitutional as applied to hair style, the haircut pro­
visions of the dress code were dealt with quickly. The various issues 
of the clothing portion of the dress code took more of the court's time 
and consideration, however. 
It was the girls' clothing portion of the dress code that was pri­
marily at issue. The dress code prohibited almost every kind of dress 
or skirt which did not hang within six inches above or below the knee, 
women's clothing not considered a dress, skirt, jeans or slacks, and 
exposed blouse bottoms which were not cut squarely on the bottom. Jeans 
and slacks were permitted for girls only if they had zippers on the side 
rather than in front. 
School officials gave two reasons as justification for enforcement 
of the girls' dress code. They stated that the dress code was intended 
to encourage self-respect and to prohibit apparel which was revealing 
or seductive. 
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One of the girls challenging the rule was discovered by school 
officials wearing jeans with a zipper in the front. When she was di­
rected to wear her blouse on the outside of her jeans to cover the zip­
per, it was discovered that her blouse bottom was rounded rather than 
straight. She was required to change blouses. 
Another student involved was not allowed to wear several pieces 
of clothing her mother made for her to wear to school. One tall girl 
was prohibited from wearing a mini-dress because it was more than six 
inches above the knee. Another could not wear a "jumpsuit" or a "nicker-
suit." None of the clothing at issue was alleged to be unclean, tight 
or immodest. 
In analyzing the situation before it, the court distinguished hair 
codes from clothing codes. It reasoned that schools had less right to 
control hair styles than clothing because hair is an integral part of 
one's body. Clothing, on the other hand, can be changed when school is 
not in session. 
In reviewing the specific provisions of the dress code, the court in 
Wallace overturned the rule's prohibitions on jumpsuits, nickersuits, 
long dresses and skirts, frayed trousers and jeans with zipper to the 
front, exposed rounded shirttails (except in shop class), and tie-dyed 
clothing. The court upheld the provisions against short skirts more than 
six inches above the knee (but suggested exceptions for tall girls) and 
excessively tight skirts or slacks. The court found that it was appro­
priate for schools to prohibit suggestive or immodest clothing in 
school -
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Another court of appeals, one which had overturned haircut rules, 
also distinguished haircut issues from clothing issues. In Richards v. 
Thurston (148), the first circuit recognized that rules governing skirt 
lengths require less justification by school officials than rules which 
require haircuts. The court's reasoning was similar to that in Wallace 
V. Ford (181), in that clothing can be changed, but requiring a haircut 
affects appearance at all times. This view was also noted in Stull v. 
School Board (158). 
In Fowler v. Williamson (99), students preparing for graduation 
exercises were told by the principal not to wear jeans to the ceremoney. 
While waiting in line in preparation for the ceremony to begin, one 
boy wearing jeans was pulled out of the line by the principal and told 
he could not participate in the ceremony. He hurried home and changed, 
but returned to school too late to participate. The boy brought suit 
alleging $500,000.00 damages for violation of his fourteenth amendment 
rights. 
In Fowler, the court found that there was no "property" or "liberty" 
right involved in participation in graduation ceremonies. Since the boy 
was therefore not deprived of any rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
he could not recover damages. 
Another decision on the issue of wearing jeans had a different re­
sult. In Bannister v. Paradis (180), the federal district court in 
New Hampshire overturned a school rule prohibiting the wearing of jeans 
to school. The court concluded that there was no disturbance, safety 
or health factor involved and school officials had been unable to 
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justify the rule. 
Third circuit cases 
The court of appeals for the third circuit has issued three deci­
sions involving the issue of student dress codes. All three conflict 
with each other in their rationale and result. 
The first decision was in Gere v. Stanley (176), where students 
refused to sit next to a boy in class and in the cafeteria because of 
his dirty hair and habits. The court ruled that the school's hair 
length rule was legally justified. A second and conflicting decision 
was rendered only four months later in Stull v. School Board (158). In 
Stull, the court distinguished Gere on the facts and ruled that student 
dress codes infringe upon student's rights. In the third, Zeller v. 
Donegal School District (178), the entire court of appeals split four to 
four with one judge concurring with part of the decision and dissenting 
with part. The four judges in the majority, with the fifth judge's con­
curring opinion, stated that they no longer felt that student dress 
codes presented a significant legal issue for federal courts to resolve 
and dismissed the lawsuit brought by the students. 
While it would appear, as a result of Zeller, that the third cir­
cuit is currently one of the circuits which would uphold the legality 
of a student dress code, that result is put into doubt as a result of 
a subsequent nonschool decision. In Syrek v. Pennsylvania Air National 
Guard (182), the court of appeals for the third circuit overturned a 
district court dismissal of a lawsuit brought by civilian employees of 
the air national guard challenging an employee dress code- The district 
187 
court had dismissed the lawsuit on the basis that the Zeller decision 
had foreclosed the issue of dress codes as a legal issue to be heard by 
federal courts in the circuit. The court of appeals in Syrek disagrred 
and said that the majority decision in Zeller actually held that govern­
ment regulation of hair length could constitute an invasion of a citi­
zen's "liberty" rights and sent the case back to the district court for 
? reconsideration of the case on the established facts. 
It does not appear that the issue is yet finally resolved in the 
third circuit. The decisions in that circuit continue to support two 
viewpoints. 
Washington, D.C. circuit 
The court of appeals for the Washington, D.C. circuit has apparently 
not ruled in any case directly involving student dress codes, "in one 
far-removed case, it did indicate that it possibly might rule against 
student rights on the issue. In a decision entitled Pagan v. National 
Cash Register Company (183), the court had before it a case involving 
alleged sex discrimination against a private employer arising out of a 
haircut rule. While the case itself revolved around federal statutes, 
the court reviewed Justice Black's ruling in Karr v. Schmidt (1975), 
noted that the supreme court had refused to hear nine appeals on the 
issue and concluded that the supreme court must not have seen any federal 
question in the issue (183, p, 1119). It can be concluded frcxn Fagan 
that future issues of student dress codes arising in the Washington, D.C. 
circuit will be resolved in favor of school officials. 
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Summary 
Unlike any other area of student rights and responsibilities con­
tained in this study, the predictability of the outcome of a lawsuit on 
student dress codes in a federal court is dependent almost exclusively 
upon the geographic location of the events. Legal issues of student 
dress codes arising in the first, fourth, seventh and eighth circuits 
will likely be resolved against school officials. Issues of student 
dress codes arising in the fifth, sixth, ninth and tenth circuits will 
likely be found in favor of school officials. Because decisions in­
volving dress codes rendered in the federal district courts have been 
decided against public officials, a decision in the second circuit would 
likely favor students- A result in the third circuit would be difficult, 
if not impossible, to predict without knowledge of the specific facts 
involved. A decision in the Washington, D.C. circuit would most likely 
favor school officials. 
Evsr» in those circuits whose decisions have generally opposed student 
dress codes, certain limited factual circumstances involving conditions 
of health, safety or distraction should result in a decision upholding a 
dress code. Also in those circuits where dress codes have not been 
favored, reasonable clothing restrictions may be easier to justify than 
haircut restrictions. 
189 
CHAPTER IX. CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 
This chapter contains a review of federal court decisions which 
have dealt with issues of corporal punishment in the public school set­
ting. Because most federal court decisions, especially those of the 
supreme court, have been favorable toward school officials, the organ­
ization of this chapter differs from that of many of the chapters con­
tained in this study. Here, because the court decisions have been so 
one-sided in favor of school officials, the chapter will begin with a 
discussion of student responsibilities and will be followed by a brief 
discussion of student rights. Federal court decisions which were ren­
dered both before and after supreme court decisions on identical legal 
issues have been excluded from this review insofar as they are con­
trolled by the rulings of the supreme court. 
Student Responsibilities 
While over a dozen federal court decisions have been found which 
discuss legal issues raised in the context of corporal punishment of 
public school students, few court decisions have favored the students 
and parents involved. Those legal issues which have been most often 
considered by the federal courts include: A student's right to be free 
from "cruel and unusual punishmentsA student's right to procedural due 
process before being administered corporal punishment; A parent's right 
to substantive due process in determining appropriate methods of punish­
ment for their children; And a student's right to substantive due 
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process. Procedural due process was discussed at length in Chapter V, 
and substantive due process was briefly discussed in Chapter V as a 
basic fairness, i.e., a right to be free from arbitrary and capricious 
action on the part of public officials. The Eighth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States has usually been applied in criminal 
law situations and states in its entirety as follows: "Excessive bail 
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, or cruel and un­
usual punishments inflicted." 
Of the four legal issues most frequently discussed in federal court 
decisions on corporal punishment, three have been resolved by the supreme 
court in favor of the school officials involved. The supreme court de­
cision in Baker v. Owen (184) resolved the issue of parents' rights to 
determine the manner of their own children's discipline. 
The facts involved in the case arose in North Carolina when Russel 
Baker, a sixth-grade student, was paddled twice on the buttocks with a 
wooden drawer divider for throwing a ball after the teacher had instructed 
the student not to do so. The drawer divider was a little longer and 
thicker than a foot-ruler. The boy testified that he felt a "stinging 
sensation" and claimed no lasting disability or injury from the paddling. 
The primary issue centered around the fact that Russel's mother had pre­
viously informed the boy's principal and teachers that she opposed 
corporal punishment on principle and directed that the boy was not to be 
corporally punished. 
When the mother and boy brought suit to challenge the teacher's act 
in paddling the boy against the mother's expressed wishes, and other 
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issues, a three-judge panel was convened in federal district court to 
consider the constitutional issues involved. On the issue of parental 
rights, the court found that rights contained in the Fourteenth Amend­
ment included the right of parents to determine the means of discipline 
of their children (78). 
The district court then weighed the parents' right to determine the 
means of discipline against the state's interest in maintaining disci­
pline in the public schools. It found that the school was furthering a 
legitimate state goal by utilizing corporal punishment as a means of 
maintaining order in the public schools and so long as the corporal 
punishment was reasonable under the circumstances, the state's interests 
outweighed the parents (78). 
The district court in Baker also ruled on the issues of violation of 
procedural due process and the Eighth Amendment, but only the issue of 
parental rights was appealed. Because the issue was heard and decided 
by a three-judge panel on constitutional issues, the appeal went directly 
to the supreme court rather than the court of appeals. 
The supreme court affirmed the district court ruling that parental 
rights to choose the manner of discipline for their children had to yield 
to the public school's interest in maintaining discipline in the schools 
(184) . It did so in a memorandum opinion which contained no written 
explanation for its reasoning. 
The issues of procedural due process and eighth amendment protec­
tion in corporal punishment situations were placed before the supreme 
court in a case originating in Florida. In that case, two junior high 
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school students in Dade County, Florida, challenged the legality of 
state statutes and school rules under which they had been corporally 
punished. They also challenged the legality of the specific acts of 
punishment imposed against them. 
One boy alleged that he was subjected to corporal punishment because 
he was slow to respond to his teacher's instructions. The boy was taken 
to the principal's office where he was to receive five blows with a 
paddle. When he refused to assume the paddling position, the principal 
called upon two adult staff members to hold the boy in a prone position 
over a desk while he administered 20 blows with the paddle. 
Upon returning home that afternoon, the boy complained to his mother 
about discomfort he felt as a result of the paddling and was taken to 
the hospital for treatment. He had suffered a bruise which required a 
prescription of cold compresses, a laxative, and sleeping and pain-kill­
ing pills. He was directed by the doctor to remain at home and rest for 
ten days. His discomfort lasted for a total of three weeks. During that 
time he visited a doctor two more times. 
The other boy involved in the lawsuit refused to submit to paddling, 
and when he resisted punishment, he was struck with the paddle on the 
arm, back and across the neck. He was paddled on a subsequent occasion, 
about three weeks later, on the buttocks and on the wrist. For the 
second paddling, the boy visited a doctor and received medication for 
discomfort which lasted about a week. 
The two boys, through their parents brought suit in federal court 
alleging that corporal punishment in the public school setting violated 
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the Eighth Amendment prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments," 
the boys' right to procedural due process before being paddled, the boys' 
substantive due process rights and the parents' right to control the man­
ner of punishment for their children. The district court dismissed 
the lawsuit. 
On appeal to the court of appeals for the fifth circuit, the court 
ruled that while corporal punishment per se does not violate eighth 
amendment or procedural due process protections, in the circumstances 
of severe punishment, both procedural due process and eighth amendment 
could be involved. The court of appeals reversed the district court and 
remanded the case back to the district court to hear the facts in the 
case and issue a decision on the merits (185). 
School officials filed a request for rehearing and the court of 
appeals agreed to rehear the matter before all the judges in the circuit 
(en banc). The judges voted by a margin of ten to five to overturn its 
previous ruling and affirm the previous district court dismissal. The 
court ruled on rehearing that the eighth amendment prohibition against 
"cruel and unusual punishments" had no application to corporal punish­
ment in the public school, and that corporal punishment does not violate 
the substantive or procedural due process rights of students in danger 
of being corporally punished (186). The issue of parental rights was no 
longer an issue because it had been resolved in Baker v. Owen (184) in 
the intervening time period. 
The United States Supreme Court agreed to accept an appeal in the 
case only on the two issues of a student's right to procedural due 
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process and the application of the Eighth Amendment to corporal punish­
ment. The issue of substantive due process was not part of the appeal. 
In its decision in the case entitled Ingraham v. Wright (187), the 
supreme court ruled that the Eighth Amendment was historically applied 
solely in the area of criminal misconduct and refused to apply it to 
corporal punishment in the public schools. On the issue of procedural 
due process, the court ruled that while students do have a "liberty" 
interest in the context of corporal punishment protected by procedural 
due process rights, that interest is adequately protected by traditional 
legal remedies and no hearing process is required. 
The procedural due process portion of the decision is difficult to 
understand in light of the discussion of procedural due process in 
Chapter V. Basically, what the court said was that because the common-
law in most states holds teachers and school administrators criminally 
and civilly liable for excessive corporal punishment, and many states 
have enacted the common-law into statutes, the common-law and statutory 
remedies available to students and parents were adequate to afford pro­
cedural due process protections to students in danger of being paddled. 
Stated another way, the court ruled that protections of potential civil 
or criminal prosecutions against teacher and school administrator abuses 
in the area of corporal punishment are sufficient protection for stu­
dents' "liberty" interests in not being unjustly paddled. The result 
is that notice of alleged misconduct and a hearing prior to the imposi­
tion of corporal punishment are not required in those states where 
corporal punishment is recognized and controlled by common-law or 
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statutory protections. 
The unusual ruling on the procedural due process issue was likely 
a result of a recognition of the interest of public school officials and 
teachers in having a swift method of punishment available as a disci­
plinary tool. The court's concern in this regard was evident in the 
following language; 
Such a universal constitutional requirement would sig­
nificantly burden the use of corporal punishment as a dis­
ciplinary measure . Hearings—even—informal hearings—re­
quire time, personnel, and a diversion of attention from 
normal school pursuits. School authorities may well choose 
to abandon corporal punishment rather than incur the burdens 
of complying with the procedural requirements. Teachers, 
properly concerned with maintaining authority in the class­
room, may well prefer to rely on other disciplinary measures 
--which they may view as less effective--rather than confront 
the possible disruption that prior notice and a hearing may 
entail. (187, pp. 680-681, 97 S. Ct. at 1417) 
Student Rights 
The supreme court in Baker v. Owen (184) and Ingraham v. Wright 
(187) resolved issues of procedural due process, parental rights to con­
trol the discipline of their children and eighth amendment protections 
in the context of corporal punishment in the public school setting in 
favor of public school officials. It has not yet spoken to the last of 
the major corporal punishment legal issues, that of substantive due 
process rights of students. While the court of appeals for the fifth 
circuit in its rehearing of Ingraham (186) ruled that students' sub­
stantive due process rights are not violated by corporal punishment, 
the issue was not expressly reviewed by the supreme court on appeal. 
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In addition to the fifth circuit in Ingraham, other federal courts in 
New Mexico in Sims v. Board of Education (188), Vermont in Gonyaw v. 
Gray (189), and Alabama in Jones v. Parmeter (190) have ruled that no 
issue of substantive due process arises in the context of corporal pun­
ishment in the public school setting. 
The court of appeals for the fourth circuit has upset the unanimity, 
however. In Hall v. Tawney (191), the court had before it a case in 
which an elementary school student and her parents alleged that the stu­
dent was paddled with a thick rubber paddle and shoved into objects 
such as desks. The student was alleged to have been hospitalized for 
ten days for treatment of her injuries and have possible permanent in­
jury to the lower back and spine. There were also allegations that the 
person responsible for the paddling acted out of malice toward the stu­
dent's family. 
The fourth circuit ruled in Hall that corporal punishment in the 
school setting does not violate the substantive due process rights of 
public school children per se, but that certain factual circumstances 
may be present in a particular situation which give rise to such a 
right. Excessive corporal punishment inflicted with malicious intent 
was ruled to be one such circumstance. The court stated its position 
as follows: 
. . . the substantive due process inquiry in school corporal 
punishment cases must be whether the force applied caused 
injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the need present, 
and was so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely 
careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted a brutal 
and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to 
the conscience. (191, p. 613) 
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While the language quoted clearly shows that the court's intent was 
to keep alive the possibility of a finding of a violation of a student's 
right to substantive due process in corporal punishment situations, it 
also clearly limited the circumstances in which such a finding can take 
place. The act has to be maliciously intended and the resulting in­
juries have to be severe in terms of the factual context. It can be in­
ferred that mere carelessness or "excess of zeal" will not result in 
violations of the students' substantive due process. 
The court in Hall had before it only an allegation of severe in­
jury resulting from malicious intent. No factual record had been made 
before the district court. The circuit court, therefore, remanded the 
case to the district court for the purpose of making a factual determina­
tion of whether the student and parents could prove their allegations of 
serious injury and malicious motivation. 
Summary 
Federal courts which have reviewed the legal issues surrounding 
corporal punishment in the public school setting have usually ruled in 
favor of school officials. The supreme court has affirmed that public 
school students may be paddled in opposition to the wishes of the stu­
dent's parents (Baker), that the eighth amendment prohibition against 
"cruel and unusual punishments" has no application to corporal punish­
ment in public schools (Ingraham), and that public school officials do 
not have to provide a due process hearing prior to the administration 
of corporal punishment if the statutes or common-law of the state 
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provide for reasonable corporal punishment (Ingraham). While one fed­
eral court has ruled that the substantive due process rights of students 
may be violated by severe corporal punishment motivated by malicious 
intent, other federal courts have not recognized a right of students 
to substantive due process in the area of corporal punishment (Sims, 
Gonyaw and Jones). 
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CHAPTER X. OTHER ISSUES 
It is the purpose of this chapter to review federal court decisions 
involving issues of student rights and responsibilities which have been 
raised by litigants and discussed by courts with less frequency than 
topics previously reviewed in this study. As with previous chapters, 
primary emphasis has been given to those federal court decisions which 
were won by school officials or in which the courts have established 
express or implied parameters of student responsibilities. 
Due to the dearth of federal court decisions on some of the legal 
issues contained in this chapter, a relatively large number of the deci­
sions reviewed involved students attending postsecondary institutions. 
While courts frequently distinguish between age levels of students re­
garding the degree of application of constitutional restraints on the 
power and authority of public school officials, the legal concepts in­
volved here are not altered significantly by differences in age and matur­
ity. The decisions involving postsecondary students reviewed in this chap­
ter contain important and relevant implications for the exercise of legal 
rights and responsibilities by public elementary and secondary students. 
Self-incrimination 
The Fifth Amendment contains a provision protecting persons from 
self-incrimination. It states in relevant part that no person "... 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
. . ." At first glance, the provision against self-incrimination 
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appears to have relevance only in criminal investigations and prosecu­
tions. That is the position that most, but not all, federal courts re­
viewing the issue of student self-incrimination have taken. 
For the purpose of this study, the issue of self-incrimination has 
been broken into two areas. The first deals with protection against 
self-incrimination during an investigation of alleged wrongdoing by stu­
dents, and the second deals with the issue of self-incrimination at 
disciplinary hearings. 
In the criminal-law area, the federal courts have made it clear that 
persons, who are suspected of committing crimes and who are under arrest 
or in custody, must be informed of their right to remain silent, the pos­
sible use of what is said at trial, and the right to have an attorney 
present. This information required by the courts in criminal situations 
is commonly referred to as the Miranda warning. The federal courts have, 
however, been reluctant to apply the investigatory aspect of self-in­
crimination to the public school setting. 
In Boynton v. Casey (83), the court reviewed a common school situ­
ation involving the interrogation of a student by a principal. The prin­
cipal had called the boy into his office to question him regarding a 
violation of a school rule prohibiting the possession of marijuana and 
the boy confessed. In later challenging his being disciplined, the stu­
dent and his parents argued that the interrogation in the principal's 
office was analogous to interrogations by police, and the boy had been 
entitled to be advised to remain silent. The court rejected the argu­
ment and said it was unable to find any legal authority which extended 
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Miranda warnings to interrogations by school officials. 
A similar result occurred in Stem v. New Haven Community Schools 
(143), In Stern, a student had been observed purchasing marijuana 
through a two-way mirror in the school. He was called into the prin­
cipal's office for questioning and advised that if he told the truth and 
turned the marijuana over to him, the school would handle the matter 
without police involvement. The boy cooperated, but another boy who sold 
him the marijuana did not, and the police were informed of the incident. 
In challenging the discipline imposed against him by school offi­
cials, the student alleged he had been denied his right to be free from 
self-incrimination. The court did not agree and said the following 
about self-incrimination in the public schools: 
To hold that the Fifth Amendment was seriously implicated 
under the facts herein, would result in an unwarranted con­
stitutionalization of nearly every activity that takes place 
in a principal's office; a situation the Supreme Court has 
long warned against. (143, p. 37) 
At least two other federal court decisions are in agreement with the re­
sult in Boynton and Stern that fifth amendment protections against self-
incrimination do not apply to investigations of student misconduct in 
the public schools (76, 114). 
Resolution of the issue of self-incrimination in the context of 
school disciplinary hearings has not been as clear, however. Only two of 
the three court decisions found in this study which have ruled on the 
issue have ruled that the fifth amendment protection against self-in­
crimination is applicable to student disciplinary hearings. 
In Gonzales v. NcEuen (67), two students declined to testify at 
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their school disciplinary hearing on charges they were involved in acts 
which led to a riot in the school. The attorney prosecuting the matter 
before the school board argued that the students' refusal to testify 
raised an inference of guilt. 
When the students challenged their being disciplined by school offi­
cials in court, school officials argued that the students' refusal to 
testify without expressly asserting fifth amendment protections amounted 
to a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. The court dis­
agreed and ruled that an inference of guilt obtained from the students' 
silence denied them their right to be free from self-incrimination. 
A similar result was reached in Caldwell v. Cannady (113). In 
Caldwell, the court held that a person cannot be denied his right to 
remain silent at a school disciplinary hearing merely because he is a 
student. Using students' silence at a school disciplinary hearing as 
evidence of guilt denied them the right to be free from self-incrimina­
tion. 
A contrary result was reached in the decision in Moral v. Grigel 
(130). The facts in Moral involved a college student who refused to 
testify during his disciplinary hearing on a charge of possession of 
marijuana. His silence was obviously a factor in the decision to expel 
him from school. 
When the student challenged his expulsion in federal court, the 
court ruled that an inference of guilt could legitimately be drawn from 
the circumstance. The court noted that such inferences are appropriate 
when they are not used in the context of alleged criminal conduct in 
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a criminal proceeding. 
Double Jeopardy 
The Fifth Amendment to the constitution also protects persons from 
double jeopardy. It reads in relevant part as follows: "... nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb, . . . ." That phrase has been interpreted to 
mean that no person can be tried twice in criminal court for allegations 
arising out of the same act. The type of conduct covered by the provi­
sion appears to be strictly criminal and has no direct application to 
administrative proceedings such as school disciplinary hearings. 
The only federal court decision found in this study on the issue of 
double jeopardy clearly made the distinction between the criminal and 
civil aspects of the fifth amendment's prohibition. In the decision 
entitled Center for Participant Education v. Marshall (120), a univer­
sity student challenged his expulsion from school for violation of a 
university president's directive. Florida state University had estab­
lished a supplemental program of courses designed to enhance its general 
academic course offerings. At the beginning of one school term, several 
of the courses became the center of controversy when an issue arose as to 
their propriety. The university president ordered that instruction in 
all the special courses be delayed temporarily pending a review of course 
outlines. The student involved in the case had been scheduled to instruct 
one of the special courses entitled "How to Make a Revolution in the 
U.S.A." He notified university officials that he was going to defy the 
president's directive and begin the course as scheduled. He was 
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personally warned by school officials not to do so, but he ignored the 
warning. 
He was later directed to appear before a preliminary hearing body 
to determine whether he had violated the president's order. He appeared, 
was found guilty and was placed on suspension. He requested and re­
ceived a full hearing before the university honor court. Before the 
honor court, the student was acquitted of the charges. The university 
staff appealed the student's acquittal to the student supreme court 
which affirmed the honor court decision. The university staff then 
appealed to the university president, the ultimate reviewing authority. 
The president found the student guilty of violating the executive order 
and suspended him from the university. 
When the student challenged his suspension in federal court, he 
alleged that his fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy had 
been violated. The court did not at all agree. The court clearly stated 
that the issue of double jeopardy applies solely to criminal prosecution 
and does not apply to civil proceedings. Because school disciplinary 
proceedings are purely civil in nature, and not criminal, the protection 
against double jeopardy is not applicable. 
Equal Protection 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the constitution provides in part that 
no state may "... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." In areas of potentially invidious discrimina­
tion, such as sex and race, the federal courts have ruled repeatedly 
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that differing treatment of students must be based on an extremely can-
pelling interest of the state in establishing different treatment. When 
the issue is not one involving an area of invidious discrimination, but 
merely discretionary decision-making, the courts are reluctant to inter­
vene. This is especially true in the area of school discipline. 
A good example is a decision entitled Center for Participant Edu­
cation v. Marshall (120). In the decision, a student challenged his 
indefinite suspension from a state university, in part, with the argu­
ment that other persons committing the same act had not been punished 
in the same manner. The facts indicated that one student violating the 
same rule had only been suspended temporarily and then allowed to re­
turn to classes and another had not been caught by school officials. 
The student challenging the disciplinary action had been on probation 
for previous violations of school rules. 
The court did not agree with the student's argument that he had 
been denied equal protection. The court reasoned that while all three 
students had committed the same offense, all three situations were not 
otherwise identical. One student had been on probation, one had no pre­
vious disciplinary problems and one had gone undetected. The court con­
cluded that the decision of the school officials was reasonable and 
fair. 
In two decisions rendered by the fifth circuit court of appeals on 
the issue of equal protection, black students alleged that discipline 
of students in their respective schools was disproportionate on the 
basis of race and therefore black students in those schools were denied 
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their right to equal protection. The students in both cases alleged 
that statistics proved that blacks were disciplined a disproportionately 
greater number of times than white students. Both decisions ruled that 
mere disproportionate discipline of one race more than another did not 
in itself establish denial of equal protection. Evidence of intent to 
discriminate also had to be shown. 
In the earliest of the two decisions. Sweet v. Childs (84"), the 
fifth circuit ruled that the black student plaintiffs had failed to show 
that suspensions imposed by school officials were arbitrarily imposed or 
that white students were disciplined less severely for similar conduct. 
The court stated that such a showing was necessary for it to find a 
denial of equal protection. The fifth circuit also declined to find a 
denial of equal protection in Tasby v. Estes (192). It noted that there 
are many legitimate nonracial reasons involved in student discipline 
that might account for a statistical showing that blacks are disciplined 
in disproportionately greater numbers than whites. The court expressly 
listed student disciplinary history, individual student needs, flagrancy 
of the offense and effect of the student's misconduct on other students 
as legitimate considerations that could be taken into account by school 
officials disciplining students for the same offense without necessarily 
denying them equal protection of the laws. 
207 
Substantive Due Process 
Substantive due process is a vague legal concept usually considered 
to be related to the "liberty" provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Because of its vagueness, it is easy to argue that it is applicable in 
many school situations. Courts are reluctant, however, to apply the 
concept unless they feel that a substantial injustice may be done if they 
do not. 
When viewed most simply in its most basic elements, substantive due 
process is a concept of fairness and reasonableness. When persons have 
been treated in an unfair or arbitrary manner by public officials, the 
federal courts, in the absence of a clearer alternative constitutional 
provision on which to base a decision, will use the concept of substan­
tive due process to justify its decision. 
Thus, if a penalty imposed under a school rule is so grossly dis­
proportionate to the offense that it has no rational basis or serves no 
legitimate school purpose, it may result in a denial of a student's 
substantive due process (193). In Cook v. Edwards (194), a district 
court in New Hampshire ruled that imposing an "indefinite expulsion" 
on a student for coming to school intoxicated, denied the girl substan­
tive due process. The court reasoned that while it would have been 
proper to suspend or expel the student for a definite period of time, an 
"indefinite expulsion" was unreasonable. The indefinite expulsion did 
not serve to inform the girl whether or when she could expect to return 
to school. 
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Several court décisions have indicated that punishing students for 
violations of school rules in the absence of substantial evidence of the 
violation would deny students substantive due process. In one case 
there was no evidence confirming a punch served at a school function as 
"intoxicating" (195), and in another there was no verification that com­
monly-found items had actually been used as drug paraphernalia (128). 
In Griffin v. Tatum (173), a circuit court, strongly supportive of school 
grooming codes, found that a school rule requiring boy's hair to be cut 
in the back in a "tapered" style rather than a "block" style was unrea­
sonable and denied students substantive due process. 
All but a few federal courts faced with substantive due process 
issues in the public school setting reviewed for this study ruled in 
favor of school officials on the issue. In Mitchell v. Board of Trustees 
(112), a rule against bringing knives and other weapons to school was 
determined not to deny a student substantive due process when he was 
expelled for violation of the rule. The court found that a reasonable 
relationship existed between the rule and maintenance of a safe educa­
tional environment. In Dillon v. Pulasky County Special School District 
(32), rules against kissing and showing affection in the school hallway 
and showing disrespect for teachers were ruled to not deny a student 
substantive due process. The situations governed by the rules had the 
potential to disrupt the school environment. Even when a school district 
took the extreme measure of temporarily suspending entire school bus 
routes as punishment for student vandalism and misbehavior on bases, the 
acts of school officials did not deny students or parents substantive 
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due process (196). 
In Petrey v. Flaugher (193), the sole issue before the court was 
whether a student was denied substantive due process when he was expelled 
for smoking marijuana on school grounds. The court ruled that smoking 
marijuana on school grounds was a grave offense, and violators could be 
subjected to harsh penalties. The court found that there was a rational 
basis between the problem of drug use on school grounds and the boy's 
expulsion from school. 
A similar result occurred in Fisher v. Burkbumett Independent 
School District (123) when a high school girl expelled for possession of 
drugs when she overdosed on drugs while at school and nearly died, chal­
lenged her expulsion, in part, on the basis that the expulsion denied 
her substantive due process. She alleged that the punishment of expul­
sion with loss of credits was so grossly severe that it was unconstitu­
tional. The court did not agree and ruled that the punishment was rea­
sonably related to the school's interest in discouraging drug abuse in 
school. 
In Debra p. v. Turlington (197), and Anderson v. Banks (198), stu­
dents challenged the legality of schools using competency tests as cri­
teria for awarding high school diplomas. Both decisions upheld the use 
of competency tests as a valid exercise of the schools' authority. Be­
cause the functional literacy tests bore a rational relationship to the 
purpose of academic improvement, they did not result in an infringement 
of students' substantive due process rights. 
When Debra P. was appealed to the circuit court of appeals for the 
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fifth circuit, the court of appeals modified the district court deci­
sion on the issue of equal protection and remanded the case back to the 
district court for a further determination of facts. The circuit court 
concluded that equal protection could be denied by the use of high school 
exit examinations which tested matters not specifically contained in the 
schools' curriculum. It ordered the district court to make a determina­
tion of whether the high school exit examination actually tested what 
was taught in the schools (199). 
Academic Standards, Evaluation and Discipline 
In probably no other area of the law reviewed in this study are the 
federal court decisions as one-sided in favor of school officials as they 
are in the area of academic issues. For the purpose of this study, fed­
eral court review of legal issues regarding academic matters are divided 
into three areas: Standards of entrance, maintenance and exit in aca­
demic programs; Evaluation of students; And procedures required for dis­
missal of students from academic programs for failure to maintain stand­
ards . 
On an issue regarding standards for entrance, a federal court in 
Doe v. New York University (200) was faced with a situation in which a 
student, who apparently met most of the qualifications for entrance into 
medical school, was considered a poor student risk by school officials 
because of her mental health history. When the prospective student 
challenged the school's denial of her enrollment, the court concluded 
that entrance qualifications should be left to educators, not the courts. 
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and dismissed the lawsuit. 
The issue of maintenance of student status in an academic program 
was reviewed by a federal court in Hubbard v. John Tyler Community Col­
lege (201). In Hubbard, the court was faced with a challenge to an 
academic requirement that prohibited continued enrollment of students 
who received a grade below "C" in courses in a nursing program. The 
court concluded that decisions regarding academic standards should be 
left to educators and found the minimum grade requirement appropriate. 
Similar results were reached in issues involving exit requirements 
frcxn academic programs in Mahavongsanan v. Hall (202) where successful 
completion of a comprehensive examination was upheld as a requirement for 
receipt of a master's degree and Morpurgo v. United States (203) where 
a comprehensive examination in a doctoral program was upheld against a 
challenge by a student who had failed ten times to successfully pass the 
examination. In Debra P. v. Turlington (197), a federal district court 
ruled that the use of a functional literacy test to determine minimum 
academic competency for high school graduation bore a rational relation­
ship to a valid state interest and was therefore constitutional. A simi­
lar result occurred in Anderson v. Banks (198) where a federal court up­
held the use of ninth-grade achievement levels as a minimum requirement 
for high school graduation. 
An interesting decision on the issue of standards of exit from an 
academic program involved the retention of twenty-one second-grade stu­
dents in one class. In Sandlin v. Johnson (204), four of twenty-one 
students in one second-grade class who were retained in second grade 
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challenged their school's use of a reading achievement level in the Ginn 
Reading Series as the basis for determination of promotion or retention. 
The students alleged that they could read as well as most students enter­
ing third grade, only that they could not read at the Ginn third-grade 
entry level. The court ruled that it was not unconstitutional to classify 
students according to their reading level and found in favor of the school 
officials involved. The court provided the following rationale for its 
decision : 
Decisions by educational authorities which turn on 
evaluation of the academic performance of a student as it 
relates to promotion are peculiarly within the expertise 
of educators and are particularly inappropriate for review 
in a judicial context. (204, p. 1029) 
Legal issues regarding evaluation of students are equally one-sided 
in result. A good example is the decision in Keys v. Sawyer (205). In 
Keys, a law student withdrew from school after receiving a failing grade 
in one class and a failing grade on a final examination in another class. 
He challenged the awarding of the two grades in court and asked the 
court to review them. The court declined to review the grades and ex­
pressed its reasoning as follows: 
The assignment of grades to a particular examination 
must be left to the discretion of the instructor. He should 
be given the unfettered opportunity to assess a student's 
performance and determine if it attains a standard of scholar­
ship required by that professor as a satisfactory grade. The 
federal judiciary should not adjudicate the soundness of a 
professor's grading system, nor make a factual determination 
of the fairness of the individual grades. ... It would be 
difficult to prove by reason, logic or common sense that the 
federal judiciary is either competent, or more competent, to 
make such an assessment. (205, p. 939) 
A similar result occurred in Caspar v. Bruton (206) where a student 
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at a vocational school challenged her removal for deficiencies from a 
practical nursing program when she had completed two-thirds of the pro­
gram. While the main issue before the court centered around the procedu­
ral due process required in such situations, the court noted that eval­
uation of students is wholly within the discretion of educators qualified 
to make such determinations and courts should intervene only when the 
student can prove "ill will" or "bad motive." 
In Ra-yman v. Alvord Independent School District (207), a student 
challenged a grade reduction of three points in an algebra class due to 
an unexcused absence in the class. At the time, the girl had the second 
highest grade-point average in her class, and her status remained un­
changed as a result of the grading penalty. Her grade-point average 
dropped from 95.478 to 95.413. 
Without discussing the legal issues involved, the district court 
ordered the girl's grade point reinstated. On review, the court of 
appeals noted that the girl's class rank remained unchanged by the pen­
alty, that her grade-point average was lowered negligibly and determined 
that the entire issue did not raise a sufficiently substantial issue 
necessary for the federal courts to intervene. The court did not elab­
orate on how much of a grade reduction or harm to a student would be nec­
essary in such situations to give rise to a federal question. 
The third academic issue, that of procedures necessary for removing 
students from programs for failure to maintain minimum academic standards, 
has largely been resolved by the United States Supreme Court in a deci­
sion entitled Board of Curators v. Horowitz (208). In Horowitz, the 
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court of appeals of the eighth circuit had broken with a long line of 
case law which held that formal hearings are not required in cases of 
academic discipline. It ruled instead that Charlotte Horowitz had her 
procedural due process rights violated when she was dismissed from medi­
cal school during her final year of study for failure to meet the in­
stitution's academic standards without the school providing her a due 
process hearing. 
The supreme court disagreed and reversed the court of appeals. The 
court noted that the administration and staff of the school had fully in­
formed the student of the school's dissatisfaction with her progress and 
deficiencies and warned her that they posed a threat to her continued 
enrollment and timely graduation- The final decision to dismiss the 
student had been made with care and deliberation. The supreme court ruled 
that those procedures were all that were required for academic discipline 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The supreme court drew a clear distinc­
tion between school discipline for failure to meet academic standards 
and student violation of valid rules of conduct. It explained its reluc­
tance to intrude in the former area as follows; 
Academic evaluations of a student, in contrast to 
disciplinary determination, bear little resemblance to 
the judicial and administrative fact-finding proceedings 
to which we have traditionally attached a full-hearing 
requirement. . . . The decision to dismiss respondent, 
. . . rested on the academic judgment of school officials 
that she did not have the necessary clinical ability to 
perform adequately as a medical doctor and was making in­
sufficient progress toward that goal. Such a judgment is 
by its nature more subjective and evaluative than the 
typical factual questions presented in the average dis­
ciplinary decision. Like the decision of an individual 
professor as to the proper grade for a student in his 
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course, the determination whether to dismiss a student for 
academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative 
information and is not readily adapted to the procedural 
tools of judicial or administrative decision making. 
(208, pp. 89-90, 98 S. Ct. at 955) 
The decision in Horowitz was expressly followed in Aubachon v. 
Olsen (209). In Aubachon. the court reviewed a situation where a stu­
dent was dropped frcan a student-teaching program due to serious defici­
encies. His deficiencies were discussed with him on several occasions 
and the final decision to dismiss him was deliberative. The court ruled 
that on the basis of the existence of the due process as outlined in 
Horowitz, a school's decision to dismiss a student for academic reasons 
should not be disturbed by the courts. 
While the due process required for academic discipline in the vast 
majority of situations is minimal, there may be some unusual circumstance 
which gives rise to more. In the decision entitled Greenhill v. Bailey 
(210), the court of appeals for the eighth circuit was faced with the 
dismissal of a medical student at the University of Iowa for academic 
reasons. What compounded the problem for school officials was the fact 
that the institution completed a form indicating that the student was 
changing his status at the school and sent it to a national medical 
school organization. On the form, a school official indicated that the 
student was dismissed from school on the basis of poor academic standing 
due to "[l]ack of intellectual ability or insufficient preparation." 
The court in Greenhill noted that references on the form to the 
student's intellectual ability and preparation would have a serious im­
pact on his ability to gain entrance to other medical schools. The 
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court concluded that the remarks made on the form created a stigma which 
deprived the student of his liberty interest in pursuing a career in the 
medical profession. The court ruled that although a full trial-type-
hearing procedure was not required, the school should have at least pro­
vided him a type of hearing where he could personally appear to contest 
the allegations against him. It is unlikely that the unusual circum­
stances present in Greenhill will occur with regularity and the decision 
rendered in Horowitz will be applicable in most circumstances (209). 
Summary 
The federal courts have reviewed a number of legal issues related 
to student discipline and control on a less frequent basis than other 
issues discussed in this study. Like the more frequently reviewed 
issues, the federal courts have often resolved the competing issues in 
favor of school officials. 
Federal courts have determined that students do not have constitu­
tional protection against self-incrimination in investigations of viola­
tions of school rules (Boynton and Stem), or in school disciplinary 
hearings (Moral; contra., Gonzales and Caldwell), They have also deter­
mined that the legal issue of double jeopardy does not apply to student 
discipline (Center for Participant Education). The federal courts have 
frequently determined that students being disciplined have not been 
denied equal protection of the laws (Center for Participant Education, 
Sweet and Tasby), or their right to substantive due process (Mitchell, 
Dillon, Petrey and Fisher; contra., Cook and Griffin). 
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In academic issues presented before the federal courts, decisions 
have regularly favored school officials. This includes issues of 
standards of entrance into academic programs (Doe), maintenance in aca­
demic programs (Hubbard) and exit from academic programs (Mahavongsanan, 
Morpurgo, Debra P., Anderson and Sandlin"». Decisions on evaluation 
issues are equally one-sided in favor of school officials (Keys, Caspar 
and Rayman). Procedural due process required by the federal courts in 
instances of academic discipline are minimal (Horowitz and Aubachon). 
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CHAPTER XI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Need for the Study 
After the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Tinker 
V. Pes Moines Independent Community School District (1), a considerable 
amount of attention was given by the news media and professional publi­
cations to issues of students' rights. Little attention was given, 
however, to court decisions won by school officials. This one-sided 
publicity resulted in a litigation paranoia among educators and some edu­
cators began to yield to student demands under threat of lawsuit, re­
gardless of the reality of their legal position. 
This study was intended, therefore, to provide a review of reported 
federal court decisions issued subsequent to the Tinker decision, with 
special emphasis placed upon decisions lost by students and parents, and 
decisions which contained expressed or inferential parameters of student 
legal responsibility so that school officials might become better ac­
quainted with the true status of student legal rights and responsibili­
ties. It was intended to reinforce educator fortitude against unreason­
able demands of students on student rights issues by providing them with 
the knowledge that school officials frequently win lawsuits brought 
against them by students and parents. 
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Statement of the Problem 
The federal courts have been turned to by students and parents to 
establish principles of student rights with increasing frequenty. Stu­
dent and parent victories have been given considerable press and media 
coverage and are familiar to many educators. Less attention has been 
devoted to court decisions lost by students and parents. The problem 
was, therefore, to determine the real extent to which decisions of the 
federal courts issued and reported from February, 1969, through 1982, 
have developed or delineated express or inferential parameters of student 
legal responsibility. 
Procedures and Techniques Used in the Study 
The research conducted in this study almost exclusively utilized 
primary source data. These data consisted of federal court decisions 
contained in the National Reporter System. The National Reporter System 
is published by west Publishing Company and contains ccciplete reported 
decisions from all federal courts with jurisdiction in the United States. 
The appropriateness of court decisions to be reviewed was established 
through use of commonly-accepted legal research sources, law reviews and 
journals and journals and publications of the education profession. 
Limitations 
The court decisions reviewed and analyzed in this study were those 
issued by the federal courts between February, 1969, and January, 1983, 
which involved public elementary, secondary and postsecondary students 
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and other court decisions whose principles were related to issues of 
student responsiblities. 
Summary 
A brief summary of the findings of this study will follow in the 
order in which they have previously been presented. Each subtopic of 
the summary represents the findings of each chapter- As was true of the 
chapters, the summary contains an emphasis on results of findings in 
court decisions which have been favorable to school officials. 
The Tinker decision 
The United States Supreme Court decision in Tinker is often remem­
bered for establishing the concept of student rights to engage in expres­
sive conduct which is free from control of school officials in the public 
school setting. But, it should be remembered that the decision in Tinker 
also established an implied responsibility on students exercising their 
rights not to infringe upon the rights of other persons. At the point 
that student exercise of constitutionally-protected rights creates a 
material and substantial disruption of the school environment, the stu­
dents involved have exceeded their protected rights and have violated 
their responsibility not to infringe upon the rights of others. School 
officials may hold students accountable for such acts. 
Speech and expression 
Federal court decisions rendered subsequent to the Tinker decision 
have aided in the delineation of the parameters of student responsibili­
ties in the area of student speech and expression. Those court decisions 
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rendered since Tinker have aided in a determination of the limits of 
"material and substantial disruption" which must occur or be reasonably 
predicted before students engaged in constitutionally-protected rights 
can be held accountable for their actions. Those decisions have shown 
that the standard of "material and substantial disruption" in the school 
setting is considerably less than what might be expected outside of the 
school setting. The courts' recognition of the special nature of the 
school environment means that students wishing to exercise constitu­
tional rights have a responsibility to do so in a more limited fashion 
than they do outside the school environment. 
Student press and distributions 
The federal courts judiciously guard student rights to publish and 
distribute their own ideas and words. This is especially true when schools 
seek to impose restraints on student publications prior to distribution. 
The federal courts have, however, not been as reluctant to uphold 
discipline of students for their actions after the distribution has 
occurred. Students can be held responsible by school officials for 
materials published and distributed by them which infringe upon the 
rights of other persons in the school community. 
Procedural due process 
Even though some minimal aspects of procedural due process have been 
required by the federal courts, a review of federal court decisions indi­
cate a significant number of federal court decisions which establish 
that student rights in the area of procedural due process are not 
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unlimited. Many issues involving procedural due process have been re­
solved by the federal courts in favor of school officials. 
Even when students are denied procedural due process, federal court 
decisions indicate that subsequent hearings, including appropriate pro­
cedural due process, can cure the defects of the earlier hearing. In 
the event that procedural due process defects are not cured, the federal 
courts have determined that damages for mere violation of procedural due 
process rights by school officials will result in only nominal damages. 
Validity of school rules 
A primary legal responsibility of students is to obey valid school 
rules. The validity of school rules is generally upheld when the rule is 
reasonable, gives notice of the proscribed conduct, is not stated in 
vague terminology and does not unduly infringe upon constitutionally-
protected rights. Interpretations of school rules made by school offi­
cials responsible for their promulgation and enforcement are given defer­
ence by the federal courts. 
Search and seizure 
The federal courts have consistently upheld the validity of searches 
in the public school setting when two criteria are met. The search must 
be based on reasonable belief in the context of the underlying facts and 
the search must be for an educational rather than a law enforcement pur­
pose. Strip searches of students must be accompanied by a greater cer­
tainty that a school rule has been violated than mere supposition that 
reasonable cause exists. 
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Dress codes 
The predictability of the outcome of a lawsuit on student dress 
codes in federal courts is determined almost exclusively by the juris­
dictional location of the events. The federal courts which have ruled 
on the issue are split nearly evenly as to whether student dress codes 
are generally enforceable. 
Corporal punishment 
Federal court decisions on legal issues arising in the context of 
corporal punishment in the public school setting have been generally re­
solved in favor of school officials. The United States Supreme Court has 
ruled that parents must yield to school officials on the advisability 
of administration of corporal punishment, the constitutional prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment is not applicable to corporal pun­
ishment of students and due process hearings are not required prior to 
the administration of corporal punishment in those states where the admin­
istration of corporal punishment is governed by statute or common-law. 
Other issues 
Numerous legal issues related to discipline of students such as 
self-incrimination, double jeopardy, equal protection and substantive 
due process have been reviewed by the federal courts but on a less fre­
quent basis than other issues discussed at length in this study. The 
federal courts have frequently resolved those issues in favor of school 
officials. 
Lawsuits in the area of academic issues have been resolved in favor 
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of school officials on a regular basis. Positions taken by school offi­
cials have been generally upheld on issues of academic standards, evalua­
tion and due process required in academic discipline. 
Conclusions 
It was the purpose of this study to review reported federal court 
decisions on student rights and responsibilities rendered between the 
issuance of the Tinker decision and the end of 1982 in an effort to de­
termine express and inferential delineations of legal responsibilities 
of students. As a result of this study, it has been determined conclu­
sively that federal court decisions have delineated express and infer­
ential legal responsibilities of public school students. Some of those 
legal responsibilities have been clearly and frequently stated by the 
courts. Others have been stated with less clarity and less frequency 
and still others find the federal courts in disagreement. 
While the direction and emphasis of this study has focused 
upon those court decisions which were lost by students or which estab­
lished express and inferential parameters of student legal responsi­
bilities, two things cannot be overemphasized. First, and foremost, 
students attending the nations' public schools do have clearly estab­
lished legal rights protected and secured by the constitution. It was 
not the purpose of this study to diminish recognition of that fact. It 
was the purpose of this study to provide a better balance of knowledge 
and awareness between student rights and student responsibilities. 
The second important thing to remember is that the decisions 
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reviewed in this study were decided in the context of specific facts be­
fore the court, apparent applicable principles of law, specific court 
jurisdiction in which they were decided, and subtle distinctions not 
appearing in the record or decisions. Discussion of the decisions in­
cluded in this study has been general and not detailed. It is therefore 
of the utmost importance that no one attempt to substitute in any 
specific factual context the information contained in this study for 
advice from competent legal counsel. The purpose of this study was 
merely to provide information, not give legal advice. 
Keeping those two important points in mind, it is possible to re­
view the legal responsibilities of students as delineated by the federal 
courts. A list of relatively clear and frequently stated elements of 
student legal responsibilities follows: 
1. Students have a responsibility not to infringe upon the rights 
of other persons to a school environment conducive to academic 
pursuits. This is true even when they are exercising their 
own constitutional rights (e.g., 1, 18, 19, 20, 23, 27, 28, 29, 
32, 76, 110). 
2. Students have a responsibilitiy, even when engaged in the ex­
ercise of their rights, not to engage in violence and serious 
disruption of the educational environment (e.g., 1, 11, 16, 17, 
18, 23, 30, 31, 53, 55). 
3. Students have a responsibility not to engage in conduct which 
can reasonably be predicted to result in material and substan­
tial disruption of the school environment (e.g., 1, 20, 21, 24, 
26, 42, 51, 53, 55, 56). 
4. School officials are not required to wait for actual disruption 
to occur before taking action when material and substantial dis­
ruption is reasonably predicted (e.g., 20, 21, 24, 26, 51, 53). 
5. Students have a responsibility, even when engaging in the exer­
cise of speech and expression, to attend classes and refrain 
from encouraging others to skip classes (e.g., 23, 27, 28, 29, 
30, 63). 
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6. Students have a responsibility, even when engaged in constitu­
tionally-protected activities, to refrain from the use of vulgar, 
profane and obscene words, and making libelous or slanderous 
statements about other persons (e.g., 33, 38, 46, 54). 
7. Students have a responsibility, even when engaging in actions 
involving speech, press and expression, to refrain from engag­
ing in acts of disrespect and insubordination (e.g., 16, 20, 23, 
32, 33, 59, 60, 61, 89). 
8. School officials may place reasonable restrictions on the time, 
place and manner of student distribution of printed materials 
(e.g., 42, 45, 46, 47, 49). 
9. School officials may hold students accountable, after the fact, 
for distribution of materials which disrupt the school environ­
ment, are reasonably predicted to disrupt the school environ­
ment, contain profanity, vulgarity and obscenity or are a 
threat to student health and safety (e.g., 46, 49, 53, 54, 55, 
57, 58). 
10. School officials are not required in most situations of minor 
discipline, such as suspension from school for ten days or less, 
to allow students the presence of an attorney, the calling of 
witnesses or the cross-examination of witnesses (e.g., 64, 72, 
82) .  
11. School officials are not required to provide students charged 
with misconduct a hearing prior to removal from school when the 
students' continued presence in school comprises a serious and 
immediate threat to the school environment (e.g., 64, 84). 
12. School officials, in the absence of actual bias or prejudice, 
may sit as an impartial decision-maker at school disciplinary 
proceedings (e.g., 67, 79, 86, 88, 92, 93). 
13. School officials involved in disciplinary proceedings involving 
long-term suspensions and expulsions are not required to: 
a. Provide notice of charges with the same degree of speci­
ficity required in a criminal proceeding (e.g., 70, 87). 
b. Provide as specific a notice of charges when the facts 
are not contested as when they are contested (e.g., 85, 
87). 
c. Provide legal counsel or pay attorney fees for students 
(e.g., 66, 91), 
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14. School officials may, in most circumstances, cure defects in 
procedural due process by providing a subsequent hearing which 
provides appropriate procedural due process (e.g., 59, 69, 80, 
90, 101). 
15. School officials, who inadvertently deny students procedural due 
process when the facts are such that the holding of a proper 
hearing would not have resulted in a different decision, will 
be required to pay only nominal damages not to exceed one 
dollar (e.g., 32, 102, 104), 
16. Students have a responsibility to obey valid school rules. 
School rules are valid if they are reasonably related to the 
purposes of education (e.g., 32, 89, 109, 111, 113, 117), pro­
vide adequate notice of the proscribed conduct (e.g., 20, 55, 
61, 85, 114), are not written in vague or overbroad terminology 
(e.g., 18, 57, 81, 124), and do not infringe upon students' 
constitutionally-protected rights (e.g., 31, 58, 114, 125). 
17. School officials are presumed to have correctly interpreted 
their own rules (e.g., 126, 127). 
18. School officials' searches of students, except strip searches, 
are valid when the search is based upon reasonable grounds for 
the search (e.g., 141, 142, 143), and the search is for an edu­
cational purpose (e.g., 114, 125, 132, 135, 141, 144, 145). 
19. School officials may use, in disciplinary proceedings, evidence 
of student misconduct obtained in valid searches of students, 
student lockers and student possessions (e.g., 55, 114, 141, 
142, 143, 144). 
20. School officials may promulgate and enforce student dress codes 
which are genuinely based on reasons of health, safety or dis­
ruption of the school environment (e.g., 149, 150, 156, 170, 
176, 179, 180, 181). 
21. School officials may administer reasonable corporal punishment 
to students, even against the expressed wishes of their parents 
(e.g., 184, 187). 
22. School officials are not required to provide students with a 
procedural due process hearing prior to the administration of 
corporal punishment when the state's common-law or statutes 
govern the administration of corporal punishment (e.g., 187). 
23. School officials investigating student misconduct are not con­
trolled by the constitutional protection against self-incrimina­
tion (e.g., 76, 83, 114, 143). 
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24. School officials do not violate the equal protection rights of 
students merely because students found guilty of similar 
offenses are not disciplined identically (e.g., 84, 120, 192). 
25. School officials may establish and enforce reasonable academic 
standards for entrance, maintenance and exit in academic pro­
grams (e.g., 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204). 
26. School officials removing students from academic programs are 
required only to inform students of deficiencies in their aca­
demic performance in order for them to have an opportunity to 
remediate the problem and to make a deliberative final decision 
in the matter (e.g., 208, 209). 
A list of student legal responsibilities which are less clear than 
those listed above or which have been discussed less frequently by the 
federal courts follows : 
1. Students have a responsibility not to engage in out-of-school 
conduct which has a significant negative effect on school opera­
tion and management (e.g.. 34). 
2. Students have a responsibility not to engage in conduct which 
will predictably result in psychological injury to others 
(e.g., 34). 
3. School officials may make determinations of curriculum content 
so long as they do not attempt to censure ideas or perspectives 
(e.g., 37). 
4. School officials involved in disciplinary proceedings involving 
long-term suspension and expulsion are not required to: 
a. Provide hearings which are open to the public (e.g., 
66,  88) .  
b. Provide an opportunity to question the decision-maker 
regarding the decision-maker's objectivity (e.g., 94). 
c. Provide students with a list of potential witnesses and 
a summary of their testimony (e.g., 66, 68, 87). 
d. Provide an opportunity for lay representation rather than 
legal representation (e.g., 62). 
e. Provide an opportunity to compel attendance of witnesses 
(e.g., 66, 90). 
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f. Provide an opportunity to confront and cross-examine a 
student witness when retaliation against the student 
witness is likely (e.g., 32, 73, 77). 
g. Provide evidence of charges beyond a reasonable doubt 
(e.g., 66). 
h. Provide for a unanimous decision by a multimember deci­
sion-making body (e.g., 66, 90). 
5. School officials disciplining students are not constrained by 
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy (e.g., 
120).  
6. School officials may establish and evaluate attainment of stand­
ards of student academic performance (e.g., 205, 206). 
A list of student legal responsibilities which have been expressly 
or inferentially raised in federal court decisions, but for which con­
flicting federal court decisions were also found follows: 
1. School officials may require prior submission for review of stu­
dent publications, for a determination of obscenity, libel and 
potential disruption of school activities (e.g., 40, 46, 47, 
48, 49, 50; contra., 44, 45). 
2. School officials involved with long-term suspension and expul­
sion hearings are not required to; 
a. Provide a more specifically detailed notice of charges 
against the student when the context of the charges pro­
vides such notice (e.g., 88, 89; contra., 63, 67, 68, 
69), 
b. Provide an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses (e.g., 
70, 85, 87, 91; contra., 32, 63, 67). 
c. Provide a written decision including a finding of facts 
(e.g., 66, 86: contra.. 63, 73). 
d. Provide the opportunity to make a verbatim record of the 
proceeding (e.g., 82, 88; contra., 63). 
3. School officials are not required to provide procedural due 
process for denial of participation in athletic competition 
(e.g., 95, 96, 97, 98; contra., 81, 100). 
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4. School officials' use of sniffing dogs can create sufficient 
reason to search students (e.g., 125; contra., 128, 146). 
5. School officials use of sniffing dogs can create sufficient 
reason to search lockers and vehicles (e.g., 114, 146; contra., 
128).  
6. School officials may use in disciplinary hearings evidence of 
student misconduct obtained in illegal searches of students, 
student lockers and student possessions (e.g., 130; contra., 
113, 128, 129). 
7. School officials in some circuit court jurisdictions may promul­
gate and enforce student dress codes (e.g., 168, 169, 171, 172; 
contra., 148, 149, 150, 154). 
8. School officials administering corporal punishment do not vio­
late substantive due process rights of students (e.g., 185, 188, 
189, 190; contra., 191). 
9. School officials can require students to testify in disciplinary 
hearings and refusal of students to testify can give rise to an 
inference of guilt (e.g., 130; contra., 67, 113). 
10. School officials enforcing reasonable school rules in a reason­
able manner do not violate the substantive due process rights 
of students (e.g., 32, 112, 123, 193; contra., 173, 194). 
After reviewing the three lists of elements of student responsibility 
found above, little doubt should remain that there are many aspects of 
student conduct and discipline over which the power and authority of pub­
lic school officials have not been greatly diminished as a result of fed­
eral court decisions. It is likely that a similar review of state appel­
late court decisions would result in a similar conclusion. While it would 
be difficult and time consuming to locate and review the hundreds of state 
court decisions in the area of student rights and student responsibili­
ties, it would be feasible to review the appellate court decisions of the 
most populous states, such as California and New York, or perhaps several 
states in a particular geographic region. Such an effort could result 
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in a verification of the findings contained in this study and could have 
positive results in strengthening the fortitude of public school offi­
cials in facing their responsibility to maintain an appropriate acadcmic 
environment. 
1 .  
2 ,  
3, 
4, 
5, 
6 
7 
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APPENDIX 
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28 U.S.C. Sec. 4l was amended to provide for 12 circuit courts of applealsty 
P.L. 96-452 on October 14, I98O. 
The Twelve Federal Judicial Circuits 
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